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ABSTRACT. A central challenge in the modem regulatory state is rationalizing and
coordinating multiple, overlapping, and interdependent public and private enforcement
mechanisms. To that end, recent years have seen mounting calls to vest administrative agencies
with litigation "gatekeeper" authority across a range of regulatory areas, from environmental
protection and civil rights to antitrust and securities. Agencies, it is said, can use their expertise
and synoptic perspective to weigh costs and benefits and determine whether private rights of
action should lie at all. Alternatively, agencies might be given the power to evaluate lawsuits on a
case-by-case basis, blocking bad cases, aiding good ones, and otherwise husbanding available
private enforcement capacity in ways that conserve scarce public resources for other uses. Yet
despite the proliferation of such calls, there exists strikingly little theory or evidence on how
agency gatekeeper authority either should or would work in practice. This Article aims to fill that
gap by offering a systematic account of this often-invoked but under-theorized role for agencies.
Drawing on theories of agency behavior and empirical analysis of the gatekeeper regimes
currently in existence, this Article sketches the case for and against vesting agencies with
litigation gatekeeper authority across a range of regulatory contexts and elaborates some
functional design principles that policymakers can use to weigh competing models or determine
whether agency gatekeeping makes sense at all. There are other payoffs as well. Anatomizing
agency gatekeeping allows us to reimagine the agency role in some of our most consequential
regulatory regimes, among them a system of job discrimination regulation that seems especially
ripe for revision following the Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes. More broadly,
this Article makes a novel contribution to the otherwise oceanic literature on "litigation reforms"
and reorients scholarly debate around optimal regulatory design and the contours and purposes
of the administrative state itself by exploring the increasingly blurred boundary between
administration and litigation.
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AGENCIES AS LITIGATION GATEKEEPERS
INTRODUCTION
One of the most controversial developments in the American regulatory
state in recent decades is a marked shift away from administrative regulation
and enforcement and toward the use of private lawsuits as a regulatory tool.'
Champions of that trend assert that deputizing "private attorneys general" to
enforce legal mandates is desirable and even necessary: private enforcement
leverages private information, expertise, and resources while serving to check
"capture" of public enforcement agencies by regulated parties.! Critics, by
contrast, cast private enforcement as overzealous, uncoordinated, and
democratically unaccountable.' Across a range of regulatory contexts, from
environmental protection and civil rights to antitrust and securities, the
resulting institutional design challenge is how to leverage private
enforcement's virtues while mitigating its vices. More broadly, how can we
rationalize overlapping and interdependent public and private enforcement
mechanisms?
In recent years, a growing chorus of commentators has offered an
intriguing answer: vest administrative agencies with the power to oversee and
manage private litigation efforts. Agencies, it is said, can use their expertise and
synoptic perspective to weigh costs and benefits and determine whether private
rights of action should lie at all.' Alternatively, agencies might be given the
1. See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAwsUITS IN
THE U.S. 60 (2010) (noting the rise of "private enforcement regimes" as a regulatory
mechanism beginning in the late 1960s); see also THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAwsUITS,
AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 11 (2002) (same);
John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintifs Attorney: The Implications ofEconomic Theory
for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 669,
669 (1986) ("American law relies upon private litigants to enforce substantive provisions of
law that in other legal systems are left largely to the discretion of public enforcement
agencies.").
2. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
3. See infra Section I.B.
4. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding
the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REv. 93, 95 (2005) (arguing for greater agency
authority "to create and delimit private rights of action"); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Agency
Authority to Define the Scope ofPrivate Rights ofAction, 48 ADMIN. L. REv. 1 (1996) (advancing
the same argument); see also Brian D. Galle, Can Federal Agencies Authorize Private Suits
Under Section 1983?: A Theoretical Approach, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 163, 165 (2003) (advancing
the same argument in the civil rights context); Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private
Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 HARV. L.
REv. 961 (1994) (advancing the same argument in the context of securities litigation);
James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the Securities Laws, ioo CALIF.
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power to evaluate private lawsuits on a case-by-case basis, blocking bad cases,
aiding good ones, and otherwise husbanding private enforcement capacity in
ways that conserve scarce public enforcement resources for other uses.s While
the specific institutional designs vary, these proposals share a common aim:
regulating private litigation efforts by granting agencies what I call litigation
"gatekeeper" authority. 6
L. REV. 115, 174-75 (2012) (same); Brianne J. Gorod, Case Comment, The Sorcerer's
Apprentice: Sandoval, Chevron, and Agency Power to Define Private Rights ofAction, 113 YALE
L.J. 939, 944-46 (2004) (advancing the same argument in the civil rights context).
5. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV.
1487 (1996) (applying this theory to securities enforcement); Pamela H. Bucy, Private
Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 52-53, 72 (2002) (applying this theory to environmental
protection and false claims); Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the
Plaintiff 6o LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167 (1997) (applying this theory to environmental
protection and securities); Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation:
Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 1oo COLUM. L. REV. 1384 (2000)
(applying this theory to civil rights claims); Park, supra note 4, at 175 (discussing this theory
in the context of securities litigation); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68
ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 941 (2001) (applying this theory to antitrust); Geoffrey Christopher
Rapp, False Claims, Not Securities Fraud: Towards Corporate Governance by Whistleblowers, 15
NExus: CHAPMAN's J.L. & POL'Y 55 (2009) (applying this theory to securities); Amanda M.
Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and
Private Enforcement ofRule ioB-5, io8 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (20o8) (same); Heidi Mandanis
Schooner, Private Enforcement ofSystemic Risk Regulation, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 993, 1012-13
(2010) (same); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax, 61 TAx LAW. 357
(2008) (applying this theory to tax); Jennifer Arlen, Public Versus Private Enforcement of
Securities Fraud 46 (2007) (unpublished manuscript), http://weblaw.usc.edu/assets/docs
/Arlen.pdf (applying this theory to securities enforcement).
6. In addition to the specific gatekeeper calls referenced in notes 4-5 supra, commentators have
made myriad other calls for a more expansive agency role in litigation regimes. See, e.g.,
RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 220-22 (2007) (framing
mass tort settlements as a form of "governance" and proposing an agency-led negotiated-
rulemaking mechanism for achieving such settlements); Tamar Frankel, Let the Securities
and Exchange Commission Outsource Enforcement by Litigation: A Proposal, 11 J. Bus. & SEC. L.
111, 119-20 (2010) (proposing an auction/license model for coordinating public and private
enforcement); C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and
Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (2009) (arguing for a
more assertive agency role to remedy the informational "aggregation deficit" in a regulatory
regime built around private enforcement); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Plaintifs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 115 (1991) (advancing an "auction"
approach); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Public Enforcement of Law, in CRIMINAL
LAw AND ECONOMICS 1, 55 (N. Garoupa ed., 2009) (asking whether the state should
"regulate private litigation so as to better coordinate it with public enforcement"); David
Rosenberg & James P. Sullivan, Coordinating Private Class Action and Public Agency
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Yet despite such calls, we lack a synthetic account of how agencies should or
would exercise litigation gatekeeper powers and, by extension, how best to
structure such authority.! This is surprising. A number of federal and state
agencies already wield gatekeeper powers, offering critical but mostly untapped
opportunities for empirical assessment.8 Calls to grant agencies gatekeeper
powers also raise significant but underexplored questions about whether
agencies can or will deploy such powers in ways that serve rather than
undermine the public good. Agencies may simply lack the capacity to
accurately gauge case merits, or they may privilege pursuit of political rewards
over welfare-maximizing regulation of private enforcement efforts. The latter
possibility is especially concerning. Given that private enforcement is designed
at least in part to counter possible agency capture, bringing agencies back into
the picture risks returning the fox to the henhouse. Addressing these and other
concerns is essential to any clear-eyed assessment of an expanded agency
gatekeeper role. We cannot evaluate competing institutional designs-or,
indeed, whether agencies should be given litigation gatekeeper authority at
all-without doing so. And yet, existing scholarship offers strikingly little
theory or evidence that might serve as a guide.
This Article aims to fill that gap by providing a systematic account of this
under-theorized role for administrative agencies in the modern American
regulatory state. My most basic aim is to develop a vocabulary for describing
the many flavors of agency gatekeeping and, drawing on theory and empirical
analysis of the agency gatekeeper regimes already in existence, to elaborate a set
of functional design principles that policymakers working across a range of
regulatory contexts can use to weigh competing approaches or assess whether
granting gatekeeper authority makes sense at all. In so doing, I hope to place
mounting calls to vest agencies with gatekeeper powers on a sounder
analytic footing.
Anatomizing agency gatekeeping is also freeing. Armed with a better
understanding of how gatekeeper authority could and would work, we can
reimagine some of our most consequential regulatory regimes while recasting
debate over some others in a fuller and more clarifying light. Thus, this Article
provides a theoretical and empirical baseline against which to evaluate
recurrent, but largely unanalyzed, calls to vest the Securities and Exchange
7. The closest to a synthetic treatment can be found in Stephenson, supra note 4. However,
Stephenson's insightful work focuses on what I label "wholesale" agency gatekeeping, see
infra Subsection II.A.2, and then turns to mostly doctrinal concerns.
8. See infra Section II.A (categorizing existing gatekeeper designs at the federal and state
levels).
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Commission (SEC) with gatekeeper power over securities class actions.9 It also
offers insights into what to do about job discrimination regulation, where the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Wal-Mart Stores. v. Dukeso has, by limiting
the availability of class actions, rendered the regime's already dysfunctional
mix of private enforcement and limited public oversight especially ripe for
revision." A final example is federal agency preemption of state-law causes of
action, or "regulatory preemption." This growing practice has prompted
several recent Supreme Court cases, as well as substantial scholarly
commentary focused on the pros and cons of exclusively administrative
regulation on the one hand and unbridled private enforcement on the other."
A systematic accounting of agency gatekeeping helps us to see these two
choices not as either/or options, but rather the outer poles of a rich continuum
of institutional designs that tap agencies' unique position and capacity to
engage with and rationalize private litigation efforts."
Beyond illuminating these more concrete issues of regulatory design, my
account stands at the intersection of three broader scholarly literatures and
makes a contribution to each. First, this Article contributes to the decades-long
search for ways to heel litigation's excesses by bringing agency oversight
mechanisms more squarely onto the menu of available litigation reforms. An
oceanic literature identifies and evaluates a wide array of mechanisms for
rationalizing litigation, from the usual suite of tort reforms (e.g., damages
9. See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 4; Rose, supra note 5.
10. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
n. See infra Part IV (offering a case study in how to apply the gatekeeper idea to job
discrimination regulation).
n. See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 480 (20o8) (examining "common law liability versus safety
regulation" as the main institutional design dimension in the regulatory preemption
debate). For an overview of regulatory preemption law and policy, see generally THOMAS 0.
McGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR: WHEN FEDERAL BUREAucRAcIES TRUMP LOCAL JURIES
(2008). For recent Supreme Court decisions, see Brueswitz v. Wyeth, 131 S. Ct. 1o68 (2011);
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008); and Geier
v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 881 (2000). For an older debate about the "regulatory
compliance" defense in tort law that takes a similarly binary agency-or-courts tack, compare
Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1985), which advocates ex ante administrative regulation as the
primary and even exclusive approach to regulating certain risks, with Clayton P. Gillette &
James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027 (1990), which advocates an
ex post court- and litigation-centered approach to regulating those same risks.
13. For a study pushing past analysis of regulatory preemption as a stark institutional choice,
see Peter H. Schuck, FDA Preemption of State Tort Law in Drug Regulation: Finding the Sweet
Spot, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 73 (2008).
123: 616 2013
AGENCIES AS LITIGATION GATEKEEPERS
caps) to heightened pleading and liability standards, reverse fee shifts, and
other options.' My analysis adds a new and often overlooked approach to this
standard line-up of options and shows that, in many ways, agency gatekeeping
is a more promising reform avenue.
Second, this Article aims to reorient a long and venerable literature on the
choice between public and private enforcement of law."s That literature, much
of it coming out of the law and economics tradition, has generated a stream of
valuable insights. But it has also grown increasingly divorced from regulatory
reality. Indeed, many of our most consequential regulatory regimes have
evolved in recent decades into hybrids of public and private enforcement in
which multiple enforcers -including federal and state administrative agencies,
private litigants, and state attorneys general - operate and interact within
complex ecologies of enforcement." The institutional design challenge in this
new regulatory landscape is not choosing between public and private
enforcement. Rather, it is how to coordinate multiple, overlapping, and
interdependent enforcement mechanisms. This Article thus joins the ranks of
legal scholarship that has moved away from a binary conception of the choice
between public and private enforcement and is instead exploring their
intersections.
14. See infra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
is. Classic contributions include Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement,
Malfeasance and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974); William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1975); and A.
Mitchell Polinsky, Private Versus Public Enforcement of Fines, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105, 120-21
(1980).
i6. For further discussion, see infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
17. A number of legal scholars have remarked on the evolution of multienforcer regimes and
begun to explore the legal and political forces that have fueled their rise. For a sampling, see
BuIUcE, supra note i; FARHANG, supra note 1; Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions:
Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass
Litigation, 34 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 1 (2000); Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes
Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARv. L. REv. 486 (2012)
[hereinafter Lemos, Aggregate Litigation]; Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal
Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 698 (2011) [hereinafter Lemos, State Enforcement]; Reza Rajabiun,
Private Enforcement and Judicial Discretion in the Evolution ofAntitrust in the United States, 8 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 187 (2012); and Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to
Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173 (2010).
18. See sources cited supra notes 4, 17. For an elegant argument challenging conventional
distinctions between public and private enforcement, see Margaret H. Lemos & Max
Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. REv. (forthcoming 2014). For rare
efforts to construct formal models of public-private enforcer interactions, see Ben Depoorter
& Jef De Mot, Whistle Blowing: An Economic Analysis of the False Claims Act, 14 SUP. CT.
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Finally, and relatedly, this analysis joins a growing scholarly literature that
aims to re-think the contours and work of the administrative state by training
attention on the increasingly blurred boundary between administration and
litigation. As the American regulatory state has shifted away from pure
administrative enforcement and toward private litigation as a regulatory tool,
an increasing portion of agency action has come to operate in the shadow of
private enforcement efforts or otherwise involve a subtle public-private
coordinating role." Other tectonic shifts in the regulatory landscape have
likewise moved agencies to take on new roles and develop novel regulatory
tools. Thus, the "ossification" of rulemaking has moved agencies to use serial
litigation rather than onerous rulemaking procedures to achieve regulatory
ends - a trend critics have dubbed "regulation by litigation."2 o Similarly,
judicial constriction of class actions and punitive damages helps explain the
rising use of so-called agency restitution actions, in which agencies litigate and
secure large monetary judgments against regulatory targets and then distribute
the proceeds to private individuals or entities who have suffered harm.' Just as
an earlier generation of administrative law scholars surfaced critically
important trends in the privatization of administrative authority,' this Article
attempts to bring the administration-litigation nexus more fully into our
conception of what the administrative state is and does.
The remainder of this Article proceeds in four parts. Part I frames the
problem agency gatekeeping purports to solve. It first situates private
enforcement's rise in a broader legal, political, and policy context, and then
reduces the vast debate about its merits and demerits to three core concerns: (i)
ECON. REV. 135, 145-51 (2006); and R. Preston McAfee et al., Private v. Public Antitrust
Enforcement:A Strategic Analysis, 92J. PUB. ECON. 1863, 1866-68 (2oo8).
1g. For research exploring how the EEOC has worked with outside litigants to achieve
regulatory goals, see Robert C. Lieberman, Private Power and American Bureaucracy: The
EEOC and Civil Rights Enforcement (Mar. 18, 2005) (American Political Development
Colloquium, Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia), http://webi
.millercenter.org/apd/colloquia/pdf/col_200s0318_lieberman.pdf
2o. See, e.g., REGULATION BY LITIGATION (Andrew P. Morriss et al. eds., 2009); W. Kip Viscusi,
Overview, in REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION 1 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002).
21. See Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 5oo, 542-43 (2011); see also
Lemos & Minzner, supra note 18 (manuscript at 8) (noting the "growing recognition that
public enforcement often serves a function traditionally associated with private litigation:
compensating victims").
22. See, e.g., PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY PRIVATIZATION OF
GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT
(2007); GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Jody
Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance,
75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000).
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zealousness; (ii) coordination; and (iii) legislative fidelity. It closes by
surveying existing litigation reform approaches, particularly ex ante legislative
fixes along the "tort reform" model, and exposing their inherent limitations in
addressing each of these core concerns.
Parts II and III, the Article's analytic core, consider the case for and against
vesting agencies with litigation gatekeeper authority as an alternative to the
usual litigation reforms. Part II offers a typology of litigation gatekeeper
powers by characterizing existing and proposed gatekeeper designs along
multiple dimensions. This is key prefatory work, as one cannot evaluate any
particular gatekeeper approach without first surveying the landscape of
design options.
Part III then elaborates the basic case for and against agency gatekeeping.
Section III.A begins by sketching a number of discrete gatekeeper tasks that,
taken together, constitute an ideal model of how well designed agency
gatekeeper authority could curb private enforcement's excesses while at the
same time alleviating problems of private underenforcement of socially valuable
claims. Section III.B then uses a mix of theoretical and empirical insights
drawn from the public bureaucracy literature and elsewhere to show how
agencies vested with litigation gatekeeper powers are likely to deviate from that
ideal. Along the way, I find much to recommend in agency gatekeeping. Well
designed gatekeeper structures can mitigate many of the zealousness,
coordination, and legislative fidelity concerns at the core of critiques of private
litigation as a regulatory tool. And they add unique value in this regard,
countering many of private enforcement's pathologies in ways that standard
"litigation reforms" cannot. Yet I also uncover some underappreciated
challenges in the design of gatekeeper structures, including, among others, the
difficulty of inducing politically sensitive agencies to make optimal use of
their power to terminate private enforcement efforts and of countering agency
capture concerns without distorting other aspects of the agency's gatekeeper
decision-making. Section III.C concludes the analysis by taking a comparative
analytic tack: assuming that vesting agencies with litigation gatekeeper
authority is desirable, how can policymakers choose among competing
designs?
Lastly, Part IV concretizes the collected insights from the first three Parts
by asking, albeit briefly, how gatekeeping might be usefully applied in
rethinking one of the most maligned regimes in the modern American
regulatory state: job discrimination regulation under Title VII and cognate
federal antidiscrimination statutes. In particular, I propose a radical overhaul of
the role of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) by
rendering its gatekeeper powers both more and less expansive than at present,
dismantling the EEOC's current system of charge processing but granting the
agency substantial new gatekeeper power over class actions and other
625
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"systemic" private lawsuits. My analysis thus offers a focused and empirically
grounded illustration of how agency gatekeeping, while hardly a panacea, can
add unique value in rationalizing and optimizing litigation regimes.
I. THE TROUBLE WITH PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT AND THE
CHALLENGE OF REGULATORY DESIGN
Any evaluation of agency litigation gatekeeper authority must begin by
defining the problem - or set of problems - such authority is designed to solve.
To be sure, this is well tilled ground: a vast scholarly literature maps the choice
between public and private enforcement of legal mandates and the merits and
demerits of private enforcement in particular. Rarely, however, has a full
treatment of the resulting institutional dynamics appeared in one place. Nor
have scholars fully assimilated the insights of political science, economics, and
more traditional legal scholarship in ways that attend to both the political-
institutional origins of private enforcement's relatively recent rise and the
actual, on-the-ground design challenges facing regulatory architects.' The
trouble with private enforcement, it turns out, is often invoked yet surprisingly
underspecified.
This Part seeks to remedy these shortcomings and paves the way for the
assessment of agency gatekeeping to come by: (i) describing the relatively
recent rise of private enforcement, particularly as a means of enforcing
statutory law; (ii) surveying the regulatory design challenges that attend the
use of private litigation as a regulatory tool; and (iii) exposing the limits of
common "litigation reforms" designed to mitigate private enforcement's
principal pathologies. Along the way, I sketch a broader and critically
important point. The optimal structure of law enforcement cannot be
determined by answering first-order questions about whether private
enforcement is systematically more or less socially efficient than public
enforcement. Nor, for that matter, is social efficiency the sole or even primary
concern. Rather, private enforcement poses a mix of zealousness, coordination,
and democratic accountability challenges that are only imperfectly subject to ex
ante legislative fixes. Thus, as I take up in subsequent Parts, deployment of
private enforcement as a regulatory tool presents a set of micro-level delegation
23. Partial exceptions include J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement
Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1137 (2012); Samuel Issacharoff,
Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375 (2007); Reza Rajabiun, Private Enforcement
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problems - problems that administrative agencies vested with gatekeeper
powers may be ideally positioned to solve.
A. The Rise of the "Litigation State"
Litigation seems perennially under attack. 4 Yet the rise of private
enforcement as a regulatory tool - particularly as a way to enforce statutory
law-is a relatively recent phenomenon. Throughout much of the twentieth
century, both before and after the New Deal, the archetypal enforcer,
particularly in American public law, was a centralized bureaucratic apparatus."
Then something dramatic happened: across a range of regulatory areas,
private enforcement took off. As Figure i reflects, government enforcement of
federal statutes mostly outstripped private enforcement efforts between 1942
and the mid-195os. Since the early 1960s, however, private enforcement efforts
have come to dwarf government-initiated ones. 6 In 2011 alone, federal courts
saw more than 40,000 new filings asserting claims under federal laws
governing securities, antitrust, and job discrimination as well as the Fair Labor
Standards Act, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO)
Act, the False Claims Act (FCA), the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act, and
Section 1983. In 1960, by contrast, private enforcement in most of these areas
was either virtually or entirely unknown.'
z4. See generally BURKE, supra note 1 (examining American policies that encourage litigation as a
method of dispute resolution, and the ensuing backlash against litigation).
25. As just one example, state-level job discrimination regulation prior to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964-one of several present-day regulatory regimes most closely identified
with private, court-centered enforcement-was an administrative regime in which agencies
conducted investigations, held hearings, and issued injunctive orders. See David Freeman
Engstrom, The Lost Origins of American Fair Employment Law: Regulatory Choice and the
Making ofModern Civil Rights, 1943-1972, 63 STAN. L. REv. 1071, 1073-74, 1081-82 (2011).
26. Figure i's data come from ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD
STATISTICS tbl.C-2 (2012) ("U.S. District Courts-Civil Cases Commenced, by Basis of
Jurisdiction and Nature of Suit") for each year, excluding deportation and prisoner petition
cases. Thanks to Sean Farhang for sharing data up to 2005.
27. Id.
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Figure 1.
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To be sure, these statistics paint a stylized portrait of current regulatory
realities. For instance, the trend from public to private enforcement has not
always proceeded in straight-line fashion.2 Nor do Figure i's trendlines take
account of purely administrative (i.e., "in-house") agency enforcement actions
and adjudications;29 litigation in state courts, where tort cases are concentrated
28. For example, federal antitrust regulation began in the late nineteenth century as a private
enforcement regime with broad interpretive authority firmly lodged in federal courts. See
Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation
Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405,461-69 (20o8).
29. There are no reliable estimates of trends in agency adjudications in recent decades, at least in
part because of the sprawling nature of the federal administrative state. However, it seems
likely that total in-house enforcement actions have increased. As just one set of data points,
the number of enforcement actions ("administrative penalty order complaints") brought by
the EPA increased by roughly two thirds between 1991 and 20i1. See National Enforcement




- - - U.S. Plaintiff Statutory
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and filing-trend debates have been most heated;3o or differences across
litigation types-e.g., big-ticket "structural reform" litigation or large-scale
class actions as against smaller-bore lawsuits -despite their very different
impact." And simple filing rates tell us little about why private enforcement has
grown as a regulatory choice - a question that has attracted substantial
academic commentary but admits of few determinate answers.3
Most important for present purposes, bare filing statistics gloss over a
critical part of the story: private enforcement has seen some of its most rapid
growth in areas like securities, antitrust, and job discrimination, where public
actors already possess substantial regulatory and enforcement authority. The
result is a many-layered and distinctively American regulatory approach in
which multiple public and private parties - including federal and state
administrative agencies, private litigants, and state attorneys general -operate
and interact within complex ecologies of enforcement." The primary
institutional design challenge in this pluralistic regulatory landscape is not
choosing among enforcement modes or deciding which should be given
primary or exclusive domain. Rather, it is optimal coordination of multiple,
overlapping, and interdependent enforcement mechanisms -of which private
enforcement is often the most important.
30. Compare WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA
UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991) (claiming a marked shift in the quantity and character of
litigation in the post-war period), with Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are
the "Litigation Explosion," "Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Clichis Eroding Our Day in Court
and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 985-95 (2003) (noting an intense
debate around claims about a "litigation explosion" but reviewing evidence that such claims
are exaggerated); NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS,
2001: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 26 (Brian J. Ostrom,
Neal B. Kauder & Robert C. LaFountain eds., 2001), http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf
/ewscol-npcsp.pdf (examining statistics derived from multiple states and concluding that
overall tort filings were stable from 1985 to 20oo and actually declined from 1991 to 2000).
31. See Viscusi, supra note 20, at i (noting that not all lawsuits are the same in scale and impact).
32. Scholarly explanations for private enforcement's growth as a regulatory tool variously point
to American political culture; increasingly dense legislative and regulatory mandates; the
rise of rent-seeking plaintiffs' lawyers and public interest groups distrustful of bureaucracy;
a legislative desire to shift regulatory costs from public/on-budget to private/off-budget
sources; and legislative efforts to end-run an uncooperative executive branch during divided
government. See generally Sean Farhang, Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the
American Separation ofPowers System, 52 AM. J. POL. ScI. 821, 823-28 (2008) (reviewing the
debate and collecting signal contributions to the literature).
33. See supra note 17.
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B. Refining the Critique ofPrivate Enforcement
Is private enforcement's rise a good or a bad thing? An avalanche of
scholarly work stakes out the poles of a rich debate. Private enforcement, we
are told, taps private information, expertise, and resources.3 It also operates,
the argument continues, as a "failsafe" mode of enforcement when public
agencies facing resource or political constraints are unable or unwilling to
enforce." But there are costs. Critics cast private enforcement as overzealous,
uncoordinated, and democratically unaccountable. A full understanding of
the contours of each of these concerns is essential to any effort to gauge the
merits and demerits of giving agencies an expansive litigation oversight role.
1. The Zealousness Critique
The zealousness critique of private enforcement takes many forms, but
most versions proceed from a stylized comparison of profit-motivated private
enforcers and idealized public enforcers. In theory, at least, public enforcement
is a more efficient means of achieving optimal deterrence of undesirable
conduct.3 1 Public enforcers can exercise prosecutorial discretion, enforcing only
where the social cost of doing so (e.g., transaction costs, including costs
imposed on affected communities and judicial resources) is less than the social
benefit (e.g., the value of deterred misconduct). In contrast, a private enforcer
will litigate whenever her expected return exceeds her expected cost, even
34. See generally Glover, supra note 23, at 1145-60 (discussing the rise and functions of private
enforcement); Stephenson, supra note 4, at 107-13 (reviewing the advantages of private
enforcement).
3s. See FARHANG, supra note 1, at 20 ("Lawsuits provide a form of auto-pilot enforcement that
will be difficult for bureaucrats or future legislative coalitions to subvert . . . ."); John C.
Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty
Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REv. 215, 227 (1983) (arguing that private enforcement
"performs an important failsafe function by ensuring that legal norms are not wholly
dependent on the current attitudes of public enforcers"); Richard B. Stewart, Crisis in Tort
Law? The Institutional Perspective, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 184, 198 (1987) (noting that private
enforcement "frees individuals from total dependence on collective bureaucratic remedies,"
and "provides a back-up guarantee of redress").
36. See Stephenson, supra note 4, at 114-20 (reviewing the disadvantages of private
enforcement).
37. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. EcoN. 169, 200
(1968) (offering the classic account of optimal deterrence in which sanctions are set equal to
the net social cost of undesirable conduct divided by the probability of successful
prosecution, such that a wrongdoer internalizes the full social cost of her action).
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where the social cost of litigating outstrips all benefits." Worse, private
enforcers may in fact exploit litigation costs, filing in terrorem lawsuits-or, in
the securities context, "strike" suits-that use the threat of massive discovery
costs to extract settlements in cases where the social cost of adjudication would
exceed any benefit, or even where culpability is entirely absent." The result,
the theory goes, is systematic overexpenditure of social resources and costly
overdeterrence. 40
As a first-order generalization, there is much truth here. In other ways,
however, the standard zealousness critique substantially overstates the case or
simply misses key dimensions of the problem. Most significant is the failure to
acknowledge the complex ways in which the socially optimal choice of enforcer
will turn not just on the public and private propensity to enforce but also on
the relative cost of competing enforcement modes.41 On one hand, private
enforcement might be more costly: relative to decentralized private enforcement
efforts, centralized public enforcement enjoys economies of scale, fewer
38. See Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to
Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575 (1997); see also Wendy Naysnerski & Tom
Tietenberg, Private Enforcement of Federal Environmental Law, 68 LAND ECON. 28, 47 (1992)
("Private litigation priorities are established on the basis of private costs and benefits, not
social costs and benefits.").
39. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlement in Securities Class
Actions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 497 (1991) (describing the problem of "strike" suits in securities
regulation); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD.
437 (1988) (offering a general theory of litigation costs and settlement behavior).
40. Another standard claim made on public enforcement's behalf is that public enforcers can
economize on enforcement costs by imposing maximally high sanctions on relatively few
violators and exercising discretionary nonenforcement as to the rest, thus achieving desired
deterrence at the least possible cost. By contrast, upping the payouts available to private
enforcers in an effort to economize on enforcement costs induces ever greater private
investment in enforcement as profit-motivated private enforcers pour resources into
litigation efforts. See Becker & Stigler, supra note 15, at 13-16; Landes & Posner, supra note
15, at 9. As with other parts of the zealousness critique of private enforcement, this critique
is true as far as it goes. But two problems limit its force. First, it is not always true that
maximal sanctions are socially efficient, thus narrowing public enforcement's advantage. See
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and
Magnitude ofFines, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 88o (1979) (complicating the analysis by noting that
maximal sanctions promote efficiency only where regulatory targets are risk neutral).
Second, and more important, there are real-world political and legal constraints on the
assessment of maximal damages. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007)
(holding that excessive damages multipliers violated the Due Process Clause); Mats Persson
& Claes-Henric Siven, The Becker Paradox and Type I Versus Type II Errors in the Economics of
Crime, 48 INT'L ECON. REV. 211 (2007) (noting political constraints on imposing large
sanctions).
41. See Polinsky, supra note 15, at 120.
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wasteful redundancies, and more efficient information processing across
cases." But in many regulatory areas, the opposite is far more likely true:
private enforcement is vastly cheaper than public, either because of greater
organizational dexterity, or because private enforcers can tap individuals,
particularly organizational "insiders," to ferret out hidden information about
misconduct."3 This is a powerful point. In regulatory regimes where
information about wrongdoing remains hidden -and so is prohibitively costly
for public enforcers to discover or dislodge- there will be little or no
enforcement at all unless private parties can be induced to surface information
about wrongdoing." To that extent, even overzealous private enforcement
efforts may minimize social loss relative to a world in which harmful conduct is
not controlled at all.
One could go on.4s For now, the key point is that the zealousness critique of
private enforcement is, at least in its full-throated form, overblown and
indeterminate. Indeed, from a regulatory design perspective, the question is
not whether private enforcement is systematically more or less socially efficient
than public enforcement. Rather, socially efficient deployment of private
enforcement presents regulatory architects with a far subtler set of second-
order, micro-level calibration challenges.
42. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Public Enforcement ofLaw, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS: CRIMINAL LAW AND EcoNOMIcs (Nuno Garoupa ed., 2d ed. 2009);
see also Glover, supra note 23, at 1179-80 (noting the potential informational advantages of
public enforcers); Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 357, 369 (1984) (same).
43. See Bucy, supra note 5, at 5 ("Private justice can supply the resource of inside information.");
Coffee, supra note 35, at 226 ("[P]rivate enforcement may be able to mobilize and reallocate
its resources more quickly than the public enforcer. .. ."); Mark A. Cohen & Paul H. Rubin,
Private Enforcement of Public Policy, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 167, 168 (1985) ("[P]rivate firms are
generally more efficiently operated than public agencies."); Richard B. Stewart & Cass R.
Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1193, 1298 (1982) (noting that
centralized public agencies often suffer from "diseconomies of scale, given multiple layers of
decision and review").
44. Note that there are ways to induce private actors to surface information about misconduct
short of vesting those actors with a private right of action. In the securities and tax context,
for instance, Congress has created what we might call "pure bounty" regimes in which
private individuals receive a cash bounty for information that leads to a successful public
enforcement action but enjoy no independent enforcement authority. See David Freeman
Engstrom, Whither Whistleblowing?, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIEs L. (forthcoming 2014)
(comparing these two types of regimes).
45. For instance, public enforcement's alleged efficiency advantages depend on the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion. Yet selective enforcement also creates incentives for bribery-or,
short of that, agency capture. I return to capture theory and its implications for agency
gatekeeping infra Subsection III.B.2.
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One such challenge arises from the fact that private enforcers vary, often
substantially, in their motives and means. This complicates efforts to set
payouts across the full enforcer pool to achieve desired enforcement levels." As
a concrete example, critics have long argued that antitrust law overdeters
socially valuable business activity because certain plaintiff types (e.g., business
competitors) are already well incentivized to detect and prosecute violations
compared to others (e.g., end consumers) and yet still reap statutory treble
damages.47
A second calibration challenge stems from what might be labeled "scaling"
problems. Private enforcement may be suboptimal where the targeted harm is
large and so exceeds the malefactor's ability to pay out fines or damages,4 or
where especially well resourced regulatory targets (e.g., Fortune Soo
companies) are able and willing to mount a vigorous defense. 49 Scaling
problems complicate optimal calibration at the other end of the harm spectrum
as well: profit-minded private enforcers may not enforce at all where the cost of
initiating enforcement is high and the harm (and, thus, the expected payout) is
low, even if enforcement would improve social welfare.so All of this turns the
standard zealousness critique on its head: the problem is not that profit-
obsessed private enforcers will target only large-scale harms in search of big
payouts or overdeter small-scale harms that do not warrant expenditure of
social resources. Rather, private enforcement may not deter either type of
harm enough.
46. See David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence from Qui
Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REv. 1244, 1256 (2012).
47. See McAfee et al., supra note 18, at 1864 (noting private enforcers' incentives "to use the laws
to win in the courts what they were unable to win in honest competition with their rivals").
48. See Naysnerski & Tietenberg, supra note 38, at 42 ("Civil sanctions have a serious defect
when the assets of the firm are limited relative to its obligations."); Polinsky, supra note 15,
at 113-14 (noting the superiority of public enforcement where defendants have insufficient
wealth to compensate private enforcers for their effort).
49. See Rajabiun, supra note 17, at 202 (noting that "risk-averse plaintiffs" might be "reluctant to
file cases against resourceful enterprises").
50. This may occur where private enforcers will suffer high psycho-emotional costs from taking
action (e.g., where an organizational insider must decide whether to blow the whistle on
colleagues or otherwise engage in "organizational dissent"). See Engstrom, supra note 46, at
1295; see also James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical
Inquiry, 53 DuKE L.J. 737, 743-44 (2003) (noting scaling issues in the securities context); Orly
Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping Obligations, 97
CAUF. L. REV. 433 (2009) (noting the problem of organizational dissent); Polinsky, supra
note 15, at 119-20 (modeling scaling problems).
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To be sure, these calibration challenges may not be insuperable. One can
imagine an endlessly variegated statutory schedule of payouts pegged to
particular enforcer or claim types that raise or lower enforcement activity to
desired levels.s" Legislators can also specify the types of enforcers who have
standing to sue or denominate certain claims as eligible or ineligible for private
enforcement.s2 But ex ante calibration is also informationally demanding:
legislators must know who within the pool of would-be enforcers will initiate
enforcement actions and of what types - and must continually monitor the
situation." As a result, legislative calibration efforts will necessarily be a blunt
instrument of control. Despite legislators' best efforts, a substantial number of
bad cases will enter the system, and a substantial number of good cases
will not.
2. The Coordination Critique
Coordination problems are no less vexing for regulatory designers. The
standard version of the coordination critique takes one of two forms. First,
profit-chasing private enforcers will yield wasteful duplication of effort and
socially costly overdeterrence by "piggybacking" on public enforcement efforts
and also on each other.s' Second, the piecemeal and unyielding nature of
profit-motivated private enforcement will deprive regulatory regimes of needed
"coherence" by, among other things, disrupting the subtle cooperative
relationships that arise between regulators and regulatory targets.ss
51. See Engstrom, supra note 46 (noting examples from the FCA, Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act (PSLRA), and antitrust contexts).
52. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, The Civil False Claims Act as a Deterrent to Participation in
Government Procurement Markets, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 201, 237 (1998) (advocating
delimiting "categories of conduct that qui tam relators can attack").
53. See McAfee et al., supra note 18, at 1865, 1872 (noting the higher informational demands of
optimizing private enforcement).
54. In the latter case, this might mean multiple enforcers chasing the same government-
provided bounty (where government deputizes private enforcers to collect fines for it) or
multiple plaintiffs seeking compensation for the same injuries via separate lawsuits. Note
that some scholars remain skeptical about the volume and effect of private-on-public
piggyback actions. See, e.g., Maria Correia & Michael Klausner, Are Securities Class Actions
"Supplemental" to SEC Enforcement? An Empirical Analysis (Univ. of Cal. Law & Econ.
Workshop, 2012) (finding only weak evidence that piggybacking is a problem).
ss. See Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA.
L. REv. 1111, 1117 (1990) (defining regulatory "coherence" as a statutory scheme that
"reflect[s] a unitary vision" rather than merely an absence of contradictory rules); Mark
Seidenfeld & Janna Satz Nugent, "The Friendship of the People": Citizen Participation in
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As with the zealousness critique, there is substantial truth here.s6 Yet in
other ways, the standard coordination critique, like its zealousness cousin,
simply misses key dimensions of the problem. For instance, legislators who opt
to establish hybrid public-private enforcement regimes are hardly without
tools for eliminating costly piggyback actions. They can legislatively bar private
actions that mirror an earlier-filed private suit or government enforcement
effort.' Or, as noted previously, they can denominate certain claim types as
eligible or ineligible for private enforcement, thus constructing a clear public-
private division of labor.58 But these approaches come at a substantial cost,
exposing once again the limits of ex ante legislative fixes. "First-to-file"
provisions create perverse incentives for private enforcers to file premature
claims in the race to the courthouse door.59 More importantly, categorically
barring piggyback suits deprives public enforcers of the ability to craft a
flexible enforcement strategy that optimally leverages available public and
private enforcement capacity.60 The problem, then, is not piggyback actions
per se.6 ' Rather, it is that legislators cannot know beforehand which piggyback
actions are part of a coherent regulatory strategy and which are not.
Environmental Enforcement, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 269, 293-96 (2005) (laying out
cooperative-relationship concerns); Stephenson, supra note 4, at 117-18 (same).
s6. More generally, the central preoccupation of litigation scholars in recent decades -how best
to achieve consent and closure in aggregated and consolidated proceedings -is at bottom a
coordination problem. See Richard A. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95
CORNELL L. REv. 1105, i1o6 (2oo) (noting the need for a "centralizing mechanism" beyond
the class action device to solve problems of consent and closure in aggregated and
consolidated proceedings).
57. The FCA provides examples of both types of provisions. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) (2006)
("When a person brings an action under this subsection, no person other than the
Government may intervene or bring a related action based on the facts underlying the
pending action."); id. § 3730(e)(3) ("In no event may a person bring an action . .. which is
based upon allegations or transactions which are the subject of a civil suit or an
administrative civil money penalty proceeding in which the Government is already a
party.").
58. See supra text accompanying note 52.
59. See Engstrom, supra note 46, at 1283-84.
60. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 35, at 225 & n.21; Erichson, supra note 17, at 41-43; Rose, supra
note 5, at 1356; Stephenson, supra note 4, at 127-28. For a classic case illustrating some of the
complexities of the piggybacking phenomenon in the securities context, see Parklane Hosiery
Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
61. See Coffee, supra note 35, at 225 ("[A]lthough some have characterized such 'tag along'
private enforcement actions as 'parasitic,' it may be more accurate to describe the
relationship between public and private enforcer as symbiotic." (footnote omitted)).
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Worse, the standard version of the coordination critique, with its
overriding focus on regulatory coherence and duplicative litigation efforts,
tends to obscure a host of significant but smaller-scale coordination challenges.
One type of coordination problem occurs when distortions in the market for
the retention and referral of legal services yield mismatches in plaintiff- and
defense-side resources and sophistication. This may result from so-called
"queuing" effects, in which the best counsel sit atop referral networks and take
the very best cases, thus matching themselves with the cases to which they add
the least value .6 Alternatively, plaintiffs' counsel at the top of the queue may
erroneously pass on a high-quality case, leaving it to lower-order counsel, and
the defendant, with full information about the extent of illegality, may respond
by investing heavily in defense.63 Whatever the cause, the resulting "adversarial
asymmetries" can impair the system's ability to fully vindicate the public
interest by permitting lawyer skill and resources, not underlying case merit, to
drive litigation outcomes.
Another type of micro-level coordination problem arises from repeat-play
dynamics. It is well known that repeat litigants enjoy advantages because they
can "play for rules," settling bad cases and pursuing only good ones at trial or
on appeal, thus bending doctrine - and, more importantly, judicial
solicitude 6 -in their favor.6 ' In a regime with only public enforcement,
government is the ultimate repeat player. Inclusion of a private enforcement
mechanism, however, adds one-shotters to the mix who, lacking a strategic
perspective beyond the case at hand, can generate bad precedent which
hamstrings public and private enforcers alike. 6
62. See David Freeman Engstrom, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: Empirical Analysis of
DOJ Oversight of Qui Tam Litigation Under the False Claims Act, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. 1689,
1699 (2013) (noting the efficiency costs of the "adversarial asymmetries" resulting from this
phenomenon); see also John Fabian Witt, Bureaucratic Legalism, American Style: Private
Bureaucratic Legalism and the Governance of the Tort System, 56 DEPAuL L. REv. 261, 28o
(2oo6) (describing this "queuing" dynamic).
63. See Engstrom, supra note 62, at 1699.
64. See Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REv. 782, 823 (2010) (noting
the risk of judicial "backlash" against private enforcement of federal statutes if too many
marginal cases are brought).
65. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW& Soc'Y REV. 95,100 (1974) (discussing repeat players "play[ing] for rules").
66. See, e.g., Bucy, supra note 5, at 66 ("[I]ncompetent, overworked, or inexperienced private
counsel, whose interests may diverge from the public interest, may be generating case
precedent that restricts government regulators.").
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A final coordination problem is unique to the situation where a government
pays private enforcers a bounty to collect fines on the government's behalf67_
say, as a sanction for violations of environmental law or fraud in connection
with government contracting. One version of the problem has been well
articulated elsewhere: regulatory designers who seek to reduce private
enforcement levels by constraining private enforcers to earn only a portion of
any fine collected will incentivize the litigants to negotiate collusive settlements
for an amount that is greater than the expected bounty but less than the full
sanction, thus eroding deterrence value. A broader, but often overlooked,
version of the problem extends from preclusion principles: because a private
enforcer collecting regulatory fines stands in the government's shoes and sues
on its behalf, any judgment will have preclusive effect on the government's
later assertion of transactionally related claims. This creates powerful
incentives for private enforcers and regulatory targets to trade a larger
settlement pot for an unduly wide liability release, compromising future
enforcement efforts, whether public or private.69
One could continue in this vein. For now, however, a unifying point can
once more be ventured: many of the most pressing coordination problems that
afflict private enforcement -from piggybacking and adversarial asymmetries to
repeat-play dynamics and collusive settlements-are either imperfectly
remediable by way of ex ante legislative fixes or, worse, entirely immune from
them. As with the calibration challenges that extend from the zealousness
critique, there are hard limits on legislators' ability to solve coordination
problems from afar.
3. The Legislative Fidelity Critique
If the zealousness and coordination critiques rest on assumptions about
private profit motivation, then a third and final critique of private enforcement
67. Examples include: (i) the qui tam provisions of the FCA, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730, 3733 (2006),
whereby private enforcers pocket a portion of any money returned to the federal treasury;
(ii) California's Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act, which permits private litigants to
receive twenty-five percent of civil penalties for labor violations, CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(i)
(Deering 2013); and (iii) California's Proposition 65, which authorizes payment of a portion
of penalties imposed in actions for failure to label dangerous chemicals, CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 25192(a) (West 2012).
68. See Landes & Posner, supra note 15, at 27 n.54; Polinsky, supra note 15, at 123.
69. See, e.g., Searcy v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 117 F.3 d 154, 16o (5th Cir. 1997) (noting the
"danger that a relator [in a qui tam action asserting contractor fraud on the government]
can boost the value of settlement by bargaining away claims on behalf of the United
States").
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proceeds from a more basic pair of observations: public enforcers are politically
accountable actors. Private enforcers are not.
The resulting legislative fidelity critique roughly tracks zealousness
concerns: if profit-motivated private enforcers initiate suit whenever the
expected value of doing so exceeds expected cost, they may develop and press
novel applications of legal mandates that public enforcers, exercising sound
prosecutorial discretion, would forgo as inconsistent with the original
legislative design.7o Relentless pursuit of profit thus yields a form of statutory
drift and mission creep as private enforcers drive law enforcement efforts in
new and democratically unaccountable directions.'
To be sure, it is not hard to see possible limits to this logic. Recall that
deployment of private enforcement is a legislative choice. To that extent, one
can argue that regulatory drift will already have been factored into the
legislative decision to delegate enforcement authority to private litigants rather
than or in addition to public prosecutors in the first place, conferring
democratic legitimacy, though at a higher level of generality, on any and all
deviations that result.' More importantly, the simple legislative fidelity
70. See David Freeman Engstrom, Private Enforcement's Pathways: Lessons from Qui Tam
Litigation (Apr. 10, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); see also Park,
supra note 4, at 159 (noting the general view that entrepreneurial private enforcers are more
likely than public enforcers to "invest resources in pursuing innovative theories of
wrongdoing"). A similar assumption that profit-motivated private litigants generate a
"demand" for the production of legal rules underpins the older debate over the efficiency of
the common law. See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 51 (1977) (offering the seminal theory of legal change in these terms).
7i. See Stephenson, supra note 4, at 119 (noting that private enforcers are not "subject to
electoral discipline"); Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 43, at 1292 (arguing that private
enforcement can "undermin[e] the advantages of political accountability . . . that
administrative regulation was designed to provide").
72. More concretely, a legislature might choose private over public enforcement based on its
determination that deputizing private enforcers to enforce legal mandates will yield less
overall drift over time than a purely public enforcement regime, particularly where the
executive branch-and, thus, the relevant administrative agency or prosecutor's office-is
controlled by an opposing political party. It follows that rational legislators might choose
private enforcement as a way to achieve greater overall legislative fidelity than might obtain
if enforcement were left in purely public hands and also greater overall "stability" of legal
norms. See, e.g., FARHANG, supra note 17 (noting that a leading explanation for private
enforcement's rise as a regulatory tool in recent decades is a legislative desire to insulate
enforcement efforts from political control, particularly where ideologically different public
enforcers cannot be trusted to faithfully implement the statute); Coffee, supra note 35, at 227
(listing "stability of legal norms" as a benefit of private enforcement); Lemos, State
Enforcement, supra note 17, at 707 (indicating that private enforcers cannot be "captured by
industry or controlled by politicians" and hence function "as a failsafe mechanism by
reducing the risk that entire classes of violations will go unremedied"); cf Matthew C.
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critique assumes that courts will be unable to police deviations from legislative
purposes, or that a sitting legislature or administrative agency vested with
rulemaking authority cannot amend legal mandates whenever private
enforcement efforts stray beyond legislative preferences." Why can't these
institutional actors, one might ask, solve the problem via rigorous judicial
enforcement of the legislative bargain or via statutory and regulatory
amendments when private enforcement efforts stray beyond their legislative
warrant?
While these objections carry some force, theory and evidence suggest that
legislative fidelity concerns remain substantial. As to the former concern,
legislative awareness of the possibility of statutory drift, or even a
determination that delegation to private rather than public enforcers will
produce less of it, hardly forecloses fidelity concerns. Ample room remains for
institutional designs that can further mitigate the problem. As to the latter
concern, solutions predicated on judicial enforcement of the legislative bargain
seem particularly vulnerable on simple institutional capacity grounds. Courts
may lack not just the will -judges may, after all, have policy preferences of
their own -but also expertise and an encompassing view of the enforcement
landscape, sharply limiting their ability to gauge how a novel liability theory
maps onto legislative purposes.74
More fundamentally, even where private enforcers are brought to heel by
legislators, agencies, or courts, the process is not costless. Indeed, private
enforcement efforts can impose substantial transitional costs in the meantime,
before a legislative, administrative, or judicial fix is in place. Regulatory targets
must still defend against private enforcement actions and, because fixes cannot
Stephenson, Legislative Allocation ofDelegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice Between
Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035 (2oo6) (modeling the legislative choice between
agencies and courts - and, implicitly, the choice between public and private enforcement - as
a tradeoff between the greater temporal stability of court adjudication and the greater cross-
issue stability of agency adjudication).
73. Here, policing private enforcement efforts would resemble the standard separation-of-
powers model in administrative law in which the House, Senate, and President, each with
their own veto point, can nonetheless coordinate to keep agency action within certain
bounds. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 8o
GEO. L.J. 523, 536-38 (1992).
74. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer & Richard Zeckhauser, The Trouble with Cases, in REGULATION
VERSUs LITIGATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS AND LAW 45, 47 (Daniel P. Kessler ed.,
2011) ("[T]he policy that emerges from litigation [will] be systematically based on an
imperfect picture of the terrain that the policy is designed to regulate.").
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be made retroactive, may suffer costly adverse judgments despite subsequent
amendment or override.'
There are also reasons to believe that these transitional costs will be large in
many regulatory contexts. First, profit-motivated private enforcers will, in
response to adaptation by regulatory targets, drive enforcement efforts into the
interstices of legal mandates in their effort to exploit interpretive gaps left by
legislators and regulators. 6 This is important: interstitial private enforcement
efforts are far less likely to draw swift political correction or override, as the
interest-group cleavages that produced interpretive gaps are often no more
easily bridged later than they were initially.'
Second, modern governance is largely administrative in form, with
legislatures enacting broad and even deliberately ambiguous statutes where
issues are too complex or politically fractious to resolve and then delegating to
administrative agencies the task of filling in the messy details using
cumbersome administrative procedures. 8 Onerous procedures help reduce the
"democratic deficit" when unelected bureaucrats make policy.' But they also
ensure that bubble periods, during which regulatory mandates remain
unsettled and transitional costs accrue, will often be protracted.
Beyond the problem of transitional costs, a final reason to credit legislative
fidelity concerns is that privately driven deviations from legislative purposes
will be incremental in ways that can frustrate democratic control efforts. Legal
innovations are not just the end products of litigation struggles; they can also
75. As an example, securities plaintiffs' efforts to extend class action liability to secondary
"aiders and abettors" of fraud were thwarted, see Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008), but not before several defendants had inked multi-billion
dollar settlements, see In re Enron Corp. Sec., 2oo8 WL 4178151, at *1o-1i (S.D. Tex. Sept. 8,
2008).
76. See Engstrom, supra note 70 (manuscript at 6-7) (laying out this theory); see also Joseph A.
Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of
Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 640-41 (2002)
(reviewing the reasons that legislators leave interpretive gaps); Donald C. Langevoort &
Robert B. Thompson, "Publicness" in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act,
101 GEO. L.J. 337, 342 (2013) (noting the tendency of private enforcers to fill "unregulated ...
space" before the SEC can meaningfully respond); Naysnerski & Tietenberg, supra note 38,
at 43 (noting that "[s]uccessful . . . suits ultimately undermine the very reason for their
existence").
77. See Engstrom, supra note 70 (manuscript at 7, 16).
78. See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REv. 355, 355 (2012) ("The age
of statutes has given way to an era of regulations . . . .").
79. See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98
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reshape the identities, interests, and capacities of potential political actors.o
Thus, large paydays arm the plaintiffs' bar with a war chest with which to
protect its hard-fought litigation gains through the political process."' At the
same time, a final judgment against a large industry actor may insulate that
actor from further legal attack, either because the judgment has preclusive
effect or because it leads the entity to alter its organizational routines to avoid
further legal entanglement in ways that are not easily reversed.8' This can
dampen the actor's incentives to join industry lobbying efforts to reverse a
given legal innovation -and, indeed, may create contrary incentives to actively
disrupt such opposition as a way to narrow the competitive advantages of
industry actors who have not yet faced litigation. By incrementally remaking
the political landscape, privately driven legal innovations may, in the jargon of
political science, produce feedback effects and path dependencies that render them
more robust than one might predict ex ante. Over time, private enforcement
may thus drive legal mandates in very different directions than we might
expect if enforcement authority remained in purely public hands.
so. The thinking here draws from the political science literature on policy durability and
retrenchment. See PAUL PIERSON, DISMANTLING THE WELFARE STATE? REAGAN, THATCHER,
AND THE POLITICS OF RETRENCHMENT 40 (1994) (noting the difficulty of obtaining
retrenchment created when beneficiaries "mobilize in favor of programmatic maintenance or
expansion"); Eric M. Patashnik, Why Some Reforms Last and Others Collapse: The Tax Reform
Act of 1986 Versus Airline Deregulation, in LING LEGISLATION: DURABIuTY, CHANGE, AND
THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN LAWMAKING 146, 151 (Jeffery A. Jenkins & Eric M. Patashnik
eds., 2012) (noting how policy enactments can alter the interest group environment in ways
that make policy repeal unlikely).
81. See Sean Farhang, Litigation and Reform, in THE POLITICS OF MAJOR POLICY REFORM IN
POSTWAR AMERICA (Jeffrey A. Jenkins & Sidney M. Milkis eds., forthcoming) ("As private
enforcement regimes have diffused across the American regulatory state, the interests
formed around them have become more widely spread and deeply rooted, increasing the
political capacity of the coalition to defend the private enforcement infrastructure from
retrenchment.").
82. See Engstrom, supra note 70 (manuscript at 24); see also Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity
and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. Soc. 1531,
1531-35 (1992) (offering a classic account of the organizational response to civil rights
enforcement).
83. See generally PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL
ANALYSIS (2004) (advancing a theory of the temporal dimensions of political processes,
including path dependency and feedback effects).
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C. The False Promise of "Litigation Reforms"
Given litigation's centrality in the American regulatory state and the
multiple zealousness, coordination, and legislative fidelity concerns that it
raises, how might regulatory designers seek to constrain or otherwise
rationalize private enforcement efforts?
A number of common "litigation reforms" have already received passing
mention above. First, legislators can manipulate litigant incentives by raising
or lowering payouts (as with multiple or punitive damages, attorney fee-shifts,
or damages caps) to achieve desired enforcement levels, or they can erect
procedural and remedial barriers, such as limits on discovery, heightened
pleading standards, or modification or elimination of joint-and-several-liability
rules.'4 State-level tort reform efforts in recent decades showcase many of these
possibilities,as and some have surfaced at the federal level as well.8  Second,
legislators can shape private enforcement efforts by activating or deactivating
certain enforcer or claim types, or by barring "piggyback" or second-filed
actions.8' A third family of options seeks to reform litigation from within by
empowering trial judges to exercise greater "managerial" control over the
litigation process or by vesting them with greater pretrial adjudicatory
authority.88  The Supreme Court's recent and controversial decisions in
Twombly89 and Iqbal,9o which arm trial judges with a more exacting pleading
standard, offer an apt and highly controversial example."
84. Engstrom, supra note 46, at 1254-55.
8. See F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the "Tort Reform" Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 437, 483-524 (20o6) (providing an overview of state tort reform efforts).
86. For example, the PSLRA responded to concern about securities "strike" suits by, among
other things, raising the pleading standard, 15 U.S.C. § 78u- 4 (b)(1)-(2) (2012), and
eliminating joint and several liability unless "the trier of fact specifically determines that
such covered person knowingly committed a violation of the securities laws," id. §§ 77k(f),
78u-4(f). See also Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 386
(2007) (cataloguing federal anti-litigation legislation).
87. See Engstrom, supra note 46, at 1297-98 (demonstrating how the FCA and federal securities
and antitrust law shape the eligible pool of private enforcers).
88. See Miller, supra note 30, at 1013-15 (recounting repeated overhauls of Rule 26 to effect
"greater judicial control over the discovery process"); see also Judith Resnik, Managerial
Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 374 (1982) (offering the classic account of "managerial judging").
8g. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
go. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
91. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), compelling pre-docketing review of claims for
legal sufficiency, offers a legislatively specified example. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) (20o6). On
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Many of these litigation reforms have been deeply controversial, sparking
heated debate about the extent to which they reduce litigation levels or costs;"
disproportionately impact particular claim93 or plaintiff94 types; or achieve
various regime-specific goals, such as, in the medical malpractice area, reducing
health care costs or improving health care quality.9 s
Yet viewing this standard menu of litigation reforms through the lens of
the zealousness, coordination, and legislative fidelity critiques reveals far larger
problems as well. In particular, most existing reforms are blunt calibration
devices. Indeed, reducing payouts to plaintiffs or their counsel or raising
pleading requirements impairs the "remedial machinery"96 across the board
and so risks screening out meritorious and unmeritorious claims alike. 97
Worse, the usual litigation reforms do even less to facilitate better coordination
of public and private enforcement efforts, whether by limiting duplicative
enforcement efforts, narrowing adversarial asymmetries, policing collusive and
overbroad private settlements, or leveling a litigation playing field sloped by
repeat players preying upon one-shot enforcers. And they do little or nothing
to police private enforcement efforts that drift beyond legislative purposes or to
mitigate the transitional costs that accrue when such efforts are only belatedly
subject to legislative or administrative override. Indeed, the usual menu of
litigation reforms is distressingly orthogonal to many or most such concerns.
controversy relating to Twombly and Iqbal, see David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal
Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203 (2013).
92. See Resnik, supra note 88, at 380 (expressing skepticism that managerial judging reduces
litigation costs).
93. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The
Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517,
519-20 (2010) (speculating that Twombly's heightened pleading standard has
disproportionately impacted plaintiffs in civil rights cases).
94. See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, and the
Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263, 1313 (2004) (claiming that tort reforms disadvantage plaintiffs
without labor force attachment, including women, children, and the elderly).
95. See, e.g., Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?, III Q.J.
ECON. 353, 354-55 (1996) (exploring the connection between tort liability and health care
costs).
96. Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 185-86.
97. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act?, 23 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 598, 598 (20o6) (finding that a substantial number of
non-nuisance cases lacking pre-filing indicia of fraud would not have been brought post-
PSLRA); Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Treble Damages Reform: Implications of the
Georgetown Project, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 73, 88 (1986) (noting that "detrebling" damages under
federal antitrust law "could deter the desirable cases as well").
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What, then, might prove the better reform avenue? The balance of this
Article pushes past the current state of play by identifying and assessing an
alternative approach to mitigating the zealousness, coordination, and
legislative fidelity problems that afflict private litigation when used as a
regulatory tool: vesting administrative agencies with litigation "gatekeeper"
powers.
II. THE GATEKEEPER ALTERNATIVE: FLAVORS OF AGENCY
GATEKEEPING
Part I traced private enforcement's rise as a regulatory tool, sketched three
types of problems -zealousness, coordination, and legislative fidelity-that
afflict private enforcement regimes, and trained a skeptical eye on the standard
suite of "litigation reforms" that purport to solve those problems. This Part
and the next develop the case for and against an alternative approach to
rationalizing and optimizing regulatory regimes that deploy private lawsuits as
an enforcement tool: vesting administrative agencies with litigation
"gatekeeper" powers. The first step in that process is to construct a taxonomy
that identifies and categorizes the rich diversity of gatekeeper designs that
populate the present-day administrative landscape. This is important, as it is
not possible to perform a rigorous assessment of the merits and demerits of
granting agencies gatekeeper powers-Part III's task-without first
understanding the various institutional forms agency gatekeeper authority
might take and the precise regulatory tasks each entails.
A. Taxonomy: Agency Gatekeeping in Five Dimensions
If legislators wanted to vest an agency with litigation gatekeeper authority,
what would it look like? Tables i and 2 offer an initial cut at a taxonomy of
agency gatekeeping. Table 1 begins by characterizing gatekeeper designs, both
real and proposed, along five dimensions: (i) whether the agency wields
affirmative or residual litigation oversight authority; (ii) whether agency
gatekeeper authority is retail or wholesale in its reach; (iii) whether the
agency's gatekeeper decisions are legally binding or merely advisory; (iv)
whether the agency passively occupies a "gate," allowing litigation to proceed
or not, or whether it instead exercises its gatekeeper authority only by actively
displacing litigation via intervention or by initiating a public enforcement
action of its own; and (v) whether an agency's gatekeeper decisions operate as
a "veto" or a "license." Table 2 provides further shape and order by clustering
design choices into six distinct gatekeeper types and mapping each type to one
or more real-world examples.
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Table i.
TAXONOMY (1): AGENCY GATEKEEPER DESIGN DIMENSIONS
Design Dimension Design Choice
Nature of Agency Authority Affirmative Residual
Reach of Agency Authority Wholesale Retail
Legal Effect of Agency Decision Advisory Binding
"Gate" Type/Required Agency Passive Gate Active Displacement +
Action Control Rights
Decision Type/Default Private Veto License
Enforcement Availability
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Table 2.
TAXONOMY (II): CLASSIFICATION OF EXISTING AGENCY GATEKEEPER REGIMES
Passive Gate/
Affirmative/ Retail/ Advisory/ Active Veto/
Type Residual Wholesale Binding Displacement + icense Real-World Examples
Control Rights
FRCP 24 intervention/
I Residual Retail Advisory N/A N/A FRAP 29 amicus
participation
EEOC "cause" findings
under Title VII, ADA, Age
Discrimination in





II Affirmative Retail Binding Displacement + Veto EEOC intervention under
Weak (or No) Title VII, ADA
Control Rights
EPA under "citizen suit"
provisions of federal
environmental law; EEOC
under ADEA; DOL under
Active Fair Labor Standards Act
IV Affirmative Retail Binding Displacement + Veto (FLSA); DOJ under False





DOJ under False Claims
V Affirmative Retail Binding Passive Gate Veto Act (termination
authority)
VI Affirmative Wholesale Binding Passive Gate Veto Regulatory preemption
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While many of the design dimensions and components presented in Tables
i and 2 are self-explanatory, some are not. The remainder of this Section briefly
steps through each design dimension and offers relevant elaboration of each to
anchor the discussion to come.
1. Affirmative/Residual
As reflected in Tables i and 2, a regulatory designer who wishes to vest an
agency with litigation gatekeeper authority must first decide if the agency will
wield affirmative authority to control or terminate private enforcement efforts
via statutory authorization. Importantly, a regulatory architect who declines to
grant the agency formal gatekeeper powers does not thereby deprive the agency
of any ability to shape private enforcement efforts. Most agencies possess
residual oversight powers within the regulatory regimes they administer via the
procedural rights accorded them under the Federal Rules of Civil and Appellate
Procedure to intervene in cases as an interested party or to submit amicus
briefs presenting the government's position.98 Note, however, that these
residual oversight powers are generally quite limited: agency intervenors or
amici shape private enforcement efforts only to the extent they can convince
the judge of the rightness of their position. They cannot subject private
litigants to prefiling review, control the course of litigation, or deprive the real
parties in interest of procedural or other rights. To that extent, and looking
ahead to other parts of the typology, an agency's residual oversight powers
under the federal rules tend to be advisory rather than legally binding.
2. Retail/Wholesale
Assuming an agency is to be vested with affirmative gatekeeper powers, a
second and critically important design decision is whether those powers will be
exercised at a retail or wholesale level. Retail gatekeeper authority entails case-
by-case agency oversight of private enforcement efforts. Real-world examples
include: (i) the authority given the Department of Justice under the False
g8. See FED. R. APP. P. 29(a) ("The United States or its officer or agency or a state may file an
amicus-curiae brief without the consent of the parties or leave of court."); FED. R. Civ. P.
24(b)(2)(A) (granting permissive intervention authority to a "federal or state governmental
officer or agency" where a claim or defense at issue "is based on . . . a statute . . .
administered by the officer or agency"). See generally Arthur F. Greenbaum, Government
Participation in Private Litigation, 21 Aluz. ST. L.J. 853, 882-983 (1989) (cataloguing
governmental "forms of participation" in civil litigation).
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Claims Act (FCA) to oversee individual qui tam actions;9 (ii) the authority
granted to the EPA to oversee individual lawsuits brought under the various
"citizen suit" provisions in federal environmental statutes; and (iii) the state
medical malpractice review boards and screening panels that over thirty states
put into place as a component of tort-reform efforts throughout the 1970s,
1980s, and 1990s to provide merits-screening of individual medical malpractice
tort cases.xoo
Wholesale gatekeeper authority, by contrast, empowers an agency to create
or destroy private rights of action across the board as to one or more
denominated claims. Importantly, the agency's ability to initiate its own
enforcement actions asserting those claims remains unaffected, thus
distinguishing wholesale gatekeeper authority from the more general authority
enjoyed by many agencies to promulgate legislative rules that are applicable to
public and private enforcement efforts alike."o' As Table 2 reflects, a real-world
example is so-called regulatory preemption, in which agencies such as the Food
and Drug Administration promulgate rules that purport to displace state tort
law entirely."o2 Beyond its use in the regulatory preemption context, wholesale
gatekeeper authority has also been the subject of myriad scholarly proposals.
Thus, some have called for granting the Securities and Exchange Commission
the power to "disimply" private rights of action under the Securities and
Exchange Act.o 3 Others have suggested that the DOJ should be granted the
authority to "denominate" certain types of FCA claims as eligible or ineligible
for qui tam enforcement across the board.o4
g. For the uninitiated, the FCA prohibits submission of false money claims to the government
in connection with federal programs or expenditures, and its qui tam provisions authorize
private individuals, dubbed "relators," to sue for fraud on behalf of the United States and
earn a "bounty" equal to a portion of any money returned to the federal fisc. See 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729-3733 (20o6).
on. See CATHERINE T. STRUVE, PEW PROJECT ON MED. LIAB., EXPERTISE IN MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION: SPECIAL COURTS, SCREENING PANELS, AND OTHER OPTIONS 57
(2003) (listing thirty-one states that had or have screening panels).
io. See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 4, at 966 ("The decision would instead reallocate
enforcement authority so that private rights of action would not necessarily reach as far as
the Commission's own enforcement authority.").
ion. See Sharkey, supra note 12.
103. See Grundfest, supra note 4.
io4. See Kovacic, supra note 52, at 237. For a trans-substantive version of the argument, see
Stephenson, supra note 4.
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3. Advisory/23inding
A third core design choice concerns whether an agency's gatekeeper
decisions are merely advisory or fully binding in their legal effect. On the
former, consider the powers given to the EEOC to oversee job discrimination
claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII
requires that all claims first be filed with and processed by the EEOC; a
claimant can mount a private enforcement effort in court only once she has
obtained a "right to sue" letter from the agency."os But the EEOC possesses
only nonbinding gatekeeper authority in such cases. As explained in more
detail in Part W's case study, the EEOC may not decline to provide a "right to
sue" letter, and its "cause" determination, though often admissible into
evidence in an eventual civil action, lacks legal effect apart from its persuasive
power before judge or jury.16
Compare this to the DOJ's gatekeeper powers under the FCA, which vests
the Attorney General-and, by further delegation, the DOJ's Civil Fraud
Division-with binding authority to oversee and control private qui tam
litigation."0 7 Indeed, the DOJ may dismiss or settle a qui tam case out from
under a private qui tam relator entirely, subject only to a basic fairness
hearing.o 8 It also possesses the statutory right to veto private dismissals or
settlements in cases it has not joined.'o9 Finally, the FCA grants the DOJ the
authority to intervene in and take "primary" control over the litigation,
105. 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-5 (f)(1) (20o6).
1o6. The strong majority position among circuit courts is that EEOC cause determinations are
admissible, either as a per se matter or on a case-by-case basis applying the balancing test set
forth in FED. R. EVID. 403. See, e.g., Smith v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 877 F.2d io6, 1113 (1st
Cit. 1989) (rejecting a per se rule regarding the admissibility of EEOC investigative
materials in favor of a case-by-case approach); Plummer v. W. Int'l Hotels Co., 656 F.2d 502
(9 th Cir. 1981) (establishing a per se admissibility rule).
107. For a brief overview of the FCA, see supra note 99.
los. 31 U.S.C. S 3730(c)(2)(B) (20o6) ("The Government may settle the action with the
defendant notwithstanding the objections of the person initiating the action if the court
determines, after a hearing, that the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable
under all the circumstances."). Most courts interpret this language to require that the DOJ
show only a "rational relation" between the dismissal grounds and a government purpose.
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece Packing Corp., 151 F.3d
1139, 1145 (9 th Cir. 1998) (applying such a standard).
109. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2006) ("The action may be dismissed only if the court and the
Attorney General give written consent to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting.").
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including depriving the relator of any further procedural rights where her
participation is seen as impairing the government's prosecution of the case."o
Occupying a space somewhere in the middle are state medical malpractice
screening panels. Conventionally understood, these administrative bodies
wield only advisory authority, holding on the merits of a case and sending a
nonbinding merits signal to litigants and courts without entering judgment."
Some liken the resulting gatekeeper role to early neutral evaluation or
mediation."' Some states, however, have vested review boards with harder-
edged powers by imposing sanctions upon parties who proceed to trial and lose
following an unfavorable board screening decision."' In such states, board
decisions are not legally binding but nevertheless exert a powerful effect on the
parties' litigation calculus.
4. Passive Gate/Active Displacement + Control Rights
A fourth key design decision concerns the action an agency must take in
order to exercise gatekeeper power. Some gatekeeper designs permit the agency
to exercise its gatekeeper authority passively, by simply expressing its
determination that a private enforcement action should or should not proceed.
The FCA once more provides a real-world example: as noted previously, the
DOJ may at any stage in the proceedings move to dismiss or settle a case out
from under a private plaintiff-relator, subject only to a basic fairness hearing."4
To accomplish this, the DOJ need do no more than register its view with the
court and request dismissal.
Alternatively, legislative designers might mandate a more active agency role
in which the agency may terminate a private enforcement effort only by taking
11o. Id. § 3730(c)(1) ("If the Government proceeds with the action, it shall have the primary
responsibility for prosecuting the action . . . ."); id. § 3730(c)(2) (C) (authorizing courts to
"impose limitations on [a relator's] participation" upon a government showing that
"unrestricted participation during the course of the litigation ... would interfere with or
unduly delay the Government's prosecution of the case").
ill. See MICHELLE M. MELLO & ALLEN KACHALiA, MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N,
EVALUATION OF OPTIONS FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SYSTEM REFORM 7 (2010).
112. See, e.g., Thomas B. Metzloff, Alternative Dispute Resolution Strategies in Medical Malpractice,
9 ALASKAL. REV. 429, 441-42 (1992).
113. See MELLO & KAcHAUA, supra note iii, at 8 (noting that in several states a plaintiff whose
claim has been found non-meritorious must "post a bond or in some other way provide an
up-front payment that is forfeited to the defendant if the plaintiff does not prevail in the
litigation").
114. See supra note lo8.
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over control of the private enforcement action or displacing it with a public
enforcement proceeding of its own. An example is found in the "citizen suit"
provisions contained in most major federal environmental statutes authorizing
the EPA to veto a private enforcement effort only by initiating a public
enforcement action in its stead."s Similarly, California's Labor Code Private
Attorney General Act ("LCPAGA") bars private enforcement actions only
where the relevant labor enforcement agencyni6 decides, after investigation of a
violation raised by a would-be private enforcer, to cite the violator.n7 As with
EPA oversight of "citizen suits," the agency can displace private enforcement
only by bringing an enforcement action itself. As a final example, and at risk of
confusing matters, the FCA grants the DOJ the authority -in addition to the
power to dismiss cases outright-to intervene in and take control of private qui
tam enforcement efforts."' The FCA thus gives the DOJ two distinct
gatekeeper options: passive dismissal (via the DOJ's termination authority)
and active displacement (via the DOJ's intervention authority).
Importantly, existing gatekeeper designs also vary substantially in the
extent of the control rights that accompany an agency's decision to displace or
otherwise take over control of a private enforcement action. For instance, Title
VII formally empowers the EEOC to displace private job discrimination claims
by initiating its own civil action, giving it what amounts to a right of first
refusal in initiating litigation."9 But the resulting "displacement" is nominal, as
the statute specifically grants the claimant full and unconditional intervention
115. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1) (2006); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §
136 5 (b)(1) (20o6); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 69 7 2(b)(1)(20o6); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, id. §
96 59 (d)(2); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(b)(1) (2012). The sole major
federal environmental statute that lacks a citizen suit provision is the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2012). See Jeffrey G. Miller, Theme and
Variations in Statutory Preclusions Against Successive Environmental Enforcement Actions by EPA
and Citizens: Part One: Statutory Bars in Citizen Suit Provisions, 28 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 401,
416-20 & n.77 (2004) (cataloguing citizen suit provisions across federal environmental
statutes).
n6. The public agencies that the LCPAGA vests with gatekeeping powers include the California
Labor & Workforce Development Agency and the California Division of Occupational Safety
and Health. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(3)(a)(1), (b)(i) (West 2013).
117. Id. § 2699-3(a)(2)(B).
us. See supra note no.
ug. See 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-5(f)(1) (2oo6) (granting the EEOC the right to file a civil action
within thirty days of a claimant's filing of a charge if the agency's conciliation efforts have
failed).
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rights, limiting the EEOC's ability to control the litigation."2 o More
importantly, even where the EEOC files and successfully settles its own
enforcement action, the claimant retains the right to sue for further
remediation not achieved in the public-side enforcement action.1 21
Things look different, however, elsewhere within federal employment and
labor law. Thus, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) grants
the EEOC a fuller set of control rights than it enjoys in the Title VII context: an
EEOC-filed action under the ADEA formally terminates the private claimant's
right to bring a subsequent private action, and the ADEA also precludes a
claimant from intervening in a public action brought on her behalf. " The Fair
Labor Standards Act offers a similarly potent set of exclusion and control
120. Id. ("The person or persons aggrieved shall have the right to intervene in a civil action
brought by the [EEOC] . . . ."). An aggrieved person has a similar right of intervention in
cases brought by the Attorney General against a government or government entity. Id.
121. See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326 (1980) ("Under § 7o6(f)(1), the
aggrieved person may bring his own action at the expiration of the 18o-day period of
exclusive EEOC administrative jurisdiction if the agency has failed to move the case along to
the party's satisfaction, has reached a determination not to sue, or has reached a conciliation
or settlement agreement with the respondent that the party finds unsatisfactory.") (emphasis
added). See generally Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 17, at 538 & n.24o (reviewing
this and related case law).
122. See 29 U.S.C. 5 626(c)(1) (2oo6) ("Any person aggrieved may bring a civil action in any
court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the
purposes of this chapter: Provided, That the right of any person to bring such action shall
terminate upon the commencement of an action by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission to enforce the right of such employee under this chapter."); EEOC v. Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 633, 641 (N.D. Cal. 1985) ("[U]nlike Title VII, the ADEA
does not explicitly provide for intervention by private parties in litigation by the EEOC.").
Note that nearly all courts to consider the issue hold that the ADEA's preclusion provision
applies only to subsequently filed actions. Compare EEOC v. E. Airlines, Inc., 736 F.2d 635,
639-41 (11th Cir. 1984) (interpreting the word "bring" in section 626(c)(1) of the ADEA to
preclude a private plaintiffs subsequent filing of suit but not a previously filed suit); Burns
v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 696 F.2d 21, 23-24 (2d Cir. 1982) (same); Donovan v.
Univ. of Tex. at El Paso, 643 F.2d 1201, 1207 (5th Cir. May 1981) (same); Dreith v. Nat'l
Football League, 777 F. Supp. 832, 836 (D. Colo. 1991) (collecting cases and holding "that a
private ADEA action is not extinguished by a later commenced EEOC action that asserts, in
whole or in part, the private plaintiffs claims"), with Jones v. Janesville, 488 F. Supp. 795,
797 (W.D. Wis. 1980) (construing "bring" in the relevant ADEA provision to mean "bring
or maintain," thus finding that even subsequently filed EEOC actions preclude earlier filed
private actions). As a result, the EEOC can reliably exercise gatekeeper power and displace a
private enforcer who would prefer to bring her own action only by filing a public
enforcement action within the sixty-day waiting period the ADEA mandates between a
would-be plaintiffs filing of a charge with the EEOC and her bringing a civil action in
court. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (2oo6) (precluding a private civil action "until 6o days after a
charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the [EEOC]").
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rights, with a DOL action terminating an employee's right to initiate her own
suit following the DOL's filing or serve as a "party plaintiff' in the
government's case.'23 So long as either agency files its public enforcement
action before the private plaintiff does so, the government retains near-total
control over the conduct of enforcement efforts. Finally, the EPA and the DOJ
possess strong, and even absolute, control rights regarding citizen suits and qui
tam suits, respectively. A citizen suit plaintiff can intervene as a matter of right
in a government enforcement proceeding that has displaced her.'" But she
wields separate enforcement authority-whether as an intervenor or as a
plaintiff in a subsequently filed action-only if she can convince a court that the
government's action is or was not "diligent[]" in its prosecution of the matter,
a difficult burden absent an obviously deficient public enforcement effort or
evident collusion between the enforcement agency and a regulatory target. 25
Similarly, and as noted previously, where the DOJ elects to intervene in a qui
tam lawsuit, it exercises "primary" control over the litigation. ,6 To that end,
the FCA instructs the courts to "impose limitations on [a relator-plaintiffs]
123. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (20o6) ("The right provided by this subsection to bring an action by
or on behalf of any employee, and the right of any employee to become a party plaintiff to
any such action, shall terminate upon the filing of a complaint by the Secretary of Labor in
an action under section 217 of this title . . . ."); see also EEOC v. Wackenhut Corp., 939 F.2d
241, 242 (5th Cir. 1991) ("The FLSA clearly states that when the government initiates suits
on behalf of an employee, either for damages or for injunctive relief, the employee's right to
subsequently bring suit to enforce the same rights shall be terminated.").
124. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (20o6) (granting "any person"
intervention as a matter of right in a public enforcement action that has displaced a citizen
suit plaintiff); see also supra note 115 (listing citizen suit provisions in other federal
environmental statutes containing the same or similar language).
125. See Miller, supra note 115, at 465-69 (reviewing case law and noting strong judicial deference
to prosecutorial decision-making and even a presumption of diligence in decisions
interpreting statutory preclusion provisions). For a classic case in which the lower court
found that the state enforcement proceeding was not sufficiently diligent to trigger the
statutory preclusion provision, see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaiv Environmental Services
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 178 n.1 (2000) (noting a lower court finding that the citizen suit
defendant and state enforcement agency had entered into a collusive civil action and
settlement in order to trigger the Clean Water Act's preclusion provision). For an example
of the wording of the diligent prosecution requirement in citizen suit provisions in various
federal environmental statutes, see 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (20o6) (barring private suit if
the government "has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a
court of the United States or a State to require compliance"); see also supra note 115 (listing
citizen suit provisions in other federal environmental statutes containing the same or
similar language).
126. See supra notes 107-11o and accompanying text; see also 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1) (20o6)
(noting that, when the government intervenes in a case, it "shall not be bound by an act of
the person bringing the action").
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participation" where necessary to safeguard "the Government's prosecution of
the case,"1 2  and any government settlement has preclusive effect on further
private enforcement efforts.' As in the citizen suit context, a qui tam relator
enjoys little in the way of control rights even if she remains fully active in the
case.
5. Veto/License
Fifth and finally, affirmative and binding agency gatekeeper authority can
take the form of a veto or a license. 1 2  Where an agency is vested with veto
authority, as in the FCA context, its failure to terminate or take control of a
private enforcement action does not prevent the private enforcer from
proceeding alone. Rather, a veto-based scheme instantiates what some would
call a "French" rule: private enforcement actions not specifically vetoed by the
agency are permitted. By contrast, an agency with licensing gatekeeper
authority makes its decision against a background assumption that private
rights of action will not lie unless the agency joins the case or otherwise offers
its stamp of approval. Here, the gatekeeper structure instantiates a "German"
rule: private enforcement efforts not specifically licensed by the agency are
forbidden. 3o
Note that none of Table 2's gatekeeper "types" deploys a license approach,
reflecting the fact that no real-world gatekeeper regime of which I am aware
incorporates such an option. Even so, it is noteworthy that some of the more
127. 31 U.S.C. § 37 30(c)(2)(C).
128. The preclusive effect of a government enforcement effort on a qui tam action is part
statutory. See sup;a note 57 (noting FCA provisions jurisdictionally barring actions "based
on the facts underlying the pending action" or "based upon allegations or transactions
which are the subject of a civil suit or an administrative civil money penalty proceeding in
which the Government is already a party"). Courts also apply standard res judicata
principles to subsequent qui tam actions, barring claims that were or could have been
brought in an earlier action. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Barajas v. Northrop Corp., 147
F.3d 905, 909-o (9 th Cir. 1998) (giving full res judicata effect to the dismissal of an
intervened qui tam action in dismissing a subsequent qui tam action asserting a different
fraud theory but involving the same invoices that were the subject of the earlier action).
Finally, note that preclusion can operate in the other direction, binding the government to
actions taken by a relator in an unintervened action. See, e.g., In re Schimmels, 127 F.3d 875,
884 (9 th Cir. 1997) (giving full res judicata effect to a default judgment entered against the
relator in an unintervened case).
129. See Stephenson, supra note 4, at 123-24 (drawing this distinction).
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fervent calls for reform of the DOJ's oversight of qui tam litigation under the
FCA, for instance, would preclude plaintiff-relators from pursuing a case in the
absence of DOJ intervention, thus transforming the current regime into a
license approach."
B. Using the Taxonomy and the Road Ahead
The above survey offers an initial glimpse of the myriad forms agency
gatekeeper authority can take. But it is hardly comprehensive. Tables i and 2
are silent regarding the structure of the agency itself, including whether
gatekeeper powers are vested in already-existing, "standing" agencies (e.g., the
SEC or EEOC), or instead in ad hoc, purpose-built administrative bodies
specifically convened to wield gatekeeper powers. Omitting this design feature
avoids cluttered exposition, as the only real-world gatekeeper examples that
take the latter, ad hoc form are the state medical malpractice review panels. 32
Also unmentioned in Tables i and 2 are the procedures that govern agency
gatekeeper decision-making, from the relatively thick procedure requirements
that govern rulemaking and adjudication under the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) to a range of far thinner ones that Congress or another legislature
could specify instead.133 These procedural options, while an important
component of gatekeeper designs, are better left to Part III's discussion of the
ways regulatory architects can shape agency incentives or counter bureaucratic
inertia in their performance of core gatekeeper tasks.134 Future work may reveal
131. See, e.g., J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam
Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 638-40 (2000). Other scholarly proposals also advance a
license approach. See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 5, at 1417 (advancing a gatekeeper proposal
requiring DOJ approval in order to go forward with a civil rights suit).
132. For a representative state statute providing for the ad hoc formation of a medical malpractice
screening panel, see MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, S 6oB (West 2013) (prescribing the
creation of a tribunal consisting of a state trial judge, physician, and attorney). See generally
Jean A. Macchiaroli, Medical Malpractice Screening Panels: Proposed Model Legislation to Cure
Judicial Ills, 58 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 181, 188-97 (1990) (cataloguing medical malpractice
panel personnel provisions).
133. While Congress could specify thinner procedures than the APA prescribes, in no event could
the procedural bundle fall below the due process floor established in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970), and its progeny.
134. See infra notes 232-238 and accompanying text. As a final example, the above rubric does not
capture provisions that, while not conferring gatekeeper powers themselves, are designed to
facilitate agency gatekeeping action. For instance, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
requires that defendants to a class action within the statute's purview provide notice of any
settlement to "relevant" federal and state officials within ten days of its filing in court, with
the ostensible purpose of allowing government officials to challenge the settlement during a
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still other design dimensions that are salient to regulatory architects and should
be included in any comprehensive survey.
Yet Table 2 in particular offers more than just a taxonomic overview. The
gatekeeper types presented therein are also arguably organized from least to
most interventionist. To that extent, the typology is designed to be a useful
tool, as regulatory designers who desire relatively greater or lesser agency
control over private litigation efforts can simply move up or down the
taxonomic ladder. The next Part begins the process of sketching an analytic
framework that can guide regulatory designers as they do so - or as they decide
whether to install gatekeeper powers at all.
Ill. THE OPTIMAL DESIGN OF AGENCY GATEKEEPER REGIMES
Having defined terms and surveyed a range of possible gatekeeper
approaches, this Part turns to an evaluation of the merits and demerits of
competing designs and the wisdom of vesting agencies with gatekeeper
authority in the first place. The analysis proceeds in three discrete steps.
Section III.A takes the form of a thought exercise: how would an ideal agency
exercising a full complement of wholesale or retail gatekeeper powers use its
authority to mitigate the zealousness, coordination, and legislative fidelity costs
outlined in Part I? Section III.B stays (mostly) in the domain of theory but
moves from the ideal to the positive, offering a more skeptical view as to how
agencies wielding gatekeeper authority in the real world are likely to deviate
from Section III.A's normative ideal. Section III.C then steps back and,
comparing leading gatekeeper designs, identifies a set of functional design
principles and tradeoffs that can help guide policymakers in choosing among
competing models. The resulting analysis is necessarily abstract and far from
the last word on the matter. Nor, it should be noted, is the goal to generate a
trans-substantive, all-things-considered judgment as to the merits of agency
gatekeeping in general. To the contrary, an important theme in what follows is
that optimal gatekeeper design is likely to be highly contextual and grounded
in the realities of a given regulatory regime. To that extent, the more limited
aim in what follows is to map some preliminary lines of analysis and offer some
mid-level generalizations about optimal gatekeeper design that can guide
institutional designers working within discrete regulatory areas, while setting
656
subsequent Rule 23(e) fairness hearing. 28 U.S.C. § 1715 (2006). See generally Catherine M.
Sharkey, CAFA Settlement Notice Provision: Optimal Regulatory Policy?, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
1971 (2008) (discussing the provision's purposes and effects).
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the stage for Part IV's case study of job discrimination regulation as a concrete
application of the gatekeeper idea.
A. The Ideal Gatekeeper Role
One way to begin to take the measure of agency gatekeeping is to ask what
tasks an ideal agency armed with a full complement of gatekeeper powers
would perform. Put another way, if an ideal agency were vested with the power
to delimit, terminate, or control private litigation efforts, what would it do?
1. The Ideal Wholesale Gatekeeper
For agencies vested with wholesale gatekeeper authority (e.g., Type VI
from Table 2), that inquiry is straightforward. First and foremost, such an
agency will use its expertise and global perspective to weigh aggregate costs
and benefits and determine whether whole categories of private enforcement
efforts are, on balance, welfare-maximizing and so should be allowed at all. In
performing this inquiry, an ideal agency will also consider whether a particular
claim or set of claims advancing a novel statutory or regulatory interpretation
strays beyond the core legislative design by, for instance, imposing liability for
conduct that does not arguably fall within legislative purposes.' As a concrete
example, the SEC might determine after study that the social costs of frivolous
"strike" suits have come to outstrip the social benefits of meritorious cases, or
that private lawsuits targeting a particular alleged violation of proxy rules lack
fidelity to the congressional design. When the agency makes such a
determination, it will flip its gatekeeper switch, terminating private rights of
action as to the offending claim types.' 6
135. Notice here that my stylized model toggles between two distinct systemic values that an
"ideal" gatekeeper agency vested with gatekeeper powers will maximize: social welfare and
democratic legitimacy. Of course, where Congress's legislative mandate is itself welfare-
maximizing, the two maximands will align in any agency gatekeeper decision delimiting,
terminating, or steering private enforcement efforts. But where an agency oversees private
enforcement efforts implementing a clearly drafted but socially inefficient law, the two
maximands will necessarily diverge, generating conflict as to what constitutes the ideal
gatekeeper-agency response. In what follows, I ignore the tensions that agency pursuit of
both maximands will sometimes create. For now, it is sufficient to flag the tension and note
that a legislature that vests an agency with gatekeeper powers might wish that agency to
pursue one or the other maximand or a mix of the two.
136. In the securities context, a wholesale agency gatekeeper decision terminating all private
enforcement efforts would, to use Grundfest's term, "disimply" some or all of the private
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Second, an ideal agency wielding wholesale gatekeeper authority can use its
powers to solve certain coordination challenges in hybrid public-private
enforcement regimes by establishing an optimal division of labor between
public and private enforcement efforts. For instance, an agency vested with
wholesale powers can switch private enforcement "on" as to some claims and
"off" as to others, carving up enforcement duties on either side of the public-
private divide in ways that reflect the comparative advantages of each type of
enforcer. 7 By doing so, an agency can also actively husband private
enforcement capacity by signaling to private enforcers, particularly plaintiff-
side law firms, where they should invest in regime-specific expertise and
enforcement infrastructure.'
Finally, recall from Part I's discussion that a principal concern raised by the
legislative fidelity critique is that, even when private enforcement efforts that
stray beyond legislative purposes are ultimately brought to heel, they can
impose substantial "transitional" costs in the interim, before a definitive
legislative or administrative interpretation of an ambiguous legal mandate is in
place. Here, too, an ideal agency vested with wholesale gatekeeper authority
can offer a salve to good-faith regulatory targets who find themselves in the
crosshairs of novel applications of a statute or regulation by holding in
abeyance all private enforcement actions asserting the claims in question,
pending legislative or administrative clarification of the liability standard. 3 9
Importantly, an ideal agency might choose abeyance even if it is likely to go on
to endorse the new liability theory. Indeed, securities law scholars have long
advocated agency-controlled "phase-in" periods during which private enforcers
are precluded from bringing suits alleging fraud under new disclosure
rights of action that the Supreme Court implied from the Securities and Exchange Act inj.L
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432-35 (1964). See Grundfest, supra note 4, at 991 n.133.
137. Many commentators have noted that public and private enforcers have informally reached
an equilibrium in this regard, with public enforcers taking the lead in some areas and private
enforcers in others. See Tamar Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REV. 553, 580
(1981) (noting that "the SEC has largely left the field to private enforcers ... in enforcement
of proxy rules"); Rajabiun, supra note 17, at 187 (asserting that mixed enforcement regimes
allow for specialization, with public antitrust enforcers tending to target monopolists and
private enforcers tending to target anti-competitive contractual relations). Wholesale
gatekeeper authority allows public enforcement agencies to formalize such understandings.
138. See Engstrom, supra note 46, at 1323-25 (noting some of the dynamics that govern private
investment in enforcement capacity in private enforcement regimes).
139. See Rose, supra note 5, at 1355.
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requirements until the agency determines that compliance standards are
sufficiently clear to warrant exposure to private liability.o4
2. The Ideal Retail Gatekeeper
Turning from the wholesale to the retail gatekeeper context requires us first
to revisit some of the wholesale gatekeeper tasks described above. Indeed, as
Table 3's first entry reflects, an ideal agency vested with a full complement of
retail gatekeeper powers (e.g., Types IV and V from Table 2) can just as easily
achieve the same ends as an agency with only wholesale gatekeeper powers.
Thus, an agency could use its retail oversight powers to serially terminate all
private enforcement efforts asserting particular claims in order to give effect to
its policy judgment that such claims are on net socially costly or stray beyond
legislative purposes, or to establish and maintain an optimal public-private
division of labor. Similarly, an ideal agency with a full slate of retail gatekeeper
powers could use those powers to mitigate transitional costs, taking control of
all cases asserting a novel claim pending legislative or administrative action and
either relinquishing that control or terminating those actions once it (or the
legislature) has installed a definitive statutory or regulatory interpretation. In
each of these ways, retail gatekeeper efforts merely retread the ideal wholesale
gatekeeper role.
140. See Grundfest, supra note 4, at 1o15. Of course, one might point out that a "phase-in" period
can impose costs of its own where it prevents private enforcement actions that are later
found to be socially beneficial. One answer here is that the concept of "transitional costs"
presupposes that regulatory targets aim to comply with legal mandates in good-faith ways.
If true, then enforcement of shifting legal mandates without a "phase-in" period will lead to
costly over-deterrence by chilling productive behavior in the shadow of possible legal
liability arising from legally ambiguous injunctions.
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Table 3.
IDEAL RETAIL LITIGATION GATEKEEPER TASKS
Agency Gatekeeper ActiorVTask Description
Terminate or SuspendAll Private Agency serially terminates all private actions
Enforcement Efforts asserting particular claims deemed socially
inefficient or beyond legislative purposes, or
holds them in abeyance pending a definitive
legislative or administrative interpretation.
Terminate or Control Particular Agency terminates or controls specific private
Private Enforcement Efforts enforcement efforts asserting particular claims
when their social costs exceed their benefits or
they inefficiently piggyback on public
enforcement initiatives. By neither terminating
nor joining an action, the agency also signals
uncertainty about case value or merit, thus
highlighting the need for careful judicial
scrutiny and case management.
Anti-queuing: Leverage Under- Agency intervenes in specific private
Resourced or Overmatched Private enforcement efforts that possess substantial
Enforcers merit but where private enforcers - whether
plaintiffs or counsel - lack sufficient resources
or expertise to fully vindicate the public
interest.
Anti-Scaling: Induce (and Pursue) Agency invites and then intervenes in specific
Low- and High-Value Claims private enforcement efforts targeting low- and
high-value claims that private enforcers would
not otherwise see as marketable.
Anti-Collusion: Police Collusive Agency monitors private enforcement efforts
and/or Overbroad Private and uses intervention or other veto authority to
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Yet retail gatekeeping powers can also be put to a variety of uses beyond
across-the-board elimination or abeyance of private enforcement efforts. The
remainder of Table 3 sets forth four additional optimization tasks that a
gatekeeper agency armed with retail gatekeeper powers will perform in an
effort to mitigate the more micro-level calibration, coordination, and legislative
fidelity problems associated with private enforcement detailed in Part I.
First, an ideal agency will use its retail gatekeeper authority to cull or cabin
specific private enforcement efforts asserting a particular kind of claim because
their social costs outweigh their social benefits, while permitting similar, but
welfare-enhancing, claims to proceed. As noted previously, private enforcers
may bring socially undesirable actions for any number of reasons, such as
indifference to social cost, erroneous calculation of case merit, pursuit of
noneconomic litigation goals, or opportunistic piggybacking on public
enforcement actions."' Where such cases arise, an ideal agency armed with
retail gatekeeper powers will terminate them before substantial costs have
accrued, or take control over those cases and steer them in more public-
interested directions. An agency can likewise use its case-specific termination
or control authority to remove from contestation private actions that will make
especially poor appellate vehicles and thus will advantage repeat-player
regulated entities seeking to "play for rules."" Finally, even when a gatekeeper
agency neither terminates nor joins a private enforcement action, it can still
play a valuable epistemic role. Indeed, an ideal retail gatekeeper in such a
situation serves a gatekeeping function of sorts by signaling to courts that its
case assessment is less certain, thus highlighting the need for closer judicial
scrutiny and more careful case management.
The next pair of Table 3's ideal tasks for retail gatekeepers is more subtle.
In general, an ideal agency vested with retail gatekeeper powers will maximally
rely on fully competent and well incentivized private enforcers to perform
enforcement tasks, conserving scarce public enforcement resources for other
uses." Yet, as Part I noted, private enforcement efforts may sometimes prove
141. See supra Section I.B.
142. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
143. Cf Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary
Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 879 (1985)
(proposing that the EPA "cede[] control over routine penalty actions to private enforcers,
and concentrate[] its efforts on the novel, difficult and expensive areas of enforcement");
Naysnerski & Tietenberg, supra note 38, at 46 ("The very existence of private enforcement
allows the public sector greater flexibility in targeting its limited enforcement resources.");
Stephenson, supra note 4, at 1o9 (noting that agencies can "economize" on scarce resources
by relying upon private enforcement where it makes sense to do so).
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deficient. For instance, failures in the market for the retention and referral of
legal services can generate disparities in plaintiff- and defense-side resources or
sophistication that render enforcement suboptimal. Where private enforcement
efforts are impaired by "adversarial asymmetries," as Part I termed them,'" an
ideal gatekeeper agency focused on optimal deterrence will join and leverage
the enforcement efforts of overmatched private enforcers who will not
otherwise fully vindicate the public interest. Here, retail gatekeeper efforts can
solve coordination problems resulting from what amounts to suboptimal
matching of private enforcers with regulatory targets.
The other main reason private enforcement efforts may prove deficient is,
to use Part I's terminology, "scaling" problems."s As noted above, private
enforcers may suboptimally enforce against low-harm misconduct where the
private cost of initiating enforcement (whether psycho-emotional or otherwise)
is high, even where the social benefit of enforcement would clearly exceed its
cost.46 High-harm misconduct may likewise attract suboptimal private
enforcement efforts, either because regulatory targets are judgment-proof (e.g.,
damages are so large they exceed the target's ability to pay), or because they
possess substantial resources and so are seen as able and likely to mount a
vigorous defense."' Here, the ideal gatekeeper role is to secure optimal
deterrence across the full spectrum of misconduct by committing to assist such
claims, thus inducing skittish or reluctant private enforcers with privately held
information about misconduct to come forward.8
Table 3's final ideal gatekeeper task is unique to the situation in which
private enforcers are deputized to collect fines on the government's behalf
rather than damages. As Part I noted, when the bounty a plaintiff-enforcer
earns is less than the full fine, she and the regulatory target will face powerful
incentives to enter into collusive settlements for an amount greater than the
bounty but less than the full fine." Enforcers and targets will likewise face
powerful incentives to swap an overbroad liability release for a somewhat
larger settlement pot, thus preventing future regulators (or other private
enforcers) from forcing full internalization of the costs of misconduct.so
Because of the threat of either type of collusion, an ideal gatekeeper agency will
144. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 5o and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
148. See generally Depoorter & De Mot, supra note 18 (describing a similar dynamic).
149. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
iso. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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continually monitor private settlements and thwart those that threaten to
dilute deterrence or are otherwise inconsistent with government goals.
B. Deviations from the Gatekeeper Ideal
The analysis above paints a rosy portrait of the myriad ways an ideal
agency vested with a full set of wholesale or retail gatekeeper powers can
rationalize and optimize private enforcement efforts. But there is also good
reason to be skeptical about the ability or willingness of agencies to perform
these tasks. Consider three broad classes of problems that may generate
deviations from the ideal gatekeeper role.
1. Institutional Competence and Capacity
A threshold question raised by calls to vest agencies with expansive
gatekeeper powers is whether agencies have the technical competence and
capacity to regulate private enforcement efforts in welfare-maximizing ways.
Turning first to the wholesale gatekeeper context helps lay bare a key
aspect of the inquiry: any assessment of the institutional competence and
capacity of agencies to perform gatekeeper tasks will necessarily be
comparative.'5 The question is not whether agencies can make socially optimal
decisions about, say, whether private rights of action should lie at all. In fact,
one should be skeptical about the ability of any institutional actor to generate a
perfectly accurate bottom-line social-welfare accounting of competing modes
of enforcement in a complex regulatory regime. Instead, the question is
whether agencies can by and large make better judgments along those lines, or
do so more quickly or cheaply, than other institutional actors.'52
Framed this way, the question in the wholesale gatekeeper context is an easy
one, as there is little reason to believe that agencies are less capable or efficient
than legislators or courts at making regime-wide judgments about the optimal
scope of private enforcement - and plenty of reason to believe they are more so.
Part of this flows from the usual observations about the superior expertise,
151. See generally NEIL K. KoMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAw,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBuC POLICY (1994) (arguing in favor of comparative forms of
institutional analysis).
152. See Stephenson, supra note 4, at 126 (noting the importance of considering agency capacity
'not in comparison to a hypothetical ideal decisionmaker, but in comparison to the primary
institutional alternatives, Congress and the courts").
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synopticism, and fact-finding capacity of agencies. 153 Along these dimensions,
agencies plainly dominate generalist courts passively adjudicating a stream of
atomized and often idiosyncratic disputes.1s4
The same is likely true of legislatures as well, though the proliferation of
legislative committees at the federal and state levels makes the institutional
comparison a closer one.s15 In particular, wholesale gatekeeper decision-making
will often involve an interconnected mix of ground-level factual questions
about the enforcement landscape and higher-level, synthetic questions about
the overall "coherence" of the regulatory regime. How costly is private
enforcement relative to public enforcement? Do private enforcers tend to target
misconduct that public enforcers miss, or are they more likely to piggyback on
public enforcement initiatives? What combination of enforcement modes will
best achieve long-term regulatory goals by, for instance, facilitating
collaborative problem-solving between regulators and regulated? Agencies
operating within their assigned regulatory bailiwicks are not just likely to have
defter command of these high- and low-level issues than legislators. They will
also be better suited to perform ongoing monitoring, ensuring timelier
updating of prior wholesale gatekeeper decisions about whether and which
claims should be private-enforcement-eligible. s6
While the superior competence and capacity of agencies are thus mostly
settled in the wholesale context, this is plainly less true in the retail context.
The difference lies in the nature of retail gatekeeping: the principal retail-level
gatekeeper task is not forming broad-scale, "legislative" judgments about the
net social costs or benefits of competing regulatory approaches but rather a far
more quotidian, "adjudicative" sorting of more and less meritorious cases. One
implication is that the nature of retail gatekeeping shifts the primary
institutional comparison to be performed. The competence and capacity
inquiry in the wholesale gatekeeper context mostly distills to a comparison of
agencies and legislatures. In the retail context, however, the primary
comparison is between agencies and courts.
153. See id. at 129-43.
154. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (summarizing the view that judicial case processing
necessarily lacks the synopticism necessary to form valid generalizations about policy
benefits).
155. See Eric Shickler, Institutional Development of Congress, in THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH 35, 37-41
(Paul J. Quirk & Sarah A. Binder eds., 2005) (noting the steady enhancement of legislatures'
fact-finding and analytic capacities via the committee system).
156. Similar points have been made in the long literature on regulatory preemption. See sources
cited supra note 12.
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A second implication is that our judgment as to which of these
institutions -agencies or courts-is better situated to assess case merit will
turn, at least in part, on how merit is conceptualized in the first instance.
American legal culture trades in at least three distinct conceptions of case merit.
The first is probabilistic and comparative: a case is more meritorious than
another if the defendant is more likely to be held liable for some remedy.' 7 A
second is pegged to social value: a case is meritorious if its successful
prosecution would, on balance, enhance social welfare."' A third is legalistic: a
case has merit if it is true that the defendant has violated a valid legal
injunction. 59
At one level, this menu of options offers little analytic traction. After all, a
gatekeeper agency will likely make judgments tracking all three merit
conceptions in performing the full slate of ideal retail gatekeeper tasks. As
concrete examples, an ideal retail gatekeeper agency might terminate a case
based on its determination that the social cost of enforcement would outstrip
its social benefit (the second conception) or, alternatively, that the plaintiffs
factual allegations, even if true, do not add up to a violation of a legal
prohibition or injunction (the third conception). Similarly, an ideal retail
gatekeeper agency deciding whether to allocate scarce public enforcement
157. See Warren F. Schwartz & C. Frederick Beckner III, Toward a Theory of the "Meritorious
Case": Legal Uncertainty as a Social Choice Problem, 6 GEO. MASON L. REv. 801, 803 (1998)
(noting the "widely accepted" assumption in American legal culture that "[t]he merit of a
case varies systematically with the probability that it will succeed"). This conception of
merit also tracks the foundational legal realist assumption, going back to at least Holmes,
that a case in which a plaintiff prevails is by definition meritorious. See Oliver Wendell
Holmes, The Path of the Law, lo HARv. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897) (defining "the law" as
"prophecies of what the courts will do in fact").
158. See Schwartz & Beckner, supra note 157, at 803 (noting the further assumption within legal
culture that links a case's merit to whether it is "socially desirable that it be maintained").
Social welfare as a key metric in gauging case merit is also implicit in much of the law and
economics literature on litigation behavior. See, e.g., Shavell, supra note 38 (noting the
divergence between the private and the social incentive to litigate a case).
159. Of course, this third conception of merit is question-begging, for it assumes an externally
constructed standard that can supply a "right" judgment of legality that may or may not
deviate from what a judge or jury will provide. See Schwartz & Beckner, supra note 157, at
805. Here again, this conception of merit is implicit in much of the law and economics
literature on litigation behavior, which frequently models the likelihood that an adjudicator
will err in the plaintiffs or defendant's favor. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Howard F.
Chang, An Analysis of Fee Shifting Based on the Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits,
Meritorious Suits, and the Role of Rule 11, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 371, 374-75 (1996). For an
illuminating discussion that partakes of the above conceptions of merit, but does so in an
effort to define "frivolous" rather than "meritorious," see Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous
Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 529-33 (1997).
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resources toward a case that features an under-resourced or overmatched
private enforcer will almost certainly consider both the case's social value (the
second conception) and also its probability of success with and without the
benefit of government participation (the first conception). Judges, too, make
similar assessments in adjudicating pretrial motions. 6o
Given that agencies and courts will deploy multiple and competing
conceptions of merit in making gatekeeper decisions, it does not make sense to
commit to one or another conception in rendering a comparative judgment
about institutional capacity. Even so, it should be clear that systematic
judgments about the relative competence and capacity of agencies and courts to
perform retail gatekeeping will heavily depend on the weight accorded to
particular gatekeeper tasks. Thus, where an agency is mainly using its retail,
case-by-case gatekeeper powers to implement broad-scale judgments about
which types of cases are welfare-enhancing and which welfare-decreasing, or
where the agency is using those same powers to solve coordination problems or
police fidelity to legislative purpose, its panoramic view of the regulatory
landscape confers a clear advantage in the same way it does in the wholesale
16o. For instance, a judge deciding a summary judgment motion under Rule 56 can be thought
to be implementing a version of the first (probabilistic) conception of merit insofar as she
asks whether a reasonable jury could find in the non-movant's favor. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56;
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (setting forth this standard). Similarly, a court
deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) can be thought to be implementing the
first (probabilistic) or second (welfarist) conception of merit, depending on one's
understanding of what the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), instruct trial
judges to do. One view is that those decisions' installation of a "plausibility" pleading
standard requires courts to gauge the likely factual sufficiency of the allegations and thus to
apply a probability screen in deciding Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, despite the Court's
own claim to the contrary. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 ("Asking for plausible grounds to
infer an agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it
simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence of illegal agreement."); Jonah B. Gelbach, Note, Locking the Doors to Discovery?
Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270 (2012)
(employing a probabilistic conception of the plausibility standard). Another view is that the
Court's Twombly and Iqbal decisions instantiate the second (welfarist) conception of merit
by requiring trial courts to weigh both the likelihood discovery will reveal inculpating facts
and also the likely litigation and other costs that will be incurred in getting there. See
Engstrom, supra note 91; Louis Kaplow, Multistage Adjudication, 126 HARv. L. REv. 1179,
1256-58 (2013). Finally, a court that decides a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) by
finding that the plaintiff has failed to state a valid legal claim even under the prior "no set of
facts" standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)- for instance, because
the relevant statute does not apply extraterritorially-would clearly be implementing the
third (legalistic) conception of merit.
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gatekeeper context.6' But this advantage narrows and may even disappear
entirely when the task at hand is merits-screening of the narrow, probabilistic
sort. Indeed, both institutional actors have at their disposal substantial
evidentiary tools - subpoenas and civil investigative demands on the one hand
and civil discovery tools, as wielded by litigant-adversaries, on the other-that
are unlikely to differ substantially in their probability-estimating utility.,6  As a
i6f. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L.
REv. 885, 928 (2003) (asserting that "agencies are likely to be in a better position to decide
whether departures from the text actually make sense" or "whether departures from the text
will seriously diminish predictability or otherwise unsettle the statutory scheme"). That
agencies possess greater technical expertise and privileged access to legislative purpose
relative to courts is also a core tenet of the Chevron doctrine. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (basing deference to agency
interpretation of statutes on, among other factors, the fact that "the regulatory regime is
technical and complex"); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 2071, 2101 (1990) (noting that Chevron's deference principle is rooted, at
least in part, in assumptions about "the comparative advantages of the agency in
administering complex statutes").
162. Legal scholars have long debated the comparative advantages of judicial versus
administrative adjudicators in particular, and generalist versus specialist adjudicators more
broadly, in interpreting statutes. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:
CHALLENGE AND REFORM 254-57 (1996) (focusing on whether generalist or specialist courts
will be more faithful to the "current" or the "original goals of a statutory program"); Revesz,
supra note 55, at 1117 (examining whether specialized courts can better "promote the
coherence of a statutory scheme" or manage legal complexity). Comparatively few analyses,
however, consider the comparative capacity of adjudicator types in performing the more
pedestrian task of gauging a claim's factual sufficiency. A standard claim is that
specialized/administrative adjudication may prove more accurate in highly technical areas
because of superior experience and expertise. See, e.g., Hemphill, supra note 6, at 670-84
(making this claim in the antitrust context); Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 161, at 927-28,
943 (making a more general version of the claim and expressing doubt whether generalist
judges, with limited time and information, "can form even a plausible view of the relevant
complexities" across a range of regulatory areas in adjudicating claims). Others, however,
assert just the opposite, arguing that immersion and insularity can in fact render specialists'
decisions inferior to generalists', and suggesting that a gatekeeper agency would be
demonstrably worse than courts at gauging case merit or evaluating the factual sufficiency of
claims. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, SPECIALIZING THE COURTS 31-34 (2011) (reviewing this
debate). Nor has empirical work made much progress on the question, at least in part
because of the impossibility of establishing an objective measure of case "merit." For
instance, a recent empirical effort to gauge the relative decisional quality of agencies and
courts in the antitrust context by comparing appellate reversal rates in cases adjudicated at
the Federal Trade Commission and in federal district courts fails not just because the
standard of appellate review is different as to the two types of decisions but also because the
study, by using decisions of appellate-level judicial generalists as a baseline measure of
merit, begs the question as to whether the adjudicatory capacities of generalist judges and
expert administrators systematically vary. See Joshua D. Wright & Angela M. Diveley, Do
Expert Agencies Outperform Generalist Judges? Some Preliminary Evidencefrom the Federal Trade
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result, there is little reason to believe that agencies wielding gatekeeper powers
or courts will systematically vary in their capacity to judge a claim's factual
sufficiency based on collected evidence or the weight to be accorded specific
evidentiary showings, except perhaps in the most technical of areas.' 6 ,
The inquiry's comparative nature and the contingency introduced by
competing definitions of merit are not just important for deciding who decides
in the retail context; they also expose critical tensions in the gatekeeper idea
itself. If "merit" is understood in narrow probabilistic terms as the likelihood
that a court will find liability, then retail gatekeeper authority will merely
duplicate - though possibly more efficiently- the outcomes the judicial system
would produce absent gatekeeper intervention. Here, the ideal agency
gatekeeper is at best an efficiency-enhancing, adjudicatory "adjunct" to the
courts that is not so different in concept from the "specialized" courts that dot
the American regulatory landscape. 64 If, however, "merit" is understood more
broadly to include a social welfare or legislative fidelity component, then
agency gatekeeping takes on a fundamentally different and more "regulatory"
character. Rather than serving as an adjudicatory adjunct, the agency is
interposed between private enforcers and the courts to implement a conception
of merit that is diferent from what judges or juries would otherwise deliver.16s
Given these complexities, rigorous empirical evidence on agencies' merits-
screening capacities is hard to come by. One approach would be to isolate a
particular type of regulatory regime and compare all litigation outcomes -
including voluntary dismissals, litigated judgments, and settlements -before
and after a jurisdiction installed a gatekeeper regime to those same outcomes in
Commission, 1 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 82, 91-94 (2013). For analysis of the few
empirical studies trained more narrowly on the merits-screening capacities of gatekeeper
agencies, see infra notes 224-227 and accompanying text.
163. One commentator has taken a contrary position in a recent analysis, suggesting that vesting
the SEC with gatekeeper powers would not be effective because "at the screening stage
before discovery, the facts are undeveloped," and it is "unclear why the SEC would be much
better in assessing cases at the pre-discovery stage than courts." Park, supra note 4, at 175.
But this view seems founded on an unduly narrow conception of the agency gatekeeper role,
as there is no reason why an agency armed with gatekeeper powers cannot use its various
investigatory tools to flesh out the merits of a case before rendering a gatekeeper decision.
To that extent, the comparative institutional analysis reduces, as noted above, to whether
agencies or courts wield substantially more or less efficient or effective evidentiary tools or
differ in their capacity to weigh evidence once collected.
164. See generally BAUM, supra note 162 (offering an overview of "specialized" courts within the
American legal system).
165. This would also raise a host of further questions about how, precisely, agency decisions
would differ from those of judges or juries. For further discussion of judge-jury dynamics,
see infra note 182.
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a second, similarly situated jurisdiction that lacked gatekeeper structures
throughout the study period. 66 The resulting "differences-in-differences"
estimate would meaningfully isolate the systemic effect of an agency's
gatekeeper actions on the volume and character of litigation efforts by washing
(or "differencing") out other possible explanations for observed variance along
these measures.167
However, even this ideal research design would fall considerably short of
establishing agencies' superior merits-screening capacity. It could not, for
instance, tell us how much of any observed change in litigation outcomes was
attributable to actual agency gatekeeper decisions (and, thus, to an agency's
actual ability to screen cases on merit grounds) as against litigants' perceptions
(accurate or not) about the agency's merits-screening capacity or proclivity to
use it.,6s Nor could such an approach tell us much about whether agencies can
arrive at merits decisions more efficiently- that is, more quickly or while
consuming fewer resources - than courts, at least not without large quantities
of data about the parties' litigation costs and the resources consumed by
agencies and courts in rendering their dispositions. Finally, even a
sophisticated research design such as the above would be stymied where a
gatekeeper agency possesses the power to intervene in and take control of,
rather than merely terminate, private enforcement actions. Here, the
government's decision to enter a case operates as both a selection and
treatment effect in ways that are famously difficult to pry apart empirically.169
What little empirical evidence from actual gatekeeper regimes that exists
well illustrates these methodological challenges. For example, numerous
studies have evaluated the decisional output of state-level medical malpractice
screening panels, with most finding few statistically meaningful differences
across states with and without panels in the frequency, severity, timeliness, or
cost of claims.o70 But a few scattered studies have painted a more discouraging
166. See JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JORN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLEss ECONOMETRICS: AN
EMPIRICIST'S COMPANION 227-43 (2009) (describing the "differences in differences"
approach).
167. Id.
168. See Engstrom, supra note 91 (noting a similar difficulty in assessing the effect of the
Supreme Court's Twombly and Iqbal decisions on motion-to-dismiss rates in light of
dynamic litigant responses to the decisions).
169. See Engstrom, supra note 62, at 1737-38 (noting the difficulty of prying apart selection and
treatment effects in measuring gatekeeper effects).
170. See MELLO & KACHALIA, supra note 11, at 8 ("No controlled studies have identified
statistically significant effects on claim frequency or payouts, while 7 have found no
association."); Frederick J. White III et al., Medical Malpractice Review Panels and Medical
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portrait for panel advocates, finding an overall increase in litigation volume and
time-to-resolution in states with mandatory screening panels relative to those
without.17 ' One possible interpretation of the finding that panels increase claim
frequency is that plaintiffs are more willing to litigate claims despite adverse
panel decisions because they view those decisions as biased or unreliable."
This would suggest that the panels lack merits-screening capacity. But a more
likely explanation is that the panels operate to subsidize claims by offering a
low-cost expert opinion that is fully admissible in subsequent litigation in most
states, thus reducing plaintiff-side litigation costs and inducing plaintiffs to
bring claims they otherwise would not.'73 Importantly, some (though not all)
of these newly filed cases will be at least as "meritorious" as the average case in
the nonpanel case pool in the sense of the probability of achieving a positive
litigation outcome.'74 But without an objective measure of the underlying
likelihood of success, we cannot know how many of these new cases are
stronger and how many weaker than before, frustrating firm inferences about
the panels' merits-screening capacity or their overall effect on the litigation
regime.'7s
Perhaps the two best empirical efforts to date avoid these difficulties but
offer conflicting findings and also reveal interpretive problems of their own.
Liability System Cost, Timeliness, and Efficiency: A Cross-Sectional Study, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 375, 375 (20o8) (evaluating the association "between the medical malpractice panel
status of a state ... and measures of cost, timeliness, and efficiency of ... claims resolution
for the year 2002").
171. See Roger Hanson et al., What Is the Role of State Doctrine in Understanding Tort Litigation?, 1
MICH. L. & POL'Y REv. 43, 70 tbl. 5 (1996) (finding higher rates of litigation in states with
screening panels); Stephen Shmanske & Tina Stevens, The Performance of Medical
Malpractice Review Panels, 11 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 525 (1986) (same); see also MELLO &
KACHALiA, supra note iII, at 9 (noting studies showing longer time-to-resolution in panel
states and speculating that this is a simple artifact of adding a step to the litigation process).
172. MELLO & KACHALIA, supra note 11, at 8.
173. See, e.g., Hanson et al., supra note 171, at 71 ("Another possibility is that plaintiffs will use
these panels as a low cost-yet effective-means to get a clear reading on the odds of
winning."). Here, my analysis tracks the standard law and economics model of the decision
to litigate as a calculation of the expected value, net of costs, of filing suit. See FARHANG,
supra note 1, at 22 (summarizing this approach).
174. This is because a case's expected value is a function of both the amount in controversy and
the probability of success. As a result, even cases with high probability (but low damages)
may not have had positive expected value without the cost savings the panels provide.
175. Even the basic finding that panels are associated with higher litigation rates may be a non-
starter because of a causal direction problem: mandatory screening panels may not cause
higher litigation rates so much as high litigation rates cause states to adopt mandatory
screening panels. STRUvE, supra note loo, at 6o.
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First, a recent large-scale study of job discrimination litigation found that the
EEOC staffs internal, nonpublic triage characterizations of case merit as well
as its formal, public "cause" determinations bore little or no relationship to
subsequent litigation outcomes.* This suggests (but does not prove) that
EEOC merit judgments, if transformed into fully binding case-termination
decisions, would not offer a more efficient, preemptive alternative to judicial
resolution.'7
Here again, however, we run up against a critical tension in the gatekeeper
idea as to whether gatekeeper agencies should serve as an efficiency-enhancing,
adjudicatory adjunct to the courts, or whether they should serve a more
"regulatory" role, implementing a conception of merit that departs from merely
predicting what a judge or jury would do. If the EEOC is viewed as an
adjudicatory "adjunct" to the courts whose principal task is to filter out cases
using a probabilistic conception of merit, then the divergence of EEOC triage
decisions from subsequent litigation outcomes should give pause to regulatory
architects considering gatekeeper designs. If, however, the EEOC's gatekeeper
role is defined more broadly to include a social welfare or legislative fidelity
component, then the apparent disconnect between EEOC triage decisions and
ultimate litigation outcomes might be grounds for cautious optimism rather
than concern. 17
176. See Laura Beth Nielsen et al., Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? Employment
Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175,
18l, 184, 187, 191 (2010) (examining 1,600 suits across seven regionally diverse district
courts during the period from 1988 to 2003 and finding that "EEOC priority codes and
merit determinations have little explanatory effect" in terms of predicting the likelihood that
a filed case will proceed to the next stage of litigation). For a full tour of the EEOC triage
and charge processing system, see infra notes 258-261 and accompanying text.
177. Note that the study also found no association between formal EEOC "cause" findings and
litigation outcomes. Nielsen et al., supra note 176, at 191. But this offers a less attractive
empirical test of agency merits-screening capacity, as the agency's "cause" determination is
disclosed to judge and jury in many jurisdictions, introducing substantial endogeneity into
the analysis. A larger problem with both findings is that, by focusing on filed job
discrimination cases, the study examined only a relatively small subset (roughly one-quarter
during the study period) of charges that the EEOC had evaluated, whether at the initial
triage stage or the "cause"-determination stage. As a result, we cannot draw clear inferences
about the EEOC's merits-screening capacity because we cannot gauge the accuracy of its
determinations in the full case population, including those that did and did not proceed to
litigation. Still, the study does permit us to conclude that, during the 1988 to 2003 interval,
EEOC gatekeeping via charge processing offered little merits-signaling value to courts
adjudicating subsequently filed claims.
178. As noted previously, this raises substantial questions about how, precisely, EEOC staff
decisions would differ from those of a judge or jury. For further discussion of judge-jury
dynamics, see infra note 182.
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The other rigorous gatekeeper study, this one examining DOJ decisions to
intervene in qui tam suits under the FCA, offers a pointed contrast to the
EEOC study, finding that the DOJ possesses at least some merits-screening
capacity in the sense of predicting judicial outcomes. 179 Yet even this finding
does not answer the key comparative question as to whether the DOJ reached
those decisions more efficiently than would courts adjudicating those same
cases in a counterfactual world without any DOJ gatekeeper role. More
importantly, the FCA regime hardly offers a conservative test. Qui tam cases
are famously technical, and agencies are likely to enjoy an advantage over
generalist courts in more complex regulatory contexts.so In addition, because
private qui tam relators assert claims for fraud on behalf of the government in
connection with federal programs or expenditures, the DOJ enjoys privileged
access to information about case merits, as it can work directly with the agency
allegedly defrauded to develop necessary evidence. By contrast, EPA gatekeeper
decisions about whether to displace environmental "citizen suits" require
investigation well beyond government boundaries in determining whether,
say, a regulatory target has unlawfully released pollutants. In nontechnical
cases involving subject matter that is largely divorced from governmental
activity, the agency's advantage may narrow or even vanish.' 8'
179. See Engstrom, supra note 46, at 1272 n.93 (using a differences-in-differences approach that
leverages a unique doctrinal change in the Ninth Circuit limiting the DOJ's power to veto
relator-defendant settlements to establish that the DOJ has at least some merits-screening
capacity).
iSo. Many qui tam cases, for instance, involve the Federal Acquisition Regulations, a byzantine
set of rules regarding government contracting that currently runs to nearly 2,000 pages, or
the equally voluminous and complex Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement regulations.
See Federal Acquisition Regulations, 48 C.F.R. ch. 1 (2005); Medicare, CENTERS FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICEs, http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare.html (last
visited Oct. 3, 2013); see also Engstrom, supra note 46, at 1271 (showing the high prevalence
of qui tam cases asserting health care fraud under Medicaid and Medicare programs). For
two recent examples of qui tam suits predicated on FAR violations, see United States ex rel.
Dyer v. Raytheon Co., No. o8-lo831-DPW, 2013 WL 5348571 (D. Mass. Sept. 13, 2013)
(describing FCA claim based on FAR rules on incentive compensation within federal
contracts); and United States v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1344 (N.D.
Ga. 2013) (noting relator claims regarding contractor billing systems predicated on FAR
violations).
181. Similarly, and as I elaborate in Part IV infra, agencies may enjoy less of a comparative




AGENCIES AS LITIGATION GATEKEEPERS
To be sure, the above rehearsal of theory and evidence is stylized and
incomplete."' For now, however, one can hazard some general conclusions
about the relative competence and capacity of agencies to perform litigation
gatekeeper tasks. The first is that the competence and capacity advantages
agencies enjoy over courts are probably narrower in the retail gatekeeper
context than in the wholesale context. Second, and more specifically, the
comparative advantage of agencies in the retail gatekeeper context, if any, will
likely turn on context- and regime-specific factors, including the degree of
technicality of a given regulatory area, the presence or absence of jury decision-
making, and the extent to which the agency enjoys preferred access to
evidentiary materials on which to base merits judgments.
Together, these two observations add up to a third: many commentators
who have made calls to vest agencies with expansive gatekeeper powers see
retail-level merits screening and case termination as the sine qua non of the ideal
agency gatekeeper role.' And yet, the above analysis suggests that case
termination is the gatekeeper task where the competence and capacity gap
between agencies and courts is likely to be narrowest. By contrast, the agency
advantage would seem to be widest when used to steer private enforcement
actions in more public-interested directions, promote cooperation with
regulated industry, enhance the consistency and coherence of regulatory
implementation, or police fidelity to the legislative design.'" To that extent,
the justification for vesting agencies with retail gatekeeper powers in many
regulatory contexts is unlikely to be founded solely on an agency's ability to
cull meritless cases.
182. By focusing narrowly on merits-screening capacity, the analysis has pushed past the
standard problem of managerial control within agencies-a topic that fits more naturally
with Subsection III.B.3's discussion of the ways bureaucratic behavioral tendencies can
distort agency gatekeeper decisions. Moreover, and as alluded to at various points above, the
analysis has mostly ducked the myriad ways judges, jurors, and bureaucrats are likely to
vary in assessing case "merit," at least in part because such differences are likely to be highly
context-specific. Future research focused on particular substantive regulatory areas can
usefully engage with the likely proclivities and biases of each of these decision-makers in
making fact determinations regarding negligence, market power, discriminatory or
fraudulent intent, and the like. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE Vicious CIRCLE:
TowARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 35-37 (1993) (reviewing the literature on expert and
lay perceptions of risk); W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, and the Mistreatment of Risk by the
Courts, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 107 (2001) (using experimental design to explore judge and juror
intuitions about risk).
183. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 5, at 1306 (discussing case termination as the sole gatekeeper task).
184. See supra notes 141-150 and accompanying text (cataloguing some possible uses of retail
gatekeeper authority, including serial use of such authority to achieve many of the same
ends as wholesale gatekeeper powers).
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2. Regulatory "Capture"
Even if agencies have the capacity to perform gatekeeping tasks in welfare-
maximizing ways, they may lack the will to do so. An influential line of analysis
holds that administrative agencies suffer from a range of bureaucratic
pathologies, particularly in their susceptibility to regulatory "capture.",ss In its
standard form, capture theory predicts that certain groups will systematically
win out over other groups in the regulatory process, both because they face
more concentrated benefits or costs and so have greater incentive to invest in
information or lobbying efforts, and also because they can better solve the
collective action problems that often stymie group-based political action. 86
Applying these ideas to the gatekeeper context, we might thus worry that
regulated parties will exert disproportionate influence over agency gatekeepers,
systematically bending gatekeeping decisions in their favor and thus
compromising the agency's stewardship of zealousness, coordination, and
legislative fidelity within the regime.
Yet capture arguments quickly run into well known problems. As an initial
matter, whether agencies can be "captured" at all is a contestable issue, both
theoretically and empirically.'' More fundamentally, assessing capture-like
185. For recent and comprehensive treatments of the capture concept, see STEVEN P. CROLEY,
REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT
26-52 (2oo8); and PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND
How To LIMIT IT (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2013).
186. See CROLEY, supra note 185, at 27. The classic accounts of the collective action problems and
asymmetric stakes that underpin "capture" theory are MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965); and JAMES Q
WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 332-37 (1973)-
187. See Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7, 7-8 (2000)
(reviewing studies and finding little consistent support for capture theories); Mark Kelman,
On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice ofthe Public
Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199, 236-68 (1988) (offering an earlier canvass of existing
studies and arriving at the same conclusion); see also Daniel Carpenter, Detecting and
Measuring Capture, in PREVENTING REGUIATORY CAPTURE, supra note 185, at 57, 67-68
(setting forth an agenda for how scholars might subject capture theories to better empirical
testing). A further conceptual problem is that capture's regulatory valence is not always
clear, frustrating firm predictions about its likely effects. The currently ascendant version of
the theory holds that capture is deregulatory (or "corrosive") in favoring regulatory targets.
See Daniel Carpenter, Corrosive Capture? The Dueling Forces of Autonomy and Industry
Influence in FDA Pharmaceutical Regulation, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE, supra
note 185, at 152, 153-55. But in the gatekeeper context, the opposite might also be true: an
increasingly well organized plaintiffs' bar might be every bit as capable of "capturing" an
agency, particularly where a steadily turning "revolving door" moves lawyers between the
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assessing institutional competence and capacity-is necessarily comparative.
And here, public law scholars offer a musical-chairs of arguments about which
institutions, if any, are more or less vulnerable. One view is that agencies might
be less susceptible to patterns of political control than institutional alternatives,
particularly legislatures, because of their ability to carve out a sphere of
"bureaucratic autonomy" from the pull and haul of politics.,88 Far better, the
argument goes, to have expert agencies - as opposed to legislatures and, more
specifically, legislative committees-make wholesale gatekeeper judgments
about the optimal reach of private enforcement.189 A second view concludes
just the opposite: because agencies operate in close proximity to regulated
parties, they are uniquely susceptible to political influence compared to
legislatures or Article III courts.19o Still another view rejects both positions and
holds that, when it comes to the asymmetric stakes and collective action
problems at capture theory's core, legislatures, agencies, and courts tend to
"move together."' 9' Thus, regulated entities might capture the gatekeeper
agencies directly, using their superior organizational capacity and resource
endowments to bend gatekeeper decisions in their favor, or they might
accomplish those same ends indirectly by capturing political overseers (whether
legislative or executive) or courts (via the litigation process).
The obvious problem with these starkly different views is that it is hard to
know whether we should be concerned about gatekeeper capture at all. One
possibility is that interposing agencies into the litigation process will be neutral
or even positive with respect to capture effects. Indeed, gatekeeping may
merely reproduce capture dynamics that already exist elsewhere within the
agency and the ranks of private enforcers. See Engstrom, supra note 46, at 1257-62, 1285
n.149.
188. See DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS,
NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862-1928, at 25, 32-33 (2001)
(noting how agencies can achieve autonomy by maneuvering among multiple principals or
building coalitions with outside groups that cut across lines of political control).
189. See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control Delegated Power,
81 TEx. L. REV. 1443, 1444 (2003) (noting that "committee members sometimes defy
majority preferences rather than reinforce them"). But see KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL
POLITICS: A THEORY OF U.S. LAWMAKING 191-200, 232-34 (1998) (exploring, but mostly
rejecting, the notion that committee members have outlier policy preferences).
19o. On the relative susceptibility of agencies and courts to capture, see M. Elizabeth Magill,
Courts and Regulatory Capture, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE, supra note 185, at 397,
408-1o (assessing whether lawsuits invoking judicial review of agency action are subject to
the same resource, collective action, and other dynamics that lead to capture in the political
sphere).
191. See KOMESAR, supra note 151, at 23. But see Thomas W. Merrill, Institutional Choice and
Political Faith, 22 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 959, 973-74 (1998) (critiquing this view).
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system, but many of gatekeeping's benefits- decisions grounded in a more
technocratic and comprehensive command of the regulatory landscape, or
more accurate and efficient filtering of meritless cases -will remain fully intact.
A more pessimistic possibility, however, is that interposing agencies as
gatekeepers will make capture dynamics far worse. On this view, gatekeeper
regimes will multiply sites for unfair political influence, empowering interested
groups to use their organizational and resource-based advantages to turn
regulatory outcomes to their advantage even beyond what they might achieve
in the legislative and judicial process.
Unfortunately, available empirical evidence does little to adjudicate
between these very different scenarios. Thus, the long empirical literature on
political control of bureaucracy confirms that the political pressures that can
distort agency enforcement decisions operate through multiple channels,
particularly legislative committees.19 That same literature also surveys the
conditions under which an agency may be more or less resistant to external
pressures, including the agency's degree of budgetary independence, 93 the
breadth of the agency's jurisdiction,194 the agency's internal structure,'95 or the
degree of legislative and executive control over appointment and removal of
agency heads.'96 And yet, this literature permits few bottom-line conclusions
about whether agency gatekeeping will exacerbate or mitigate capture concerns
across the run of possible applications. As with institutional competence and
192. For classic studies, see Terry M. Moe, Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case
of the NLRB, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1094 (1985); and Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran,
Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade
Commission, 91 J. POL. EcoN. 765, 792 (1983).
193. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63
VAND. L. REv. 599, 611 (2010) (noting funding sources as a potential element of agency
independence); see also Daniel P. Carpenter, Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and
Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 283, 284-87 (1996) (discussing
more formal models of budgetary control of agencies); Michael M. Ting, The "Power of the
Purse" and Its Implications for Bureaucratic Policy-Making, 1o6 PUB. CHOICE 243, 244-47
(2001) (same).
194. See Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control ofAdministrative Agencies,
8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93, 99-100, 104 (1992) (arguing that agencies are more vulnerable to
capture where they regulate fewer interests).
195. See, e.g., Andrew B. Whitford, Decentralization and Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 14 J.
THEORETICAL POL. 167, 173 (2002) (noting that political control of a bureaucracy turns
heavily on its organizational structure).
196. See generally Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2013)
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capacity concerns, the degree to which capture dynamics drive deviations from
the gatekeeper ideal articulated in Section III.A will be highly contextual.
The few empirical studies that focus on actual gatekeeper regimes are no
more conclusive and once more underscore the extent to which gatekeeper
regimes must be assessed through close, case-by-case analysis rather than
general rules. For instance, recent studies examining the DOJ's use of its power
to commandeer qui tam suits brought under the FCA reveal a trio of troubling
regularities: the DOJ is more likely to join cases brought by former DOJ
attorneys now serving as plaintiff-relator's counsel;197 the DOJ is less likely to
join cases brought against Fortune ioo companies or top defense
contractors;19" and qui tam cases relating to controversial war efforts in Iraq
and Afghanistan remained under DOJ investigation longer than other defense-
related cases during the George W. Bush Administration and then were quickly
acted upon during the Obama Administration, suggesting a partisan pattern
of delay. 99
Yet these findings once more expose the ambiguities at capture theory's
core. As an initial matter, it is hard to know whether the DOJ's seeming soft-
pedaling of defense cases results from overly cozy relationships between the
Department of Defense and the "old generals" network within the defense
contractor establishment, simple overhead political control (e.g., the
Administration's desire to deflect attention from unpopular war efforts), or a
combination of both. This is important, for one cannot insulate agencies from
capture dynamics without first identifying their source. Indeed, greater
bureaucratic autonomy might mitigate capture resulting from political control
transmitted via the White House or congressional committees, but it may at
the same time exacerbate "revolving door" forms of capture.
More importantly, these empirical findings hardly provide ironclad proof
of something we can call capture. To be sure, lower DOJ intervention rates
against large defendant companies and defense contractors might well reflect
agency timidity in the face of those entities' political influence or litigation
197. See Engstrom, supra note 46, at 1306-07 (finding that the DOJ is more likely to intervene in
qui tam suits in which former DOJ attorneys are serving as plaintiff-relator's counsel,
despite the fact that those same suits also produce lower average recoveries than suits
brought by attorneys without a DOJ connection).
198. See Engstrom, supra note 62, at 1735 (finding that the DOJ is substantially less likely to use
its power to intervene in cases brought against Fortune ioo companies or top defense
contractors).
199. See id. at 1745 (reporting findings).
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resources.2 Large defense contractors may also be uniquely unattractive
enforcement targets because they are too important to debar from future
government work, substantially reducing the government's litigation
leverage."' It is just as possible, however, that larger companies draw more
marginal qui tam complaints because they are perceived by private plaintiff-
relators as having deeper pockets or being more sensitive to public relations
concerns."' As with perennial claims in other regulatory contexts that this or
the other agency has been captured or is otherwise engaged in covert transfers,
the empirical evidence here is equivocal."
Nonetheless, consideration of the DOJ's gatekeeper activities in the FCA
context helps us to carve out some more general observations from the
conceptual and empirical morass. First, it seems clear that capture, to the extent
it exists at all, will be far more likely to rear its head in the retail than in the
wholesale gatekeeper context. Part of this is practical: it will often be difficult
for legislative overseers to detect capture-related distortions across a large body
of individual agency decisions. This is particularly true of qui tam lawsuits,
some of which remain under seal even after the DOJ renders a gatekeeper
decision." 4
Yet the greater susceptibility of retail gatekeeper agencies to capture has a
deeper, theoretical basis as well. Traditionally understood, capture results from
asymmetric stakes and the logic of collective action, but it also requires a
"rationally ignorant" public."s This is important, for a long literature with
theoretical and empirical components suggests that agency adjudication is
more likely than rulemaking to facilitate capture because adjudication is less
visible and less salient to the general public.' 6 Applied to the gatekeeper
200. See id. at 1735; see also Rajabiun, supra note 23, at 81 ("Even without regulatory capture,
economizing practices by public enforcers reveal the presence of incentives to divert
resources to actions against firms less likely to be able to defend themselves.").
201. See Engstrom, supra note 62, at 1735.
202. Id.
203. See supra notes 192-196 and accompanying text. The finding that the DOJ is more likely to
intervene in cases brought by former DOJ insiders is likewise subject to alternative
explanations. One possibility is that former DOJ insiders are systematically more risk-averse
than other counsel and so prefer cases that are smaller but more likely to generate a
recovery.
204. See Engstrom, supra note 46, at 1287.
205. See generally ANTHONY DOWNS, AN EcoNOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957) (offering the
seminal account of "rational ignorance" in public choice theory).
2o6. See Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette ofFederalism: New York, Printz,
and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 117-18; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to
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context, the greater opacity of retail gatekeeper decisions means that they are
less likely, in political science argot, to transform "latent" publics into
"concerned" and fully "mobilized" publics."' Here, then, is yet another reason
to be skeptical about the ability of agencies to perform retail gatekeeping tasks
in particular. Just as Subsection III.B.i found that the competence and capacity
advantages of agencies were likely narrowest in the retail gatekeeper context,
we might also harbor reasonable concern that agencies exercising retail
gatekeeper powers will be more susceptible to capture than those vested with
wholesale powers.
Second, concrete examination of the DOJ's oversight activities in the FCA
context highlights some of the acute challenges regulatory architects will face in
insulating gatekeeper agencies from capture. One aspect of this has already
been noted: regulatory designers cannot insulate agencies from corrupting
external pressures unless they can distinguish among capture dynamics issuing
from the White House, congressional committees, or a revolving door with
industry." 8  The fact that decision-distorting political pressures operate
through multiple channels can thus present regulatory designers with
something of a Catch-22. In the FCA context, for instance, one could insulate
DOJ gatekeeper decisions from legislative pressures that may be skewing them
in favor of Fortune ioo companies or defense contractors by rendering DOJ
enforcement efforts self-funding, or by granting agency officials charged with
gatekeeper duties greater protection from removal. But shielding the DOJ from
political oversight in this way will also grant the agency freer rein to dispense
regulatory favors to former DOJ insiders. In other words, one cannot mitigate
one type of capture without facilitating another.
A range of other, more specific mechanisms designed to mitigate capture
concerns likewise entail substantial costs. Thus, regulatory designers concerned
about capture could, rather than granting agency heads greater budgetary
control or removal protection, instead tweak the agency's various gatekeeper
powers directly. Among other things, one might fortify the procedures that
govern agency gatekeeper decision-making beyond those required under the
APA; grant the agency a "veto" rather than a "license" gate, thus empowering
Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REv 59, 59-60 (1995) (including greater
transparency and democratic accountability among the benefits of rulemaking relative to
adjudication). But cf CRoLEY, supra note 185, at 146 (conceding that adjudication's
"exclusivity" raises concerns about "special access" and "regulatory favoritism," but arguing
that other aspects of the process-such as ALJ "semi-independence"- renders adjudication
an "unwieldy" mechanism for dispensing regulatory favors).
207. See OLSON, supra note 186, at 51 (coining these terms).
2os. See supra notes 192-203 and accompanying text.
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private enforcers to go it alone and potentially force the agency's hand; or,
relatedly, install a "tiered" bounty system that grants private enforcers a higher
pay-out where the agency has refused to join the action in order to incentivize
solo and possibly agency-forcing private enforcement efforts. However, and as
discussed in greater detail in Section III.C below, each of these options imposes
critical design tradeoffs that regulatory architects must take account of in
choosing among gatekeeper designs.
3. Political Oversight and Bureaucratic Behavior
The possibility that gatekeeper agencies might be susceptible to deterrence-
diluting capture does not exhaust the ways politics or other external pressures
can drive deviations from Section III.A's gatekeeper ideal. A subtly different
but potentially more important set of concerns arises from two influential
claims about bureaucratic behavior that have co-existed, sometimes
awkwardly, alongside the scholarly preoccupation with agency capture. The
first is that agencies and agency personnel exhibit tendencies toward self-
aggrandizement, allocating resources with an eye to collecting political and
personal rewards and ensuring the continued flow of resources to the
agency.2 o9 The second is that agencies tend to be overly cautious concerning
risks within their regulatory bailiwicks.2 o The result is a final cluster of
concerns that regulatory architects should carefully consider before vesting
agencies with gatekeeper powers.
Perhaps the best place to bring into focus the ways bureaucratic behavior
can distort gatekeeper decision-making is to explore a retail gatekeeper
agency's power to intervene in and take over control of private enforcement
actions. As noted in Section III.A, an ideal agency with full retail gatekeeper
powers will maximally rely on well-incentivized, well-resourced private
2og. This is often called the "self-aggrandizement" or "agency expansion" hypothesis. See
WILLIAM A. NISKANEN JR., BuREAucRAcY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 38-42 (1971)
(offering the classic account); see also Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in
Constitutional Law, 118 HARv. L. REV. 915 (2005) (offering an updated and more skeptical
view).
21o. Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review ofAgency Rulemaking,
99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1080 (1986) (noting the "excessively cautious" nature of regulators);
see also Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, io6
COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1296-1300 (2oo6) (reviewing literature suggesting agencies will
exhibit "excessive regulatory caution").
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enforcers to perform enforcement tasks, thus conserving scarce agency
resources for other welfare-maximizing tasks."
Yet the self-aggrandizement hypothesis suggests that a gatekeeper agency
armed with intervention authority may instead deploy its power in pursuit of a
very different set of regulatory outputs. For instance, we might expect that a
gatekeeper agency whose resources depend on winning the favor of political
overseers will seek to maximize objective and observable measures of
enforcement success, such as total monetary recoveries, over harder-to-
quantify and empirically contestable goals such as total illegal activity deterred
or aggregate welfare gains." ' Interestingly, the gatekeeper decisions of an
agency that seeks to maximize total recoveries will yield an overall enforcement
strategy that is little different from that of unregulated profit-seeking private
enforcers." To that extent, a gatekeeper agency focused on maximizing
recoveries may reinforce, rather than mitigate, the problem of socially costly
overdeterrence.
Other possible agency maximands can yield even more substantial
deviations from the gatekeeper ideal. For instance, an agency might join cases
with an eye to maximizing its win/loss ratio." 4 By cherry-picking strong cases
and creating a substantial spread between win rates in cases it joins and those it
does not, it can signal its pivotal role to political overseers. A win-maximizing
agency might thus focus scarce public enforcement resources on smaller,
easier-to-win cases, leaving more consequential misconduct undeterred."s
Worse, such an agency might seek to maximize recoveries in which public
zn. See supra text accompanying note 141.
2n2. See JAMES Q WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do AND WHY THEY
Do IT 161 (1989) (noting agencies' tendency to pursue certain observable bureaucratic
outputs over others); Lemos & Minzner, supra note 18 (manuscript at 18) (asserting that
"agencies seeking to build reputations as effective enforcers will tend to emphasize easily
measurable accomplishments rather than more amorphous forms of success"). While this
idea is intuitive, a sophisticated analogy can be found in the economics literature on "high-
powered incentives." See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu, Michael Kremer & Atif Mian, Incentives in
Markets, Firms, and Governments, 24 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 273 (2007) (theorizing that "high-
powered incentives" linked to agent performance can generate "unproductive signaling
effort" in certain cases).
213. On the enforcement strategies of private enforcers, see Nuno Garoupa & Daniel Klerman,
Optimal Law Enforcement with a Rent-Seeking Government, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 116 (2002);
and Polinsky, supra note 15.
214. See Engstrom, supra note 62, at 1703.
215. See Frankel, supra note 6, at 113 ("[I]f success for the Enforcement division is measured by
the number of cases, convictions, or settlements, incentives would lead [it] to avoid the
large costly complicated cases and focus on the small ones.").
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enforcers actively participate. 6 The motive here should be obvious: another
agency win may generate better press than a mix of public and private
successes. Both scenarios run directly contrary to the gatekeeper ideal in
which public enforcers carefully husband private enforcement capacity,
delegating enforcement duties to competent and trustworthy private enforcers
and thus freeing up scarce public resources for other enforcement and
gatekeeper tasks."
The above dynamics have a further, and critically important, implication: a
retail gatekeeper agency focused on maintaining access to resources will be
unlikely to make optimal use of its authority to terminate inefficient private
enforcement efforts. Part of this is a continuation of the logic of a self-
aggrandizing agency: a politically conscious gatekeeper agency focused on
maintaining access to needed resources will steer its efforts toward readily
observable measures of enforcement success, such as recovery counts and
amounts, rather than purely reactive case terminations. In addition, the self-
aggrandizement and excessive-caution hypotheses, when read together,
suggest that a typical agency, even an "expansionist" or "empire-building" one,
will be "defensive" and "scandal-minimizing.""' Applying these ideas to the
gatekeeper context, we might therefore expect that agency officials will not
block private enforcement efforts where subsequent events may turn up
evidence of wrongdoing, thus embarrassing the agency, or where the actual
and reputational costs of terminating bad lawsuits can be reliably shifted to the
216. See Engstrom, supra note 62, at 1703.
217. Id.
218. Importantly, agency pursuit of an objective function other than maximizing social welfare
will not just impose opportunity costs and waste scarce public enforcement resources. Self-
aggrandizement distortions will also imperil the agency's ability to play an "anti-scaling"
role. See supra tbl.3 and accompanying text. Recall here that one of the principal tasks an
ideal agency wielding retail gatekeeper powers will perform is to induce private enforcers to
come forward with certain claims, particularly low- and high-value ones, which may be
socially optimal to prosecute but will not attract profit-oriented private enforcers without
support from public enforcers. By committing to aid those claims, the agency can induce
private enforcers to come forward who otherwise would not, thus plugging enforcement
gaps left by the necessarily coarse calibration of payouts. Yet the possibility that a gatekeeper
agency will strategically seek to maximize regulatory outputs other than social welfare
creates a version of a hold-up problem. Because the gatekeeper agency cannot perfectly
assure private enforcers it will not renege in the face of other opportunities, private enforcers
rightly worried about being left holding the bag will not surface the claims in the first place.
See Engstrom, supra note 62, at 1705-06; see also Depoorter & De Mot, supra note 18, at 152-
53 (modeling this dynamic).
219. James Q Wilson, The Politics ofRegulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357, 378 (James
Q. Wilson ed., 1980).
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judiciary.2 0 Worse, politically motivated agencies may in fact use their
intervention authority to aid socially inefficient private enforcement efforts,
since they will add to recovery tallies or the agency's win rate."
A final potential concern flowing from a version of the self-aggrandizement
theory is that, even when an agency's leadership is firmly committed to playing
a welfare-maximizing role, it may be stymied in those efforts by the careerist
incentives of agency personnel and problems of internal managerial control.
For agencies exercising retail gatekeeper authority, the substantial and difficult
task of assessing the merits of private enforcement actions will typically fall to
line-level attorneys and their mid-level managers, each with their own personal
and often career-oriented goals.m These personnel "may bias agency decisions
toward larger and more consequential cases, smaller and potentially more
winnable cases, or cases brought by more sophisticated private enforcers
deemed to be better litigation partners, all in search of r6sum6-burnishing
successes.""' Pursuit of any of these alternative goals may cause agency
220. See, e.g., Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Moral Hazard Problem with Privatization of Public
Enforcement: The Case of Phannaceutical Fraud, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 281, 282 (2007)
(framing the "effects that the availability of private enforcement have [sic] on the
Government's incentives" as a moral hazard problem, and arguing that the availability of
private enforcement "causes public prosecutors to reduce the care that typically controls
their exercise of prosecutorial discretion" (emphasis omitted)). A useful analogy here is the
"bailout effect" that legal scholars and political scientists have noted in the context of judicial
review. See Justin Fox & Matthew C. Stephenson, Judicial Review as a Response to Political
Posturing, 105 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 397, 397 (2011) (describing the "bailout effect" in the
constitutional law context whereby "judicial review may rescue elected officials from the
consequences of ill-advised policies"); see also MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION
AWAY FROM THE COURTS 57-58 (1999) (arguing that "judicial overhang" can distort
legislative behavior); ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 261 (2006) (offering a similar account
that likens judicial review to an "insurance policy against erroneous legislative
determinations," thus creating a moral hazard problem for legislative behavior). Still
another analogy can be found in the concern that public regulators are systematically biased
against the more tangible harms that flow from Type II errors (i.e., "false negatives" in the
form of an erroneous conclusion that a dangerous product is safe) and in favor of less
observable Type I errors (i.e., "false positives" in the form of an erroneous conclusion that a
safe product is dangerous). For discussion, see MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI,
PUBLIc CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW 359 (2009).
221. Engstrom, supra note 62, at 1705.
222. See CARPENTER, supra note 188, at 21-22 (noting the unique power "mezzo level" managers
wield in bureaucratic environments).
223. Engstrom, supra note 62, at 1705; see also Lemos & Minzner, supra note 18 (manuscript at 25-
31) (reviewing the extensive literature on the individual-level incentives of enforcement
agency personnel); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Reflections on Professional
Responsibility in a Regulatory State, 63 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1105, 1115-16 (1995) (noting
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gatekeeper decisions, and enforcement efforts more generally, to deviate from
the social optimum.
The above collection of bureaucratic behavioral pathologies presents a
formidable challenge to Section III.A's gatekeeper ideal. But to what extent do
they find empirical support? As with capacity- and capture-based objections to
agency gatekeeping, empirical evidence is scarce and inconclusive. Thus,
securities scholars have long contended that the SEC tends to pursue relatively
small cases in an effort to pad its success rate and win favor with political
overseers rather than allocating scarce enforcement resources with an eye to
optimizing deterrence and thus maximizing social welfare.m4 Similarly, EEOC
critics assert that civil rights prosecutors initiate small and politically
inoffensive cases, leaving more ambitious enforcement efforts to private
enforcers."s
By contrast, empirical analysis of an actual gatekeeper regime-once more
drawn from DOJ oversight of qui tam litigation- finds mixed evidence in
support of bureaucratic behavioral concerns. On the one hand, examination of
more than twenty years' worth of DOJ intervention decisions yields little
evidence that DOJ gatekeeper decisions are skewed toward either low-value
(and perhaps more winnable) cases or larger, marquee cases." On the other
hand, the evidence squarely establishes that DOJ rarely uses its termination
authority to dismiss cases out from under private plaintiff-relators."' This
further fuels the notion that, while case termination is the most commonly
articulated justification for vesting agencies with gatekeeper authority, it is also
where agencies may be least reliable.
"government attorneys' proclivity to . . . engage in career-building"); McAfee et al., supra
note 18, at 1872 ("[S]ome government actors are likely to be partly motivated by factors
other than efficiency, including career concerns . . . .").
224. See, e.g., Cox & Thomas, supra note 50, at 778 (arguing that the SEC may have "preferred
weak opponents"); Jonathan R. Macey, The Distorting Incentives Facing the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 639, 646 (2010) ("The focus is on the
number of cases brought by the Division, and, to a lesser extent, on the size of the fines
collected by the SEC. . . . In light of this metric of success, it is not surprising that the SEC
focuses on low-hanging fruit."); John C. Coffee, Jr., Is the SEC's Bark Worse than Its Bite?,
NAT'L L.J., July 9, 2012 (noting the tendency of the SEC to pursue many relatively small
actions, rather than focusing on a few big ones, in order to avoid the embarrassment of
having any defendants "escape scot-free").
225. See Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and
Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1444-45 (1998) (noting the tendency of civil rights
prosecutors to bring relatively small and politically uncontroversial cases).
226. See Engstrom, supra note 62, at 1727.
a2. Id. at 1717-18.
684
123: 616 2013
AGENCIES AS LITIGATION GATEKEEPERS
C. Synthesis: Choosing Among Gatekeeper Designs and Tweaking Gatekeeper
Performance
Armed with the above insights, we can begin to draw some broad
conclusions about when to vest agencies with gatekeeper powers at all and,
assuming doing so is worth the candle, how to choose among available
designs.
First and foremost, wholesale gatekeeper authority is plainly a less flexible
regulatory instrument than retail gatekeeper authority. To be sure, agencies
wielding wholesale gatekeeper powers can make technically sound broad-scale
judgments about the optimal reach of private enforcement, and will likely
outperform legislatures in doing so. And wholesale gatekeeper agencies can
achieve other valuable ends as well, switching private enforcement on and off
to carve out a division of labor between public and private enforcement and
minimize the transitional costs that accrue while legal mandates are in flux.
However, wholesale gatekeeper powers, like ex ante legislative efforts, are
blunt regulatory mechanisms. Unlike agencies wielding retail gatekeeper
powers, wholesale gatekeeper agencies cannot terminate socially costly or
duplicative private litigation efforts on a case-by-case basis, block collusive
settlements, or leverage the litigation efforts of overmatched or reluctant
private enforcers.
Yet if retail gatekeeping is a more flexible regulatory instrument, it is also
potentially far more problematic. As noted at turns above, agencies wielding
retail gatekeeper powers are likely more susceptible to capture and bureaucratic
behavioral tendencies that warp their decision-making. They may also enjoy
little comparative advantage over courts in performing the basic retail
gatekeeper task of culling undesirable cases. Taken together, these observations
offer critical perspective on calls to vest agencies such as the SEC with retail
gatekeeper powers. While many such calls cast merits-screening as the heart of
the ideal agency gatekeeper role," 8 theory and evidence suggest that agencies
may be least able and willing to perform such a function.
Of course, this does not undermine all argument in favor of vesting
agencies with retail gatekeeper powers. Retail gatekeeping may still add
significant value where agencies have privileged access to merits-related
information, as in the FCA context, or in especially complex regulatory areas,
where returns to agency expertise are likely to be higher.29 It is also important
228. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 5, at 13o6-07 (discussing case termination as the sole gatekeeper
task).
229. See supra note 18o and accompanying text.
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to note that case termination is not the only way retail gatekeeper agencies can
rationalize litigation regimes. Indeed, certain retail gatekeeping tasks -such as
leveraging overmatched private enforcers or using intervention or termination
authority to steer the elaboration of legal mandates or counter the repeat-player
advantages of regulated entities - may prove especially valuable early in the life
of a litigation regime when plaintiff-side referral networks are immature and
legal mandates are still being fleshed out via administrative and judicial
interpretation.
Nor are regulatory designers without tools to mitigate agencies' worst
bureaucratic tendencies by shaping agency incentives. For instance, regulatory
designers concerned that a gatekeeper agency is under-utilizing its termination
authority can subject the agency to liability for a prevailing defendant's fees
and expenses in cases it does not join.23o And where an agency is pursuing
larger-scale, marquee cases to the detriment of smaller-scale cases that might
not otherwise attract sufficient private enforcement efforts, legislators could
specify a minimum recovery and require that the agency pay the difference if a
non-terminated, unintervened action recovers less."' Judicious use of such
measures can tweak gatekeeper performance and bring it closer to Section
III.A's gatekeeper ideal."3
However, other design mechanisms that regulatory architects might use to
counter agency capture or lassitude spotlight the difficult tradeoffs that inhere
in choices among gatekeeper designs. For instance, one could fortify the
procedures that govern gatekeeper decisions by, say, requiring an agency that
invokes its wholesale gatekeeper powers to follow the full notice-and-comment
230. See Michael Rich, Prosecutorial Indiscretion: Encouraging the Department of Justice to Rein in
Out-of-Control Qui Tam Litigation Under the Civil False Claims Act, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233,
1275-76 (20o8).
231. See David Kwok, Coordinated Private and Public Enforcement of Law: Deterrence Under
Qui Tam 17-18 (Feb. 18, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
232. A possible objection to the use of budget-based penalties as a constraint on gatekeeper
agency action is that legislative oversight committees tend to exercise near-plenary control
over agency budget flows, thus muting the mechanistic workings of fee shifts of the sort
envisioned above. As a concrete example, the incentive-shaping effect of fee shifts will be
particularly weak where the resulting hits to the agency's budget divert it away from tasks
elsewhere within its regulatory bailiwick, creating cross-pressures on other, separate
regulatory programs favored by legislative overseers. In such an instance, we might expect
that the legislative committee will merely gross up the agency's budget to offset the
budgetary shortfall created by the fee shifts. As a result, a mechanistic fee shift may not, in
the end, prove any different from the usual agency appropriations process except where the
agency is self- (or independently) funded. For examples of independent agency funding, see
Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX.
L. REV. 15, 44 (2010).
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procedures prescribed by the APA or provide a reasoned accounting of its
retail-level decisions akin to what the APA requires in the formal adjudication
context."3 Greater transparency, some have claimed, will increase the visibility
of low-salience administrative decisions and render agency gatekeepers "more
readily subject to monitoring and discipline." 3 4 But fuller ventilation of agency
gatekeeper decisions can also render a gatekeeper agency more vulnerable to
the predations of legislative committees, aggravating capture concerns.23s More
importantly, transparency can exacerbate an agency's pursuit of political
rewards, making it more inclined to privilege observable bureaucratic outputs,
such as win-loss ratios or recoveries in agency-joined cases, over more public-
interested goals.236 In the end, fortified procedures designed to increase
transparency may impair, rather than enhance, agency gatekeeper performance.
Other measures designed to combat agency capture or lethargy likewise
risk distorting a gatekeeper agency's decision-making. As noted previously,
regulatory architects might enlist private enforcers to play an anti-capture or
agency-forcing role by vesting the agency with "veto" rather than "license"
gatekeeper authority and, in addition, by paying higher ("tiered") bounties to
private enforcers who persevere in cases that a captured or lackadaisical agency
refuses to join. 37 However, tiered bounties will also raise the opportunity
233. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 461, 541-44 (2003) (describing the APA's notice-and-
comment rulemaking procedures and their transparency benefits). The requirement that a
gatekeeper agency provide a "reasoned accounting" of its decision would thus track the
APA's requirement that parties to a proceeding receive a reasonable opportunity to submit
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law as well as an on-the-record accounting of
the agency's ruling on each proposed finding or conclusion. See 5 U.S.C. 5 557(c) (2012).
234. Rosenberg & Sullivan, supra note 6, at 166 (noting that procedural requirements can combat
"self-serving" enforcement decisions and render the agency's "prosecutorial choices . . .
politically transparent and therefore more readily subject to monitoring and discipline").
235. Cf DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 189, at 1444 (noting possibility that legislative
committee preferences concerning oversight of administrative agencies will not map onto
those of the legislative majority).
236. See supra notes 185-186 and accompanying text (noting various "bureaucratic pathologies"
that extend from political control of bureaucracy). For a recent and innovative argument
that increased transparency may exacerbate agency vulnerability to so-called "accountability
pathologies," see Jacob E. Gersen & Matthew C. Stephenson, Accountability Pathologies in
Public Law: Diagnosis and Treatment (Harvard Law Sch., Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus.
Working Paper, 2013). For a more technical working out of similar ideas, see Justin Fox,
Government Transparency and Policymaking, 131 PUB. CHOICE 23 (2007); and Andrea Prat, The
Wrong Kind of Transparency, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 862 (2005).
237. As an example, the FCA provides that the private qui tam relator's bounty percentage is
lower where the DOJ intervenes in and takes over control of the case and higher where the
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cost-i.e., the "price"-that a gatekeeper agency focused on maximizing
returns to the federal fisc pays when it fuilly delegates enforcement authority to
capable private enforcers. As a result, tiered bounties may tempt a good-faith
but politically conscious agency to make overly aggressive use of its power to
commandeer private actions, confounding sound management of available
enforcement capacity and reducing private incentives to invest in such capacity
in the first place.
Finally, surveying the universe of possible gatekeeper structures alongside
the problems that can afflict each suggests some designs to be avoided. Most
notable in this regard is vesting agencies with non-binding (or, in Part II's
terms, "advisory") retail gatekeeper authority. Indeed, available evidence on
the performance of the medical malpractice screening panels, though subject to
the usual concerns about generalizability, suggests that advisory gatekeeper
authority, by offering a low-cost evaluation of case merit, incentivizes more
and more time-consuming litigation while providing little benefit. 9 Of
course, one could always spin this outcome as promoting access to justice by
rendering certain claims privately marketable that would not otherwise be
brought. But medical malpractice screening panels were devised with the
opposite aim. And, even if expanding access is a laudable goal, one wonders why
regulatory architects could not achieve that same end by simply adjusting the
payouts available to private enforcers as a way to draw additional claims into
the system.
DOJ declines to become involved. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (20o6). For other examples of
government control of bounties, see supra notes 107-1o9 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 5, at 1357 (noting that gatekeeper authority "might dissuade some
private enforcers from participating in the system, thus reducing the amount of private
resources available to supplement the [SEC's] enforcement efforts"). Still another example
of an anti-capture device that imposes clear tradeoffs in the gatekeeper context is delegating
gatekeeper authority to multiple agencies simultaneously, thus preventing any single
interest group from controlling bureaucratic action. See Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and
Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 20o6 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 214 (describing the
use of "overlapping jurisdiction" among regulatory agencies as an anti-capture device); A.C.
Pritchard, The SEC at 7o: Time for Retirement?, 8o NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073, 1099-1101
(2005) (advocating the transfer of agency enforcement duties to the executive branch as an
anticapture device). Applied to the gatekeeper context, one could parcel out gatekeeper
powers to a second agency, such as the DOJ, with a wider portfolio of regulatory
responsibilities. Yet it is not hard to see that doing so risks diluting the expertise advantage
gatekeeper agencies enjoy, potentially exacerbating competence concerns and, at the
extreme, creating a gatekeeper regime that is little different from leaving adjudication to
generalist courts in the first place.
239. See supra notes 170-175 and accompanying text.
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IV. AGENCY GATEKEEPING IN ACTION: REIMAGINING JOB
DISCRIMINATION REGULATION
To this point, we have explored a large body of theory and evidence to
identify and assess the problems that afflict use of private litigation as a
regulatory tool, reviewed the possible merits and demerits of vesting agencies
with gatekeeper powers as a way to ameliorate those problems, and considered
some of the tradeoffs that arise in choosing among gatekeeper designs. This
final Part rounds out the analysis with a closer case study of how agency
gatekeeping might be usefully deployed in a single, discrete context: job
discrimination regulation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
cognate federal antidiscrimination statutes. 4 o Part of my aim is
methodological: to model how policymakers might ask and answer questions
about whether or how to choose gatekeeper structures in any given regulatory
context. Yet my choice of job discrimination regulation is also substantively
deliberate. As elaborated below, the Supreme Court's recent blockbuster
decision in Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes4' was a watershed moment in the
regime's history, capping a decades-long debate about how best to regulate job
discrimination and rendering the regime uniquely ripe for revision. To that
end, this Part asks how the above design principles and related insights
regarding agency gatekeeping might be deployed in refashioning American job
discrimination regulation.
A. The Challenge offob Discrimination Regulation After Wal-Mart Stores v.
Dukes
Few regulatory areas have generated more heated debate in recent decades
than job discrimination. Part of the reason is the regime's sheer scale: as Figure
2 reflects, Title VII and related federal antidiscrimination statutes are the 8oo-
pound gorilla of the American litigation state, currently generating nearly
100,000 formal "charges" filed with the EEOC each year, of which roughly
15,ooo yield lawsuits in federal district court.4' Part of it, too, is that the
240. For the main text of Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 200oe-1 to e-9 (20o6). Cognate job
discrimination laws include the Americans with Disabilities Act, id. §§ 12101-12213, the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, id. § 2000e(k), the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)
(2oo6), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, id. 5§ 621-634.
241. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
242. These charge and litigation numbers are drawn from Stephen B. Burbank et al., Private
Enforcement of Statutory and Administrative Law in the United States (and Other Common Law
Countries) 60-72 (Univ. Pa. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No. in-o8,
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regime's sprawling and byzantine character-with its mix of public
enforcement efforts by the EEOC and Attorney General, private lawsuits by
claimants, and an EEOC administrative review process that private claimants
must submit to before filing suit" -has provided endless fodder for argument
about the nature of discrimination and how best to structure regulatory
institutions to attack it.
Figure 2.
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- - - - - -All EEOC Charges - Private Suits - -- -Public Suits
2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1781o47; Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business
of the United States Courts, U.S. COURTS 129 tbl.C-2A (2012), http://www.uscourts.gov
/uscourts/Statistics/JudiciaBusiness/2ox/JudicialBusiness20nl.pdf ("U.S. District Courts-
Civil Cases Commenced, by Nature of Suit, During the 12-Month Periods Ending
September 30, 2007 Through 2011"); and Charge Statistics, FY1997 Through FY2oI2, EEOC,
http://www.ecoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm. Notice that the purely public
enforcement side of the regime has generally been inconsequential relative to the private
enforcement side, as the EEOC generally initiates (or intervenes in) lawsuits in no more
than a few hundred cases per year. See EEOC Litigation Statistics, FY 1997 through FY 2012,
EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm.
243. In the interest of space, I assume a working knowledge of the current regime. For a
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That debate recently reached a fever pitch in response to the Supreme
Court's 2011 decision in Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes.44 In that case, the Court
rejected a mammoth class action lawsuit brought on behalf of 1.6 million
current and former Wal-Mart employees alleging that a corporate culture
permitting bias against women, when combined with a managerial structure
delegating substantial job-related decision-making authority to local store
managers, constituted actionable discrimination under Title VII.24' Of course,
the holding in the case-that a system of delegated decision-making that
produces large statistical disparities in job outcomes cannot furnish the
requisite commonality to support a class action under Rule 23-was technical
and fact-intensive and has generated predictable debate about its applicability
to future cases, whether in the job discrimination context or beyond. 6 Still,
and wholly apart from the decision's on-the-ground effect, Wal-Mart was
plainly a watershed moment in the regime's history, generating a reckoning of
sorts about where the job discrimination regime has been and where it is
going. Indeed, out of the heated debate both before and after Wal-Mart, one
can glimpse an emerging consensus about the challenges of regulating job
discrimination in the twenty-first century, with important implications for
thinking about how the regime might be refashioned going forward.
The centerpiece of this rough consensus is that the nature of discrimination
and the organization of the American workplace have both undergone a
fundamental shift in recent decades. The first part of this view, as usefully
summarized by Samuel Bagenstos, is that "modern-day employment
discrimination is characterized less by overt, intentional discrimination than by
244. 131 S. Ct. 2541.
245. Id. at 2542.
246. While most agree that the decision will plainly lead to fewer job discrimination class actions,
the size of the effect is open to debate. Compare Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Annual Workplace
Class Action Litigation Report, SEYFARTH SHAw LLP 1-2 (2013), http://www.seyfarth.com/dir
docs/publications/CAR2o3preview.pdf (noting the "wide-ranging impact" of Wal-Mart,
as evidenced by, among other things, the lowest monetary total for the top ten largest
employment discrimination class action settlements since 20o6), with Elizabeth Tippett,
Robbing a Barren Vault: The Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart for Cases Challenging
Subjective Employment Practices, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 433, 473-75 (2012) (arguing that
class actions challenging "subjective" employment decision-making A la Wal-Mart were, and
will remain, rare). See generally Margo Schlanger & Pauline Kim, The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission and Structural Reform of the American Workplace 1-2 & nn.3-4
(Aug. 13, 2013) (U. Mich. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Research Paper Series) (collecting
scholarly commentary and recent case law relating to Wal-Mart's effects on class
certification proceedings in private job discrimination actions).
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unconscious or subtle biases."" Second, and just as important, the American
workplace has grown flatter and more collaborative, rendering job
discrimination "less a problem of discrete, harmful management decisions and
more a problem arising from workplace interactions among workers at all
levels of an occupational hierarchy."' 8 A prescription follows from this
diagnosis: if job discrimination regulation is to achieve further substantial
labor market gains for protected workers, it must adopt a "structural" approach
to the problem that targets the systemic effects of the implicit biases and subtle
stereotypes embedded in individual and collective judgment. 49
This view of the changing nature of job discrimination carries three
significant implications for thinking about the optimal structure of the regime
going forward. First, individualized, tort-like lawsuits are unlikely to achieve
substantial further improvements in labor market outcomes for protected
workers. Importantly, this is not because damages suits cannot generate an
organizational response: it is well established that Title VII lawsuits during the
regime's early life had both general and specific deterrence effects that helped
move protected workers into employment ranks.2 so Rather, the reason is more
practical. The nature of discrimination in the present-day workplace is less
247. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits ofAntidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF.
L. REV. 1, 5 (20o6). For two of the seminal contributions Bagenstos is summarizing, see
Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161 (1995); and Susan
Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 1o COLUM. L.
REv. 458 (2001).
248. Bagenstos, supra note 247, at 5.
249. To be sure, not everyone agrees with every part of this view. A sizable body of academic
opinion suggests that much of the difference in labor market outcomes across groups is
attributable to variation in human capital or worker preferences rather than illegal
discrimination, particularly in the gender context. See, e.g., James J. Heckman, Detecting
Discrimination, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 101, 107-11 (1998); Jacob Mincer & Haim Ofek, Interrupted
Work Careers: Depreciation and Restoration of Human Capital, 17 J. HUM. RESOURCES 3 (1982).
Moreover, even commentators who share a conviction about the structural diagnosis do not
agree on what precise regulatory response is indicated, with some advocating a non-
adversarial, non-litigative approach. See Sturm, supra note 247, at 527-30; see also Lester M.
Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction, in THE TOOLS
OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEw GOVERNANCE 1 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002)
(arguing in favor of more flexible and decentralized "new governance" regulatory
approaches as the optimal way to combat job discrimination).
250. See, e.g., Alexandra Kalev & Frank Dobbin, Enforcement of Civil Rights Law in Private
Workplaces: The Effects of Compliance Reviews and Lawsuits Over Time, 31 LAw & Soc.
INQUIRY 855, 890 (20o6); Sean Farhang, Private Lawsuits, General Deterrence, and State
Capacity: Evidence from Job Discrimination Litigation (2012) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
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overt and explicit, and it provides ever fewer discrete decision-making nodes
against which traditional legal-evidentiary tools can be directed. Indeed, as
workplace hierarchies have flattened and overt, explicit forms of discrimination
have receded, winning individualized job discrimination lawsuits has become
increasingly difficult."5
A second, and closely related, implication is that regulatory efforts that
successfully implement the structural approach will tend to be large-scale and
systemic in nature and will also rely upon aggregate forms of proof as a way to
reveal discriminatory decision-making structures. The Wal-Mart case, of
course, is the ultimate exemplar: the Wal-Mart plaintiffs adduced highly
aggregated statistical evidence showing marked disparities between male and
female Wal-Mart employees in pay and promotion and also substantial
qualitative evidence of gender bias via several dozen affidavits, though they
could not explicitly connect the two."
A third and final implication is cautionary regarding the second. In the best
of circumstances, regulatory efforts implementing a structural approach will be
deeply contested and will raise difficult questions about where to locate the
wrong of discrimination. For critics, the structural theory of liability that
plaintiffs pursued in Wal-Mart is problematic because it holds private
employers responsible for broader societal forces."' Defenders, by contrast,
take the view that private employers can and should be held liable for the costs
associated with broader, unconscious discrimination where they "facilitate" the
ground-level impact of such discrimination.2 4 Structural enforcement efforts
251. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare
in Federal Court, i J. EMPiRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 441 (2004) (noting the low and declining
fortunes of job discrimination plaintiffs); Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial
Outcomes in Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1584 (1989) (same).
252. Those disparities were substantial, with compensation paid to women totaling 5% to IS%
less than compensation paid to similarly situated men. Similarly, while roughly 65% of Wal-
Mart's hourly employees during the class period were women, only 33% of management
employees were women. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 146, 156 (N.D.
Cal. 2004).
253. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 247, at 40 (noting that "many of the problems that lead to
workplace inequalities are problems of society-wide scope for which many legal actors will
find it difficult to attribute blame to any particular employer," and suggesting that "we may
be asking antidiscrimination law to do too much of the work of responding to society's
inequalities").
254. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating
Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849, 851-54 (2007) (arguing that employers who
"facilitate" discriminatory workplace decisionmaking, even if rooted in broader societal
influences, should be subject to liability under antidiscrimination laws).
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will thus require difficult and contentious line-drawings about the bounds of
actionable discrimination.2 5s
Yet in the current system, these lines are drawn not by politically
accountable actors -and, indeed, not even as part of a merits determination by
judges. Rather, they are drawn at the class certification stage using the clunky,
facially procedural machinery of Rule 23. As many commentators have noted,
when it comes to structural enforcement efforts, the procedural question-
whether geographic dispersion or other differences across plaintiffs defeats
certification under Rule 23's strictures - almost entirely merges with the
question of whether, to use Wal-Mart as an example, a common policy of
unguided discretion can be conceptualized as actionable discrimination at all. 6
As a result, structural enforcement efforts, while raising deep questions about
the bounds of actionable discrimination, raise equally difficult questions about
how- and, as elaborated below, where and by whom - adjudicatory decisions
should be made.
255. See Richard Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age ofAggregate Proof 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97,
157-58 (2009) (summarizing the debate about where to locate the wrong of discrimination
and likening the core legal question raised to that of "enabling torts" in terms of how to
adjudicate liability of a defendant accused of facilitating the wrongful injuring of the
plaintiff by a third party).
256. See id. at 153 (noting that the debate over class certification in the job discrimination context
"is, at bottom, a debate over an implicit reconceptualization of discrimination under Title
VII"). The merger of procedure and substance in the job discrimination context has both a
formal doctrinal and a practical basis. On the former, and as the Wal-Mart Court squarely
held, a trial court must "'probe behind the pleadings,"' including the "'factual and legal
issues comprising the plaintiffs cause of action,"' and the resulting analysis will "entail
some overlap with the merits of the plaintiffs underlying claim." 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551-52
(2011) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982)). As to the latter (practical)
basis, it is well accepted that successful class certification, whether in the job discrimination
context or elsewhere, often generates a rapid settlement because of the threat of substantial
liability a defendant faces. Indeed, much of the amicus practice in Wal-Mart centered on the
possibility of "blackmail settlements" either just before or after class certification. See, e.g.,
Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that certification
creates "insurmountable pressure on defendants to settle"); Brief for the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Wal-
Mart, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10-277), 2011 WL 2889oo, at *21-22 (noting that class certification
dramatically raises the stakes in litigation for defendants, often creating "'intense pressure to
settle'" even weak claims in ways tantamount to "'judicial blackmail'" (quoting In re Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer, Inc., Si F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995))). But see Charles Silver, "We're Scared
to Death": Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 136o (2003) (identifying
but dismissing this claim).
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B. Proposal: Reforming the Regime by Remaking the EEOC's Gatekeeper Role
With a better sense of the challenges posed by job discrimination
regulation and also Part III's insights regarding optimal gatekeeper design, we
can begin to reimagine the regime. Two core revisions promise to better align
the existing system with contemporary workplace realities while mitigating the
system's more evident flaws.
1. Dismantling EEOC Charge Processing
First, the EEOC's administrative charge resolution process, which private
claimants must submit to before filing suit, adds strikingly little gatekeeper
value and should be dismantled. As reflected in Figure 3 (and as described in
passing in Part II's overview of gatekeeper designs), that time-consuming and
resource-intensive process begins with an initial "triage" characterization of
case merit by EEOC staff in order to allocate the case to one of three
bureaucratic pathways." The most meritorious tranche of cases (comprising
roughly 15-20% of cases and receiving an internal "A" label) are investigated by
the EEOC. When agency staff find the plaintiffs allegations supported by
"reasonable cause," they attempt to "conciliate" the dispute by moving the
parties to a voluntary resolution.s' Cases of middling merit (roughly 55-6o%
of cases, labeled "B" cases) are recommended for the EEOC's voluntary
mediation program." For the remainder of the cases (roughly 20-30%, labeled
"C" cases) -and also those "A" and "B" cases that have failed to resolve via
conciliation and mediation efforts -the EEOC issues a "right to sue" letter
257. For a comprehensive overview of EEOC charge processing, see C. Elizabeth Hirsh, Settling
for Less? Organizational Determinants of Discrimination-Charge Outcomes, 42 LAW & Soc'Y
REV. 239 (20o8).
258. For statistics on how many cases receive the "A" label (and also "B" and "C" labels, as noted
in the discussion that follows), see id. at 243; and Michael D. Ullman et al., The EEOC
Charge Priority Policy and Claimants with Psychiatric Disabilities, 52 PSYCHIATRIc SERvs. 644,
647 tbl.2 (2001) (using data from 1995 to 1998). Importantly, both the mediation and
conciliation processes are entirely voluntary in the sense that the EEOC cannot impose a
binding settlement. See supra notes los-io6 and accompanying text.
259. See Robert E. Talbot, A Practical Guide to Representing Parties in EEOC Mediations, 37 U.S.F.
L. REv. 627, 629 (2003) (describing the EEOC mediation program); Matthew A.
Swendiman, Note, The EEOC Mediation Program: Panacea or Panicked Reaction?, 16 OHIO
ST. J. ON Disp. REsoL. 391, 400-02 (2001) (same).
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authorizing the claimant to file a lawsuit in court.260 Note that, because
substantial EEOC investigation occurs only for cases falling into the most
meritorious ("A") case group, the EEOC's issuance of right-to-sue letters is, in
the vast majority of cases, a ministerial act that comes at the end of the
statutory 18o-day period with little or no agency engagement.
Figure 3.
EEOC CHARGE RESOLUTION PROCESS
26o. By statute, after 180 days the complainant can request-and the EEOC must issue-a right-
to-sue notice, cutting off continued mediation, investigation, or conciliation. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-S(f)(1) (2006).
261. See LAURA BETH NIELSEN ET AL., AM. BAR FOUND., CONTESTING WORXPIACE
DISCRIMINATION IN COURT: CHARACTERISTICS AND OUTCOMES OF FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION 1987-2003, at 14 (2008) (examining a large sample of job
discrimination suits between 1987 and 2003 and finding that the EEOC fails to make any
finding in 77% of cases); Hirsh, supra note 257, at 245 (noting that many EEOC investigative
reports do little more than record the employer's position on the claim); Nielsen et al., supra
note 176, at 177 (noting a consensus among plaintiffs' counsel that "most often the EEOC
process results in considerable delay without producing meaningful investigation or
conciliation"); Ullman et al., supra note 258, at 646 (finding that "only category A cases tend
to receive a full investigation").
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Examining further details of the system reveals other problems, especially
as to cases the EEOC initially determines to have the most merit. Past studies
suggest that only five to ten percent of total charges, including those classed as
"A" cases, receive a "reasonable cause" finding and proceed to conciliation at
all, and less than one-third of those (roughly 3,000 cases) are successfully
resolved- a vanishingly small proportion of total system throughput. 62 By
comparison, roughly three-quarters of the 11,ooo charges among the "B" cases
that the parties are willing to mediate are successfully resolved. 6 3 The EEOC,
in other words, achieves poorer results in the cases in which it invests far more
of its limited resources. 64 And while it appears that successful conciliations
typically generate larger recoveries than mediations - an average of $45,ooo as
against $17,000 in 2o2 26s-this may in fact strengthen the case for abolishing
the conciliation process entirely, for it suggests that some, possibly many, cases
within the current pool of conciliated claims would be attractive to plaintiffs'
lawyers, paid via contingency fee, who would presumably take some of these
cases even in the absence of EEOC assistance.
z62. Hirsh, supra note 257, at 246; see also NIELSEN ET AL., supra note 261, at 14 figs.2.17, 2.18
(finding that the EEOC makes a formal cause determination in only twenty-three percent of
cases and finds "cause" in just one in five of those); EEOC Enforcement & Litigation
Statistics, All Statutes, FY 1997 - FY 2012 (2013), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics
/enforcement/all.cfm (reporting that roughly one-third of cases the agency found supported
by "reasonable cause" produced "successful conciliations" over the 1997-2012 interval).
263. See Fiscal Year 2012 Performance and Accountability Report, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMM'N 26 (Nov. 15, 2012) [hereinafter EEOC 2012 PERFORMANCE], http://www.eeoc.gov
/eeoc/plaVupload/2o2pari.pdf (noting a total of 8,714 successful mediations out of 11,380
attempted).
264. For instance, for FY 2012, the mediation program accounted for only $25.9 million of the
EEOC's $385.5 million total budget request, while administrative charge processing
accounted for $197.0 million. See Fiscal Year 2012 Congressional Budget Justification, U.S.
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N io (Feb. 2011), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload
/2oi2budget.pdf; see also Nancy M. Modesitt, Reinventing the EEOC, 63 SMU L. REV. 1237,
1249 (2010) (examining EEOC budget reports and concluding that the EEOC's dollar-for-
dollar return on its mediation program is much higher than the return on charge processing
and litigation efforts).
26s. These averages are calculated from the EEOC's published performance statistics for 2012 by
dividing the approximate total monetary benefits achieved in mediated resolutions ($153.2
million) by the total number of such resolutions (8,714) and also the total monetary benefits
achieved in conciliations ($71 million) divided by the total number of such resolutions
(1,591). See EEOC 2012 PERFORMANCE, supra note 263, at 26-27; EEOC, Monetary Benefits
by Types of Resolutions FY 20o9 Through FY 2013 (Nov. 19, 2013) (on file with author).
266. See William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims ofEmployment Discrimination: What Really Does
Happen? What Really Should Happen?, Disp. RESOL. J., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 40, 44 (reporting
survey results finding that the plaintiffs' employment bar will not generally accept cases
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More broadly, the EEOC charge resolution process, as with the medical
malpractice screening panels examined in Parts II and III, almost certainly
incentivizes more, and more marginal, claims by offering a low-cost initial
evaluation of case merit, particularly in jurisdictions where EEOC "cause"
findings are admissible in litigation.2" And yet, the EEOC's charge resolution
process appears to provide precious little gatekeeper value. As Part III showed,
the only rigorous empirical study of EEOC gatekeeper activities to date found
that neither EEOC triage categorizations nor the agency's "reasonable cause"
determinations bore any statistically meaningful relationship to subsequent
litigation outcomes among the subset of cases that emerged from the EEOC's
process and generated lawsuits.26 Thus, although the EEOC's charge
resolution process may provide at least some merits-signaling value to the
parties - perhaps facilitating settlements among the "A" cases subject to actual
investigation -that process does not appear to provide reliable merits signals to
courts once full-scale litigation has begun. This raises doubts about the
competence and capacity of the EEOC to engage in merits-screening, or do so
more efficiently, relative to courts.
with less than $60,000 in provable damages). Studies reporting win rates and damages
awards in job discrimination suits that advanced to trial are consistent with this result. See
GARY BLASI & JOSEPH W. DOHERTY, UCLA-RAND CTR. FOR L. & PUB. POL'Y, CALIFORNIA
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT: THE FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND
HOUSING ACT AT 50, at 61 (2010) (examining job discrimination cases tried in California
state court in 2007-2008 and reporting a roughly 50 percent plaintiff win rate and median
plaintiff verdict of $20S,000); see also Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and
Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison, DisP. RESOL. J., NOV. 2003-
Jan. 2004, at 44, 48, 50 (reporting a 36.4% plaintiff win rate and a mean recovery of
approximately $336,000 in federal court job discrimination actions terminating in 1996). I
further explore the role of the plaintiffs' employment bar in the proposed restructuring of
the EEOC below. See infra notes 300-301 and accompanying text.
267. See Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency's Role in Employment
Discrimination Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 44 (1996) ("[M]any attorneys prefer to routinely
refer cases to the EEOC where the agency will conduct an investigation at the public's
expense."); see also supra notes 173-174 and accompanying text (showing how gatekeeper
mechanisms, especially non-binding ones, can operate to subsidize undesirable claims). One
study goes further and argues that EEOC charge processing generates a type of adverse
selection problem in which claimants with nonmeritorious claims are most likely to engage
the EEOC process. Alberto Divila & Alok K. Bohara, Equal Employment Opportunity Across
States: The EEOC 1979-1989, 8o PUB. CHOICE 223 (1994). For debate over whether trial
judges have discretion to exclude EEOC "cause" determinations from jury consideration, see
Leslie Abbott, Comment, Out ofBalance: Excluding EEOC Determinations Under Federal Rule
ofEvidence 403, 24 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 707 (1991).
268. See supra notes 176-177 and accompanying text.
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The above facts make it easy to conclude, as others have, that the EEOC's
charge processing system is not working. 69 And, in some ways, this should
not be surprising. Mter all, the inclusion of EEOC conciliation at the dawn of
the regime arose out of the then-prevailing view that discrimination was
simply the "fruit of ignorance" or purely irrational prejudice that demanded a
regulatory response focused on education, not legal coercion.70 Put another
way, conciliation was never intended to serve as a retail gatekeeper device
within the conceptualization of Parts II and III.
The more difficult question is how to fix the regulatory scheme. One
possibility is to abolish the investigation-conciliation process entirely, but to
retain the EEOC triage process in order to route certain cases to an expanded or
even mandatory mediation program." Note, however, that the success of such
a program would not be assured. As it currently operates, the mediation
program may benefit from selection bias wherein the parties who are most
likely to agree to it are also those most likely to reach a resolution.
Furthermore, if, as may be the case, the triage process does not accurately sort
cases by merit in the first place, it is dubious that the EEOC can efficiently
channel worthy cases into the current mediation program, let alone an
expanded version of it. This may counsel in favor of abolishing both
conciliation and mediation -and thus putting the EEOC out of the business of
processing individual disputes entirely.
269. See, e.g., Maurice E.R. Munroe, The EEOC: Pattern and Practice Imperfect, 13 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 219, 275-79 (1995) (proposing that the EEOC abandon all efforts to resolve individual
claims in favor of more systemic enforcement efforts); Selmi, supra note 267 (arguing that
the agency should either be eliminated or reorganized to devote almost all of its resources to
cases that are not lucrative enough for private attorneys). For rare arguments in support of
EEOC charge processing, see Anne Noel Occhialino & Daniel Vail, Why the EEOC (Still)
Matters, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 671, 704 (2005) (arguing that EEOC charge processing
still plays a "critical" role); and Joseph Prud'homme, Federal Employment Law: Current
Problems and a Call for Reform, 1 J. RACE, GENDER & ETHNICITY 51 (20o6) (arguing in favor of
greater EEOC empowerment).
270. See Engstrom, supra note 25, at lo86 (quoting REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE TEMPORARY
COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION 48 (1945)) (tracing the origins of conciliation as a
regulatory device at the state and federal levels); see also Selmi, supra note 267, at 2 (noting
that "the purpose of resolving claims through conciliation has long since been lost").
271. For analyses supporting the EEOC's mediation program, see Michael Z. Green, Proposing a
New Paradigm for EEOC Enforcement After 35 Years: Outsourcing Charge Processing by
Mandatory Mediation, 1os DICK. L. REv. 305 (2001); Talbot, supra note 259; and Swendiman,
supra note 259.
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2. A New "Systemic" Action and Robust EEOC Gatekeeping
The above analysis calls for fundamentally reshaping or even eliminating
the EEOC's current role in processing individual disputes, thus sharply
contracting its gatekeeper role. A second vital revision to the current regime
would do just the opposite, vesting the EEOC with sweeping gatekeeper
powers over all class action and "systemic" job discrimination suits-with the
latter term defined (paralleling the EEOC's current definition)' as any case
with twenty or more joined plaintiffs."'
Expanded EEOC gatekeeper power over class and systemic suits should
have at least three critical components. First and foremost, the EEOC should
be given (in Part II's terminology) "license" gatekeeper powers over class and
systemic cases, with the agency's determination to allow a putative class action
to proceed substituting for class certification under Rule 23.'* Second, the
EEOC should be given full intervention authority (in Part II's terms,
displacement power with strong control rights) akin to what the DOJ wields in
the FCA context."s This intervention authority would allow the EEOC to take
the helm in large-scale actions, whether from the outset or in cases it licensed
initially but which have since moved in directions that ill serve the public
interest. Finally, and to guard against the moral hazard problem of a risk-
272. See EEOC 2012 PERFORMANCE, supra note 263, at 27 (defining "multiple-victim suits" as
suits "with fewer than 20 victims" and distinguishing them from "individual" and
'systemic" suits).
273. It is not clear how many private actions would meet these criteria, as neither the EEOC nor
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts regularly reports such data. However, a
comprehensive study of job discrimination litigation over the period 1987-2003 using a
random sample of nearly 2,000 suits from 6 different district courts found that class actions
accounted for between 2% and 3% of the total (with only 1% ultimately winning
certification). See NIELSEN ET AL., supra note 261, at 13; see also DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL.,
CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIvATE GAIN 53 (2000) (reporting
roughly 150 reported judicial decisions in employment class actions during 1995-1996);
Melissa M. Mulkey, Class Dismissed: Defending and Preventing Employment Class Actions in
Your Workplace, HR ADvISOR: LEGAL & PRAC. GUIDANCE, July-Aug. 20o6, at 1 (noting the
filing of 222 federal employment-related class action suits in 2001, and 349 such suits in
2004). Extrapolating from the Nielsen sample to the current total case tally of roughly
15,ooo federal job discrimination suits per year would imply roughly 300 to 450 putative
employment class actions filed annually.
274. This would take large-scale employment discrimination actions outside Rule 23's ambit
entirely. Note that a passive "veto" approach would be less ideal here, despite its agency-
forcing and anti-capture qualities. The principal advantage of the license approach is that it
requires affirmative action by the agency, which is necessary if the agency's decision to allow
the case to go forward is to double as class certification.
275. See supra notes 107-11o and accompanying text.
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averse EEOC that is too reticent to terminate cases - that is, an EEOC that too
liberally licenses cases it reviews - the EEOC should be subjected to liability for
a prevailing defendant's fees and costs in licensed, but unintervened, cases. As
noted previously, such a fix can mute the "bailout effect" by countering the
bureaucratic incentive to over-license private actions because of the agency's
ability to shift termination costs, both actual and reputational, to the courts.276
This new suite of EEOC gatekeeper powers over larger-scale job
discrimination suits would serve several salutary purposes. First, a strong
EEOC gatekeeper role would inject a degree of public accountability into the
normatively contestable question of which subjective employment practices
constitute actionable discrimination. It would do so by transferring principal
authority for determining the conceptual bounds of actionable discrimination
from decentralized trial court judges deploying the spare procedural dictates of
Rule 23 to a single, expert, and politically accountable agency. When combined
with the curtailment of the EEOC's gatekeeper authority over small-scale
actions, a more expansive EEOC gatekeeper role with respect to larger-scale
actions would also effect a critical shift in emphasis within the regime by
moving the focus of EEOC enforcement efforts away from individualized
actions and toward more systemic ones, thus better aligning the system with a
more structural approach. 7
In addition to effecting a basic shift in emphasis, granting the EEOC
expansive authority to intervene in and take control of large-scale job
discrimination actions would allow the agency to play several of the more
micro-level, litigation-rationalizing roles detailed in Part III. In particular, an
EEOC armed with robust gatekeeper powers over class and systemic suits
could settle, terminate, or steer cases in order to (i) prevent duplicative,
piggyback litigation efforts ;,8 (ii) counteract the repeat-player advantage that
276. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
277. Scholars have frequently called for a similar shift in emphasis within the regime but have
not generally paired those calls with proposals that alter bureaucratic incentives in ways
designed to achieve the shift. See, e.g., Modesitt, supra note 264, at 1263, 1270-74 (advocating
that the EEOC shift toward "investigating and litigating significant claims" and proposing
that the EEOC recover fees and fines, but failing to explain how this will move the agency
toward more systemic cases); Munroe, supra note 269, at 275-79 (proposing the
dismantlement of the EEOC charge processing system and a re-allocation of EEOC
resources toward litigating larger claims without specifying why a newly unburdened EEOC
would do so). Of the roughly three hundred cases on the EEOC's docket at the end of FY
2012, fewer than half involved multiple aggrieved parties, and still fewer- twenty percent-
were "systemic" lawsuits involving twenty or more aggrieved parties. See EEOC 2012
PERFORMANCE, supra note 263, at 27.
278. See supra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
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defendants might otherwise enjoy;79 (iii) police cheap or collusive settlements
by private class counsel;2so and (iv) shield employers from transitional costs
where plaintiffs advance a new theory of liability that may only belatedly be
subject to legislative or appellate override. 8 '
Perhaps most important of all, remaking the regime around an EEOC
gatekeeper role that is both less and more expansive than at present may be a
politically saleable compromise. Champions of the regime who favor a more
structural approach to regulating job discrimination will surely applaud the
effort to partially override the Court's decision in Wal-Mart and restore the
vitality of larger-scale class actions. At the same time, some critics of the
current regime will take succor from the outright abolition of the
administrative charge resolution process and the likely decline in overall case
filings that will result.2 More importantly, some employers will applaud the
EEOC's termination (via nonlicensing) of meritless large-scale actions that
might otherwise proceed to costly and protracted class certification
proceedings. They may derive comfort from what amounts to a reverse fee-
shift via the EEOC's exposure to liability for a prevailing defendant's fees in
licensed but unintervened cases. And they may well prefer a more expansive
EEOC gatekeeper role because of its greater predictability relative to a system
in which certification decisions depend, at least in part, on which district judge
hears the case based on a spin of the wheel in the court clerk's office. 8
279. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
28o. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
282. For further explanation of why this will be the case, see infra notes 295-299 and
accompanying text.
283. Whatever the political saleability of my proposal, it is plainly no less saleable than
competing proposals. For instance, the sole congressional proposal that has arisen post-
Wal-Mart would allow plaintiffs to maintain a "group action" under federal job
discrimination laws subject to what appear to be softened versions of Rule 23's usual
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements, thus reversing Wal-Mart
at least in part, but would not alter any other aspect of the regime, thus offering no
concession to employers. See Equal Employment Opportunity Restoration Act, H.R. 5978,
112th Cong. 5 3 (2012); S. 3317, 112th Cong. 5 3 (2012). Another standard proposal advanced
in Wal-Mart's wake is for the EEOC to take on a more active enforcement role by initiating
and prosecuting more "pattern or practice" lawsuits under its current statutory authority.
See, e.g., Joseph A. Seiner, Weathering Wal-Mart, 89 NoTRE DAME L. REv. (forthcoming
2014). As noted previously, however, such proposals are unlikely to succeed without altering
the current agency's incentives. See supra note 276 and accompanying text. Note two further
problems with such proposals. One is that the EEOC is acutely resource-constrained, and so
it seems unlikely that even a Congress that is sympathetic to a more robust EEOC
enforcement role will fund a significant expansion of the EEOC's litigation capacity in the
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3. Countering Likely Objections
The above overhaul of job discrimination regulation will surely draw
objections, many of them derived from the core concerns with gatekeeper
designs - competence, capture, and bureaucratic behavior - spotlighted in Part
III. Some of these objections have already been anticipated and addressed, such
as subjecting the EEOC to a reverse fee shift in order to guard against the
bailout effect and overly liberal licensing of class and systemic suits by a risk-
averse agency. 14 Other possible objections arising out of Part III's analysis,
however, have not.
The first likely objection arising from Part III's catalog of concerns
questions the EEOC's competence and capacity to exercise gatekeeper authority
over class actions compared to courts adjudicating class certification motions.
One version of the concern would ask why the EEOC should be granted
substantial gatekeeper powers that depend, at least in part, on its capacity to
engage in case-by-case merits-screening given evidence suggesting the agency
possesses uncertain merits-screening prowess within the current charge-
processing regime.2" However, we should be wary of inferring anything about
EEOC's ability to oversee class and systemic suits from its recent record of
charge processing decisions. The many thousands of decisions the agency
currently makes each year are distributed among hundreds of line-level staff in
current era of fiscal austerity. This, incidentally, would also seem to rule out a number of
pre-Wal-Mart proposals for an enhanced EEOC enforcement role in non-systemic cases as
well. Particularly unrealistic in the current fiscal climate is a proposal to vest the EEOC with
cease-and-desist powers along the lines of those held by the Federal Trade Commission or
National Labor Relations Board-an administrative approach to job discrimination
regulation that the early civil rights movement favored until the late 196os. See Julie Chi-
Hye Suk, Antidiscrimination Law in the Administrative State, 2oo6 U. ILL. L. REV. 405, 472-73
(advancing such a proposal as a way to remake the present-day regime); see also Engstrom,
supra note 25, at 1o81 (recounting the early civil rights movement's advocacy of a similar
agency-centered approach to regulating job discrimination); supra note 268 (collecting
other, pre-Wal-Mart proposals to expand the EEOC enforcement role by expanding or
intensifying the individual charge processing portion of the regime). A second concern is the
competency of the EEOC to take on an expanded litigation role in systemic actions. These
concerns- resource constraints, competence, and capacity-suggest that a more promising
approach is a hybrid public-private approach of the sort advanced herein, which would
allow the EEOC to leverage private resources and legal talent in the prosecution of systemic
actions. For more discussion of the advantages of a hybrid approach-including an analogy
to the FCA's qui tam regime-see infra notes 287-289 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 179-180 and accompanying text.
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multiple district, field, and local offices.2 6 By contrast, one would expect that
EEOC gatekeeper decisions regarding the far more tractable number of class
and systemic suits would be made far higher up in the agency's managerial
hierarchy and only after thorough investigation and assessment by legal and
non-legal staff. To that extent, the EEOC's exercise of gatekeeper powers over
only class and systemic cases would almost certainly make better and more
focused use of resident agency expertise.
A further version of the competence and capacity objection might note that
the EEOC has in recent years sought to move toward heavier involvement in
more systemic enforcement efforts,28 and the results have not been pretty:
several judges entered significant sanctions against the EEOC in 2012, and the
agency suffered substantial defeats in a number of other cases that drew
judicial comment about the agency's subpar case preparation and litigation
capacity. Yet even here, an expanded gatekeeper role should not be cause for
substantial concern. This is because an ideal EEOC will maximally rely on well
resourced and well incentivized private enforcers, stepping in only to terminate
or take over enforcement efforts that have deviated from public purposes or to
leverage under-resourced or overmatched enforcement efforts.'9 To that
extent, the above proposal envisions a fully "hybrid" public-private
enforcement model along the lines of the current qui tam regime under the
FCA, making the EEOC's capacity to conduct full-scale systemic litigation on
its own less relevant.
286. See The Commission, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/legislative/commission.cfm (last
visited Sept. 1, 2013).
287. The EEOC announced in April 20o6 that it would pursue more systemic discrimination
cases affecting large number of workers, and it has recently reiterated its focus in that
regard. See, e.g., Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Makes Fight Against Systemic Discrimination
a Top Priority (Apr. 4, 2006), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/4-4-o6.cfm
(announcing intent to strengthen approaches to investigating and litigating systemic cases);
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMP'T COMM'N, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT PLAN FY 2013-2016 (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc
/plan/sep.cfm (announcing an agency-wide shift away from small individual lawsuits
toward larger-scale pattern or practice lawsuits).
288. See Maatman, supra note 246, at 5 (noting several cases in which district court judges leveled
sanctions against the EEOC in pattern and practice cases deemed to lack merit); see also
EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., No. o7-CV-95-LRR, 2010 WL 520564 (N.D. Iowa Feb.
9, 2010) (ordering EEOC to pay $4.46 million in fees and costs for performing an
inadequate pre-filing inquiry); Jenna Greene, Trucker Case Crashes for EEOC, NAT'L L.J.,
May 11, 2012 (recounting the same sexual harassment case and quoting the judge as saying
she had "never had a case brought by a government agency that was such a mess").
289. See supra notes 141-144 and accompanying text.
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A second broad objection grounded in Part III's rendition of core concerns
is that the above proposal, by injecting a degree of political accountability into
the class certification question, might also permit employers with political clout
to duck enforcement efforts via capture-like channels of influence. Political
capture of the EEOC's gatekeeper apparatus, the argument goes, would erode
deterrence and deprive some plaintiffs of recourse for no reason beyond their
having sought employment at a politically influential company. But this, too,
seems to be less of a concern. As noted previously, a gatekeeper agency's
vulnerability to capture dynamics will likely turn on the scope, and thus the
political salience, of the particular gatekeeper decisions it makes.29o And in
salience terms, we might think of EEOC gatekeeper decisions on large-scale
class actions and systemic suits as occupying a middle ground between the
numerous retail-level gatekeeper decisions the DOJ makes in the FCA context
regarding individual and often small-scale qui tam suits and the wholesale
gatekeeper decisions federal agencies make in the regulatory preemption
context in deciding whether private rights of action should lie at all. The high
salience of EEOC decisions as to the few hundred class and systemic actions
filed annually may make dispensing regulatory favors without detection
difficult, thus allaying capture concerns.
The remaining objections extend beyond the core concerns highlighted in
Part III but nonetheless help bring into relief some of the tradeoffs inherent in
the agency gatekeeper approach. One is that the abolition of EEOC charge
processing will leave claimants with legitimate but smaller-scale grievances
without legal recourse because of their inability to obtain counsel. 91 But this
should be less concerning given the realities of the current regime. As noted
previously, even cases that receive the EEOC's "A" triage label are unlikely to
receive a "cause" determination after the agency's investigation,292 raising
questions about the overall merit of the vast majority of charges in the pool.
The brutal reality is that the social cost of processing and adjudicating the tens
29o. See supra notes 205-208 and accompanying text.
291. See Selmi, supra note 267, at 33-34 (noting that the current charge processing system serves
as a forum for low-value claims, especially those asserting discrimination on the basis of
race, gender, or national origin). Empirical support for this concern comes from the claim,
noted previously, that plaintiff-side employment lawyers will typically not accept cases with
provable damages below roughly $60,ooo. See supra note 266. Still more evidence comes
from the previously noted RAND study of California job discrimination claims, which
found that smaller claims and claims brought by particular claimant types (laborers, racial
minorities) are relegated to the administrative adjudication side of the state-level regime
while larger claims and claims brought by other claimant types (professionals, men) attract
counsel and flow into the state court system. BLAsi & DOHERTY, supra note 266, at 40, 53-54.
292. See supra notes 262-264 and accompanying text.
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of thousands of small-scale, individual disputes that currently dominate the
system may exceed their social benefit.
More importantly, the above proposal should lead to an uptick in
"structural" enforcement efforts (at least compared to the current post-Wal-
Mart status quo) and these actions will, whether through specific or general
deterrence channels, also benefit workers who might have otherwise filed
smaller-scale, individual claims." Here again, this is not to deny that the
proposal, by shifting enforcement emphasis within the regime from individual
to class and systemic suits, will have distributive consequences in terms of who
benefits and who does not. As just noted, the current charge processing system
plainly serves as a forum for low-value claims, and these claims are also
systematically more likely to involve lower-income, minority, and female
claimants."9 Rather, the point is that those consequences need not be zero-
sum as between particular plaintiff or claim types. In the end, many plaintiffs,
including some who can only pursue individual actions in the current, post-
Wal-Mart state of the world, may do better under the above-proposed
resuscitation of class and systemic actions than they do now.
A second concern is that the abolition of charge processing will strain
already-crowded district court dockets if cases that currently resolve via
conciliation and mediation (or otherwise reach settlement during EEOC
processing efforts) were to flow directly into federal courts.2 95 Yet as noted
previously, the total number of successful conciliations and mediations is
small -ten percent of total chargeS29 6 - and it is a plausible assumption that
many of these cases would be amicably resolved prior to litigation even without
EEOC involvement. 9 7 Moreover, it was just noted that, much like medical
293. See Farhang, supra note 250, at 5 (explicating the concepts of general and specific deterrence
in the job discrimination context (citing Albert Reiss, Selecting Strategies of Social Control of
Organizational Life, in ENFORCING REGULATION 23 (Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas eds.,
1984))).
294. See supra note 291.
295. Note that this is a concern from a systemic efficiency standpoint, but it is likewise
concerning if we think that rising filings may generate a "backlash" among district judges.
See Lemos, supra note 64, at 817; see also Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible
Discrimination, 84 N.C. L. REv. 927, 931 n.15 (20o6) (collecting federal judges' complaints
about employment discrimination cases burdening their dockets).
296. See EEOC 2012 PERFORMANCE, supra note 263, at 25-27 (noting that roughly lo,ooo of the
nearly ioo,ooo charges filed with the EEOC annually are successfully conciliated or
mediated).
297. See Selmi, supra note 267, at 3 (noting that some cases would be "settled favorably for the
plaintiffs" without litigation even in the absence of agency involvement). A puzzle here is
why EEOC charge processing and conciliation facilitates settlement at all given that the
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malpractice screening panels, EEOC charge processing likely acts as a claimant-
subsidizing magnet, drawing some claims into the system that might not
surface otherwise, some of which then go on to yield lawsuits.298 As a result,
the abolition of EEOC charge resolution will place at least some downward,
and possibly offsetting, pressure on district court filings.299 As a final note
here, it bears emphasis that abolishing EEOC charge processing does not scrub
the system of all merits-based gatekeeping. Rather, it shifts that responsibility
to the plaintiffs' employment bar. At the dawn of the Title VII regime, this was
unthinkable, as the number of plaintiff-side employment lawyers (or other
lawyers, especially African-Americans with links to civil rights groups, able and
willing to serve in that role) was quite limited, particularly in the South.3oo But
EEOC lacks a credible threat of joining or independently pursuing more than a trivial
number of enforcement actions.
298. See supra notes 173-174, 268-269 and accompanying text.
299. See Selmi, supra note 267, at 53 (noting that not all charges filed in the current regime
"would be transformed into lawsuits" upon the abolition of EEOC charge processing).
3oo. A precise accounting of the state of the black and plaintiff-side employment bar at the time
of Title Vll's enactment is hard to come by. But the immaturity of the plaintiffs'
employment bar seems certain given the prevalence of at-will employment in American law
at the time and the fact that those states that enacted state-level fair employment laws
between 1945 and 1964 mostly created administrative regimes to enforce them, thus offering
only limited litigation opportunities around which entrepreneurial plaintiffs' counsel could
gather. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan, The Public Policy Exception to the Employment at Will
Rule Comes ofAge: A Proposed Framework for Analysis, 29 AM. Bus. L.J. 481, 483-84 (1991)
(noting the prevalence of the strict at-will doctrine in most states until the 1970S or 1980s);
Engstrom, supra note 25, at 1081-82 (noting the administrative enforcement approach of
most state fair-employment laws passed in the pre-Title-VII period). One can also infer a
lack of private counsel willing to bring suits at the dawn of Title VII implementation -
whether among black lawyers or the plaintiffs' bar-from the fact that much of the first
wave of Title VII suits came from civil rights groups, particularly the NAACP (whether its
national office or local branches) or its legal arm, the Legal Defense Fund. See JACK
GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: LEGAL BATTLES OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
443-62 (2004) (offering a detailed overview of early Title VII implementation and the
centrality of the LDF in bringing it); see also JUDITH STEIN, RUNNING STEEL, RUNNING
AMEIUCA: RACE, ECONOMIC POLICY, AND THE DECLINE OF LIBERALISM 169-77 (1998)
(describing the centrality of the NAACP and LDF in wide-scale litigation efforts against the
steel industry in the late 1960s and early 1970s). To be sure, this state of affairs would
quickly change. By 1966, the leadership of the Associated Trial Lawyers of America had
recognized that civil rights suits could provide large paydays and was urging the
organization's members to bring at least one civil rights suit. See Engstrom, supra note 25, at
1143. And the period following Title VII's passage saw steady growth in case filings, from
fewer than 350 in 1970 to some 9,000 by 1983, suggesting the rapid expansion among the
ranks of private lawyers willing to bring such claims. See PAUL FRYMER, BLACK AND BLUE:
AFRICAN AMERICANS, THE LABOR MOVEMENT, AND THE DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY
83, 88 (2008); John J. Donohue & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
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today, the plaintiffs' employment bar is well-capitalized financially and
intellectually, and already serves a critical case-screening function separate
from EEOC charge processing.3 o'
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 985-86 (1991). But taken together, the above
evidence makes it safe to conclude that the private plaintiff-side employment bar was, at the
time of Title VII's enactment, at best embryonic.
301. To be sure, some commentators have suggested that Title VII implementation has been
hampered by the lack of a well-developed plaintiffs' employment bar. See, e.g., Stephen C.
Yeazell, Brown, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Silent Litigation Revolution, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 1975, 1991-99 (2004) (suggesting, though without accompanying empirical support,
that federal law "has not yet produced a robust plaintiffs' bar in employment
discrimination"). And that bar may have suffered something of a contraction in the 1980s as
a result of narrowing judicial interpretations of Title VII's attorney's fees provision in
particular, leading some commentators to declare it an "endangered species." Ray Terry,
Eliminating the Plaintiffs Attorney in Equal Employment Litigation: A Shakespearian Tragedy, 5
LAB. L. 63, 63 (1989); see also FARHANG, supra note 1, at 191-92, 191 n.115 (noting repeatedly
articulated concerns during congressional debate over the Civil Rights Act of 1991 regarding
the "dearth of competent counsel willing to represent victims of discrimination despite
many meritorious suits" and the need to shore up the "civil rights market" in order to
facilitate litigation of meritorious claims) (quoting S. REP. No. 315, at 33 (1989)). However,
the best evidence suggests that the present-day plaintiffs' employment bar is sufficiently
robust to play a substantial screening role. In particular, it is clear that the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, by making available limited punitive damages and jury trials, generated a surge of
Title VII enforcement activity and concomitant growth of the plaintiffs' employment bar.
See Richard Michael Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division of American Work Law, 28
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 163, 200 (2007) (noting the general view that the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 made Title VII claims "far more attractive to the plaintiffs' bar"); see also Sturm,
supra note 247, at 551 n.342 (citing a sitting EEOC commissioner for the proposition that the
1991 Civil Rights Act, by providing for punitive damages and jury trials, fueled "the creation
of a plaintiffs' employment bar"); Sean Farhang & Douglas Spencer, Economic Incentives
for Attorney Representation in Civil Rights Litigation 16-17 & 47 fig.' (2012) (unpublished
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1882245 (finding an increase in plaintiffs able to
secure representation following the Civil Rights Act of 1991). Today, the National
Employment Lawyers Association, the principal plaintiff-side employment lawyer
organization, boasts more than 3,000 members. See Membership: About NELA, NAT'L EMP'T
LAWYERS Ass'N, http://www.nela.org/NELA/index.cfin?event=showPage&pg= about (last
visited Sept. 1, 2013). It is likewise clear that lawyers play a substantial case-screening role
within the current system. See BLAsi & DOHERTY, supra note 266, at 50 (examining patterns
in the characteristics of the job discrimination claims brought in California state court by
plaintiffs represented by counsel and claims brought by unrepresented plaintiffs that remain
in the state's administrative enforcement regime and finding that the former tend to be
higher-value and more likely to win); Dunlop Commission on the Future of Worker-
Management Relations: Statement on Alternative Dispute Resolution Before the
Department of Labor (Apr. 6, 1994) (testimony of Paul Tobias, head of the National
Employment Lawyers Association) (stating that plaintiff-side employment lawyers turn
down 95 percent of cases that come to them); see also Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte
Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
1i, 143 (2009) (analyzing job discrimination litigation outcomes and concluding that "[i]t is
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Third, critics of the above proposal may object not to the capture risk that
comes with the EEOC's greater political accountability relative to courts, but
rather to the politicization of job discrimination regulation itself. One version
of this critique takes a functionalist form. Thus, one might worry that vesting
the EEOC with expansive gatekeeper powers will cause enforcement levels to
lurch from one extreme to another in tandem with changeovers in partisan
political control, thus defeating private enforcement's salutary role, according
to its champions, as a stable, "failsafe" mode of enforcement.3o2 This, the
argument would go, should be of particular concern because the above
proposal, by effectively transferring the class certification determination to the
EEOC, vests the agency with something akin to soft rulemaking authority in
defining which employer practices constitute actionable discrimination. A
further version of the politicization critique sweeps far more broadly and
objects to the above proposal's prioritization of a politics-based model of
administration over a rights-based model of litigation, either because civil
rights is somehow different from other regulatory areaso 3 or because the
permissible degree of political control over private litigation is (or should be)
shaped by due process or other constitutional values.304
Neither concern, however, makes much headway. To begin, while it is clear
that vesting the EEOC with gatekeeper authority over class and systemic suits
unlikely that employment attorneys fail to substantially screen their cases on the merits").
On the financial and intellectual capitalization of the broader plaintiffs' bar over the post-
war period, see Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-Financing Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 183, 216
(2001).
302. See Coffee, supra note 35, at 227 (advancing the "failsafe" argument); Stephenson, supra note
72, at 1038 (noting that the delegation of enforcement and adjudicatory authority to agencies
is likely to produce greater temporal instability than delegation to courts); see also Matthew
C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53, 55 (2oo8)
(explaining how a moderate amount of "bureaucratic insulation creates ... inertia" that is
preferred by the majority of voters).
303. A version of the civil rights exceptionalist view is implicit in the argument that
antidiscrimination rights should not be subject to any cost-based defense. See, e.g., Mark S.
Brodin, Costs, Profits, and Equal Employment Opportunity, 62 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 318, 320
(1987) (rejecting any cost-based defense, even in disparate impact cases, in favor of an
uncircumscribed antidiscrimination right). But see Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and
Groups, 53 STAN. L. REv. 833, 834 (2001) (critiquing this view); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights
Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 857-58 (1999) (critiquing a
similar tendency to identify "pure" constitutional values apart from the remedial apparatus
that imports cost balancing and gives them real-world effect).
304. This choice between a politics-based model of administration and a rights-based model of
litigation inheres in much public law scholarship but is rarely addressed head-on. For a
recent analysis that views parens patriae actions by state attorneys general through a due
process lens, see Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 17, at 532-35.
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will inject a partisan political cast into job discrimination regulation,os it is less
clear why political variability in job discrimination regulation should not be
seen as a welcome improvement over the current state of affairs. As noted
previously, frontier regulatory questions about which subjective employment
practices constitute actionable job discrimination are deeply normatively
contested.3' Given this, it is not obvious why regulation of such practices
should be more politically insulated than, say, occupational safety,
environmental protection, or-perhaps most analogous of all-labor policy,
where regulatory stringency clearly, if not entirely uncontroversially, varies
across patterns of party control.o 7 In any event, those who hold a civil rights
exceptionalist view or otherwise believe that, unlike other regulatory areas, job
discrimination regulation should not vary with patterns of political control can
take comfort in the fact that the above proposal will leave adjudication
of individual claims, as against class and systemic claims, fully in judicial hands,
without even EEOC charge processing to interfere with a claimant's day
in court.
Further, and though a full rejoinder to the constitutional version of the
politicization critique is beyond the scope of this Article, a preliminary analysis
suggests that the Constitution presents no barriers to vesting agencies with
gatekeeper powers of the sort proposed here. So long as Congress
characterizes - or, in the case of already-existing statutes, recharacterizes - the
underlying right as contingent on agency action, vesting an agency with
305. Past empirical studies of the effect of party control on EEOC outputs leave little doubt on
this score. See, e.g., B. Dan Wood, Does Politics Make a Difference at the EEOC?, 34 Am. J. POL.
SO. 503 (1990) (documenting significant effects of the party holding the presidency on the
percentage of charges resolved and the number of settlements reached by the EEOC).
306. See supra notes 247-249 and accompanying text.
307. See Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile:
Problems with Its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DuKE L.J. 2013, 2015
(2009) ("[The NLRB] has oscillated between extremes with every change of controlling
political party . .. ."); Moe, supra note 192, at io8 (finding that a statistically significant
amount of the variance in decisions of the National Labor Relations Board over time can be
explained by political conditions); cf Edelman, supra note 82 (surveying the sociology
literature on the organizational response to civil rights laws). Similarly, an EEOC that falls
into deregulatory partisan hands will degrade enforcement vigor even after the agency
returns to pro-regulatory partisan hands by reducing the overall investment the plaintiffs'
employment bar makes in regime-specific enforcement capacity, including litigation
expertise and an infrastructure for identifying and retaining clients. See Engstrom, supra
note 46, at 1252. Either dynamic will narrow regulatory variation across partisan
changeovers, thereby attenuating the degree of political accountability that is achieved.
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gatekeeper powers does not appear to run afoul of the Due Process Clause,
Article III, or the Seventh Amendment.30s
CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to open up new ways of seeing the role of
administration in the modern American regulatory state by mapping a range of
ways policymakers can vest agencies with litigation "gatekeeper" powers over
private lawsuits in order to rationalize and optimize litigation regimes. The
principal goal has been to provide a common nomenclature and a generalized
set of evaluative tools that are as applicable to environmental protection and
civil rights as they are to antitrust and securities. The analysis has also sought
to bring agency gatekeeping more squarely onto the menu of available
"litigation reforms" and show that gatekeeping may prove a more promising
308. To begin, an agency's exercise of wholesale gatekeeper powers will not trigger due process
concerns at all. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915). The
same result obtains in the retail gatekeeper context, so long as Congress structures the right
to be enforced so as to avoid constitutional problems. More concretely, while a cause of
action can be a protectable property interest sufficient to trigger due process, see Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982), the Court's other due processjurisprudence leaves ample room for Congress to insulate an agency's exercise of retail
gatekeeper authority from constitutional attack by defining (or re-defining, in the case of
already-existing regimes) the right to be enforced to make clear that a private right of action
terminates upon agency takeover of the litigation, see Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,
470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 4o8 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972). Indeed,
Congress's use of such an approach in the ADEA context, as noted previously, passed
muster in the only case to hear a due process challenge to an agency's exercise of gatekeeper
powers over statutory causes of action. See EEOC v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 897 F.2d
1499, 1506-07 (9th Cir. 1990); see also supra note 122 and accompanying text (reproducing
ADEA provisions regarding EEOC gatekeeper powers). Congress can similarly(re-)structure the right to be enforced to avoid Article III's prohibition on vesting an agency
with judicial powers. (Note that Article III concerns are only implicated where a gatekeeper
agency terminates a private enforcement action, since a gatekeeper agency's takeover of a
private enforcement action will still result in adjudication before an Article III court.) In
particular, where Congress makes clear that a would-be plaintiffs right of action is
contingent upon an agency's discretionary preemption or termination, then an agency's
exercise of its gatekeeper authority is unlikely to be viewed as an improper transfer of the
"essential attributes of judicial power" or an adjudication of a "private" right under the
Court's public/private rights rubric. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478
U.S. 833, 848-50 (1986); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
68-69 (1982). Finally, the Court has long held that the constraints imposed by the Seventh
Amendment analysis are coterminous with those imposed by Article III, see Granfinanceria,
S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 53 (1989), suggesting that jury rights will play no
independent role in the above analysis.
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reform avenue than conventional tort-reform-like measures centered around
damages caps, attorney fee shifts, or pleading standards. A final aim has been
to model how gatekeeping might be deployed in specific regulatory contexts by
using gatekeeper ideas to rethink and refashion American job discrimination
regulation.
Going forward, two types of inquiry are in order, one theoretical and the
other empirical. On the theoretical side, we need better theories to understand
what the ideal agency gatekeeper role should be in a world of coordinated
public-private enforcement, and also how particular institutional designs
might best facilitate that role. On the empirical side, we need more micro-
institutional analyses targeting specific regulatory contexts that can help us
gauge how and when agency gatekeeping works, or does not work, on the
ground. Offering a synthetic accounting of the agency gatekeeper concept, this
Article can hopefully stimulate scholarly work in both directions.
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